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ABSTRACT
Experience is the source of empirical knowledge. Does this require that experience itself be
knowledge? My answer to the question is affirmative. Experience, in so far as it is the
source of empirical knowledge, has to be itself knowledge. Following the traditional
understanding of knowledge, this means that experience as the source of knowledge is a
kind of justified true belief. This I call the gnostic conception of experience, or gnosticism
for short. The aim of the thesis is to argue for gnosticism. The thesis consists of nine
chapters.
Chapter 1 proposes gnosticism and examines some historical traditions from the
gnosticistpointofview.
Chapter 2 defends a version of traditional understanding of knowledge on which
gnosticismisbased.
Chapter 3 rejects nongnosticism by arguing against nonconceptualism. It is argued that
nonconceptual experience cannot play a justificatory role for thought, since there is no
systematicrelationbetweennonconceptualexperienceandthought.
Chapter 4 rejects quasi-gnosticism by arguing against conceptualism. Based on the
doxastic criterion of justification, the chapter challenges the justificatory role of nondoxatic
conceptualexperience.
Chapter 5 explores the relationship between experience and concept and argues that
experienceandconceptareconstitutiveofeachother.
Chapter 6 proposes and argues for doxasticism which says that experience is belief about
theworld.
Chapter 7 defends doxasticism against the disbelief objection which says we do not
always believewhat weexperience.
Chapter 8 argues that the voluntariness of belief does not undermine doxasticism since
experienceisanactive, rational explorationoftheworld.
With doxasticism established, chapter 9 returns to gnosticism by tackling the problem of
the justification of experience. It is argued that experience can be justified as true without
beinginferentialandisinthissensethefoundationofempiricalknowledge.3
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1.Introduction: TheGnosticConception ofExperience
1.TheEnglishword “experience”has “empeiria”asitsorigininGreek. In thisthesis, Ishall
use the term to denote human sensory experience which can be either perceptual or
nonperceptual. Perceptual experience is experienceofphysical objects, whilenonperceptual
experienceisofsomethingelse.
1
ByknowledgeImean propositionalknowledgethat wecan communicatetoeachother.
That is, I am concerned here with knowing that something is the case (“knowing that”); not
with practical knowledge concerning how to do something (“knowing how”). We may
distinguish two kinds of propositional knowledge, that is, knowledge of necessity and
knowledgeofcontingency. In this thesis Ishall confinemyselfto knowledgeofcontingency,
which Ialso call empirical knowledge, that is, knowledge about the world around us, which
includesushumanbeingswithinit.
Empirical knowledge, in contrast to knowledge a priori, is dependent on experience.
Or, we may say, experience is the source of empirical knowledge. Does this require that
experience itself be knowledge? Myanswer to the question is affirmative. Experience, in so
far as it is the source of empirical knowledge, has to be itself knowledge. This I call the
gnosticconceptionofexperience,orgnosticismforshort.
There are two points to note. First, gnosticism does not mean to say that we should
identifyknowledge with experience, an ideathat has been correctlycriticised byPlato in his
Theaetetus. Plato denies that we should define knowledge in terms of perception. The
reason is that, on the one hand, not all perceptions are knowledge (there are cases of
misperceiving), and on the other hand, there is knowledge other than perception, say,
memory(Plato 1997a, 164b) and inferential knowledge. Gnosticism would agree with Plato
in both regards. On the one hand, gnosticism is a conditional. It says that in so far as
experience is the source of knowledge, it is itself knowledge. Hence the fallibility of
experience does not itself threaten gnosticism as long as we agree that there are true
experiences and only true experiences are the source of empirical knowledge. On the other
hand, gnosticism would agree that experience is not the only species of knowledge. For
gnosticism, experience is a species of knowledge which provides the foundation for other
speciesofknowledge.Memoryandinferentialknowledgearebothbasedonexperience.
Second, to say experience is knowledge is not to say one’s knowledge can transcend
one’s conceptual capacities. The idea, again, can be found in Plato’s Theaetetus. Plato
considers one challenge to the idea that perception is knowledge. When we hear people
1 Ileaveitopenwhetherthissomethingelseisamentalobject.Adetaileddiscussionofthisisinchapter6,§2.6
speaking a foreign language which we have not learned, we hear the sound of their voices
whentheyspeakwithoutknowingwhattheyaresaying.Similarly, supposewedonotknow
our letters, we see them when we look at them without knowing them (1997a, 163b). To
this challenge, Plato allows a reasonable reply. That is, “we know just that in them which
we see and hear. We both see and know the shape and the colour of the letters; and with the
spoken words we both hear and know the rise and fall of the voice. But what schoolmasters
and interpreters tell us about, we don’t perceive by seeing and hearing, and we don’t know
either” (1997, 163b-c). In this way, Plato allows that what wedo not see and hearwe do not
know either. And for this reason, the example does not show that experience is not
knowledge. It only shows what kind of knowledge we may have by having experience
dependsonwhatwealreadyknow.
Thepoint of gnosticism is that wenot onlyget knowledgethrough experience, but also
base knowledge on experience which is itself knowledge. Knowledge has to have a sound
foundation. The foundation of knowledge has to be its most solid part. Given this, anyone
who wishes to insist that experience is the foundation of knowledge has to agree experience
is itself knowledge. Hence gnosticism is a combination of the empiricist commitment that
knowledge comes from experience and the rationalist insight that knowledge can only be
derivedfromknowledge.
2. Gnosticism is very congenial to the perceptual model of knowledge we find in early
ancient Greeks. The ancient Greeks more or less identify knowledge with experience, and
especially with visual experience. One of the most common verbs in ancient Greek for
saying “I know”, for example, is oida, which means “I have seen”. Hence, for ancient
Greeks, what one knows is actually what one has seen. But this perceptual model of
knowledge seems to fail to take root in ancient Greek philosophy owing to an apparent
obsessionwithknowledgeofnecessity.
Greek philosophy is perfectly prepared to think that reality may be entirely different
from what we ordinarily take it to be and it is this hidden reality which interests the ancient
Greeks most and is taken as the real object of knowledge. This reality, nevertheless, is not
something we human beings could possibly see. And if we stay with the perceptual model
of knowledge, then it seems that we have to accept that we human beings simply have no
knowledge at all. Hence according to Xenophanes, only the greatest god has knowledge of
the truth of the universe which is one and changeless. For Xenophanes, we human beings
simply have no knowledge; what we can do is just to “Let these things be believed as
approximationstothetruth”(Waterfield2000,p.30, F17).
The whole history of western philosophy is in a sense a struggle to fight this version of
scepticism. And the typical solution is to give up the perceptual model of knowledge and7
turn to something else. If we cannot see the reality, we may well be able to know the reality
viaadifferentroute,thatis,through reason.
This is the idea we find in Parmenides and Melissus. Parmenides identifies thinking
with “being” straightaway. He claims that it is the same to think and to be, and the plurality
of ordinary empirical objects is just an illusion. Melissus, too, turned his ontological
conclusionsagainstthesenseand arguesthat senseobjectsareillusory. In likemanner,Plato
insists “a man should make all haste to escape from earth to heaven; and escape means
becoming as like God as possible; and a man becomes like God when he becomes just and
pure, with understanding” (1997a, 176b). Similarly, for Aristotle, “knowledge is of
universals” (1984, 1086b33). This means that there can be no demonstrative knowledge,
which strictly speaking means no knowledge at all, of particulars (1984, 75b22-36).
Aristotle thus makes a distinction between experience and art, according to which
“experience is knowledge of individuals, art of universals” and “knowledge and
understanding belong to art rather than to experience” (1984, 981a). For Aristotle, the
differencebetween artists and men of experienceis that “the formerknow the cause, but the
latterdonot”(1984,981a,seealso981b-982a).
We see the main reason that the perceptual model of knowledge loses favour with
Greek philosophers is that the dominant rigorous criterion of knowledge excludes
knowledge of particulars. This rigorous criterion of knowledge is not anymore popular in
contemporaryphilosophyand is certainlynot thewayIunderstand knowledgeinthis thesis.
For this reason, there is a good chance that some Greek philosophers can still be considered
gnosticistsdespitetheirexplicitclaimthatexperienceisnotknowledge.
Democritus, for example, recognizes that we may have knowledge of ordinary things,
though he accords it low status. He distinguishes two forms of knowledge: one genuine, the
other bastard. According to this distinction, “To the bastard kind belong all the following:
sight, hearing, smell, taste, touch. But the other kind is genuine and is far removed from the
bastard kind” (Waterfield 2000, p.176). Democritus seems to hold the view that experience
isknowledgeofparticulars.
Likewise, Plato should not be considered a nongnosticist for the simple reason that he
adopts a rigorous criterion of knowledge. Plato nevertheless has a further reason to deny
experience is knowledge, namely, the separation of experience and reason. Plato seems to
draw a sharp distinction between experience and reason. According to him, experience is
essentially devoid of reason which is essential for knowledge. For Plato, human beings and
animals share a kind of sensory capacities he either calls experience or perception. And the
onlydifferencebetween human beings and animals is that wedo calculations while animals
do not. According to him, experiences are what “reach the soul through the body” and they
are “some things which all creatures, men and animals alike, are naturally able to perceive
as soon as they are born”, while reason and calculations are “the result of a long and8
arduous development, involving a good deal of trouble and education” (1997a, 186c). And
knowledge, for Plato, is to be found in reason: “knowledge is to be found not in the
experiences but in the process of reasoning about them; it is here, seemingly, not in the
experiences, that it is possible to grasp being and truth” (1997, 186d). Hence, concludes
Plato, “perception and knowledge could never be the same thing” (1997, 186e). Experience
isdevoidofunderstanding,and hencecannotbegnostic.
Plato, however, is only a pseudo-nongnosticist. In Plato, the separation of experience
and reason or concept is only a matter of analysis, not a matter of fact. For Plato, reason, in
effect, always resides in experience and makes experience gnostic. This is whyPlato has no
difficulty in claiming what an eye-witness has is knowledge, although distinguishes this
from saying that perception is knowledge (1997, 201b-c). According to Plato, it is more
correct to say that the eyes are that “through which we see” than that they are “with which
we see” (1997, 184c). The idea is that we see with the faculty of reason. This is exactly
what I mean by saying experience is gnostic. Hence despite his explicit claim that
perceptionisnotknowledge, wemaystillhavegoodreasonstoconsiderPlatoagnosticist.
The gnosticist idea is more certain in Aristotle. Aristotle makes a clear distinction
between human experience and animal perception. For him, experience is considered a
capacity developed from perception which we share with other species of animals.
According to Aristotle, perception is “a connate discriminatory capacity” which all animals
share while experience is what we gain via memory” (1984, 99b35-100a9; see also
980b26-981a1). In fact, for Aristotle, experience is not only retention of percepts, but also
“to have an account from the retention of such things” (1984, 99b35-100a2).
2 Although
according to his rigorous criterion of knowledge, he would not consider knowledge of
particulars as knowledge, he agrees that to experience is to make judgment and have
knowledge about particulars.
3 For this reason Aristotle says experience “seems to be very
similar to science and art”. In fact, for Aristotle, “science and art come to men through
experience; for “experience made art” (1984, 981a-5). Aristotle is thus a well-qualified
gnosticist.
Allowing knowledge of particulars to be knowledge, we can now conclude that
Aristotleisawell-qualified gnosticist.Wecan even allowPlatotobea gnosticist,withsome
qualification. The reason is that, for both of them, there is understanding in experience,
although,inthecaseofPlato,understandingisanalyticallyseparated fromexperience.
3. The rigorous conception of knowledge in ancient Greek philosophy leads to a kind of
2 For this reason, Everson says in Aristotle, “emperia is much closer to ‘concept’ than to ‘experience’, by which it is
standardlytranslated”(Everson1997,p.227).
3 Burnyeat thus suggests that it would be less misleading to translated episteme as “understanding” rather than knowledge.
ThiswouldallowustointerpretAristotleasallowingforawiderangeofdifferentkindsofknowledge(1981).9
extremescepticismattheverybeginningofHellenisticphilosophy.
Hellenistic philosophy starts from early Pyrrhonism. According to Diogenes Laertius,
Pyrrho introduces the form of philosophy “which consists in non-cognition and suspension
of judgement”. Pyrrho “would maintain that nothingis honourable or base, or justorunjust,
and that likewise in all cases nothing exists in truth; and that convention and habit are the
basis of everything that men do; for each thing is no more this than that” (Long & Sedley
1987, p. 13). Later Pyrrhonists “affirm the appearance, without also affirming that it is of
such akind”. They“perceivethat fireburns”; but they“suspend judgement about whetherit
has an inflammable nature”. “Our resistance (so they say) is confined to the non-evident
accompaniments of appearances”. Hence the Pyrrhonist scepticism is about the way things
really are, not their appearances. Thus in his writings on Sensations Timon says: “That
honeyissweet Idonotaffirm,but Iagreethatitappearsso”(ibid.).
Citing Timon, Aristocles describes Pyrrho as declaring that “neither our sensations nor
our opinions tell us truths or falsehood” (ibid., p. 15, F4). It is important to note that this
Pyrrhonist scepticism has abasein its metaphysics. As Long and Sedleypoint out correctly,
for Pyrrhonists, the cognitive incompetence is not due to a weakness in our faculty, but to
how things arebynature, namely, the “indifferent, immeasurableand inarbitrable”nature of
things (ibid., F3).
4 Pyrrho thus holds a stronger version of scepticism. It is not that we
cannot know the truth of the world, but that there is no truth of the world to be known.
Hence the reason why “we should not put our trust in” our sensations or opinions is not that
sensations oropinionsmaytell us falsehood, but that thereis no truth orfalsehood to betold
about the world. For this reason “we should be unopinionated, uncommitted and
unwavering, saying concerning each individual thingthat it no moreis than is not, orit both
isandisnot,oritneitherisnorisnot”(ibid.,F4).
5
An initial Epicurean response to the Pyrrhonist scepticism is that “if someone thinks
that nothing is known, one thing he doesn’t know is whether that can be known, since he
admits to knowing nothing” (ibid., p. 78). Strictly speaking, this response is not relevant.
The point of Pyrrhonist scepticism is that there is nothing to be known, not that we cannot
know what is there to be known. Epicurus may revise his response by saying that a
Pyrrhonist cannot know whether or not there is anything to be known. But interestingly, the
Pyrrhonist scepticism is based on something certain. A Pyrrhonist claims that there is
nothing to be known in reality, not that nothing can be known. The challenge is not a
challengetoourcognitivecapacity,butachallengebasedon ametaphysicalclaim.
The real Epicurean response to Pyrrhonist scepticism, however, is based on the idea
that “the preconception of true has its origin in the senses, and that the senses cannot be
refuted” (ibid.). According to Epicureans, neither can the senses be contradicted by reason,
4 ThisechoesHeraclitus’sclaimthatthethingitselfischangeless,althoughitissensedasbeinginconstantchange.
5 Theworld’sindeterminability,inPyrrho,islinkedtothedesirabilityofequanimity.Butweshallnotdigresstothishere.10
nor can thesenses “convict each other”, northesenses “beableto confutethemselves, since
all will always have to be considered of equal reliability”. Hence, the striking conclusion:
“whateverimpressionthesenses getat anytimeistrue”(ibid.,p.78-79)
6.
It seems that everything the Epicureans say about the senses is wrong. First, the senses
can certainly be contradicted by reason. If you see two Gordon Browns in a conference
room, you evidently need to investigate further. Second, the senses do convict each other.
You may hear a noise as being of a car and later see that this is really the case. Thirdly, the
sensesdo refutethemselves fortheveryreason thattheyarenot ofequal reliability. Viewing
an object close-by is obviously more reliable than viewing it from far away. Hence the
Epicureanconclusioniswrong:notalltheimpressionsthesenses get aretrue.
However, when the Epicureans say all the sensory impressions are true, they mean
theyaretrueasfacts:“ourseeingand hearingarefacts,just ashavingapainis”(ibid.,p. 79).
For Epicurus, “The peculiar function of sensation is to apprehend only that which is present
to it and moves it, such as colour, not to make the distinction that the object here is a
different one from the object there” (ibid., p. 81). Hence “The eyes cannot discover the
nature of things. So do not trump up this charge against the eyes, for a fault which belongs
to the mind”. We should thus “distinguish opinion from self-evident” (ibid., p. 82). And,
opinions, according to Epicurus, are true or false, “since they are judgements which we
make on the basis of our impressions, and we judge some things correctly, but some
incorrectly, either by adding and appending something to our impressions or by subtracting
somethingfromthem,andin general falsifyingirrationalsensation”(ibid.,p.81).
If this is what the Epicureans mean by stating that all impressions are true, then it
cannot be a response to the Pyrrhonist scepticism. Since all it says is that experience as
experience is true, neither that there is truth in the world, nor that we can know the truth of
theworld,ifthereistruthintheworldatall.
The Epicurean understanding of the senses may nevertheless give the impression that
Epicurus is a gnosticist. But Epicurus is only a pseudo-gnosticist. Epicurus does claim that
sensations, along with preconceptions and feelings, “are the criteria of truth” (ibid., p. 87).
But how can the senses be the criteria of truth if they are not concerned with the truth of the
world? When Epicurus says experience is always true, what he has in mind is experience
without judgment about the world. For this reason, experience is only true as experience.
For Epicurus, sensation is immune to the influence of memory, reason and other sensations
and is hence “irrational”. All this differs from gnosticism in that, for gnosticism, experience
is knowledge exactly because it is rational. Gnostic experience is rational in that it
presupposes all the memory, reason, and other experiences. Gnostic experience is
knowledgeoftheworld,notknowledgeofexperience.
6 ThisviewisrecentlyadvocatedbyGuptawhoclaimsthatexperienceisalwaysreliableand“Thefault,ifany,lieswithme
andmybeliefs—beliefsforwhichIamresponsible”(2006,p.29).11
Hence, for experience to be a candidate for knowledge, it has to be able to be true or
false. This is the idea we find in the Stoics. For the Stoics, impressions of rational animals
are essentially rational, which means that they are “thought processes” (ibid., p. 237). Many
sources suggest that the Stoics consider the senses as judgemental. According to the Stoics,
“When we were explaining the power which exists in the senses, it was simultaneously
made clear that many things are grasped and cognized by the senses; and this cannot take
place without assent”. For the Stoics, “an animal must either have sense-perception
removed from itself or it must be granted that kind of assent which lies in our power”. “It is
no more possible for a living creature to refrain from assenting to something self-evident
than for it to fail to pursue what appears appropriate to its nature” (ibid., p. 248). The Stoics
thus propose a qualified identity of the mind and the senses: “For the mind, which is the
sourceofthesenses and is even itselfidentical to thesenses, has anatural powerit directs at
the things by which it is moved” (Cicero 2006, 2.30). This is paralleled by the unnamed
dogmatists in Sextus who claim that the same faculty is in one respect that of thought and
anotherthatofsensoryexperience.
Sensory impressions can thus be true or false. The Stoics then distinguish two kinds of
impression, one cognitive, the other noncognitive. According to the Stoics, “Some sensory
impressions arise from what is, and are accompanied by yielding and assent. But
impressions also include appearances which are quasi-products of what is” (ibid. p. 237).
Hence for the Stoics, “Of all impressions, some are cognitive, others not”. And “the
impression arising from what is” is called the cognitive impression and is thus considered
“thecriterionoftruth”(ibid.,p.241).
Accordingto Sextus Empiricus, “TheStoics saytherearethreethings which arelinked
together, scientific knowledge [episteme], opinion [doxa], and cognition [katalepsis]
stationed between them. Scientific knowledge is cognition which is secure and firm and
unchangeable by reason. Opinion is weak and false assent. Cognition in between these is
assentbelongingto acognitiveimpression;andacognitiveimpression,so theyclaim,isone
whichistrueandofsuch akindthatitcouldnotturnoutfalse”(ibid.,254).
The picture seems to be this. Scientific knowledge is knowledge of necessity.
Cognitive impressions are thus very much like what we call today knowledge of particulars
and are the sources of inferential knowledge. Thus, “expertise is a tenor which advances
methodically with impressions” (ibid., p. 259). For this reason the Stoics are well-qualified
gnosticists.
4. Like Greek philosophers, modern philosophers are also fascinated by knowledge of
necessity. Rationalists share a belief that it is possible, by the use of reason, to gain a12
superior kind of knowledge to that derived from the senses.
7 Descartes sees it as one of the
first steps in metaphysics to “lead the mind away from the senses” (1985, p. 9). He believes
that our inborn “natural light” or “light of reason” would enable us to “penetrate the secrets
of the most recondite sciences” (1985, p. 400). Spinoza, for his part, considers “knowledge
from random experience” perceptions that are “mutilated, confused, and without order for
the intellect” (1985/1988, p. 477). According to Spinoza, “It is of the nature of reason to
perceive things truly, viz. as they are in themselves, i.e., not as contingent but as necessary”
(1985/1988, p. 480). Leibniz, too, embraces the notion of an innate “natural light” of reason
which, he argues, enables us to know “necessary truths”. According to him, “the senses can
indeed help us after a fashion to know what is, but they cannot help us to know what must
beorwhatcannotbeotherwise”(1969,p.550).
The fascination with knowledge of necessity does not itself disqualify rationalists from
being gnosticists. There is a chance that Descartes agrees experience is knowledge, if he
considersexperienceascognitive.
On the face of it, Descartes may seem to deny that experience involves judgement.
According to Descartes, “the perception Ihaveof[an object] is a casenot ofvision ortouch
or imagination…but of purely mental scrutiny” (1996, p. 21). For this reason, knowledge
does not come “from what the eye sees”, but “from the scrutinyof themind alone”(1996, p.
21). For Descartes, “even bodies are not strictly perceived by the senses or the faculty of
imagination but by the intellect alone, and that this perception derives not from their being
touched or seen but from their being understood” (1996, p. 22). Hence “something which I
thought I was seeing with my eyes is in fact grasped solely by the faculty of judgement
whichisinmymind”(1996,p.21).
But again, as it is the casein Plato, theseparation of sensoryexperience and reason is a
matter of analysis, not a matter of fact. Concerning imagination and sensory perception,
Descartes remarks: “I cannot…understand these faculties without me, that is, without an
intellectual substance to inhere in…there is an intellectual act included in their essential
definition” (1996, p. 54). According to Descartes, “there is in me a passive faculty of
sensory perception, that is, a faculty for receiving and recognizing the ideas of sensible
objects; but I could not make use of it unless there was also an active faculty…which
produced or brought about these ideas” (1996, p. 55). And it later turns out, that the active
faculty is in the “corporeal things” that produce the ideas in me (1996, p. 55). We may then
thinkthatthereisachancethatDescartesisagnosticist.
There is, nevertheless, one thing in Descartes which disqualifies him from being a
gnosticist. Despite insisting that there is an intellectual act included in the essential
definition of imagination and sensory perception, Descartes denies that sensory perception
7 ItisneverthelesswrongtothinkofDescartes,Spinoza,andLeibnizaspure“apriorists”whotrytodispensewithsensory
experienceentirely.13
really involves judgement about the world. There are two reasons for this. First, for
Descartes, sensory perception as a species of understanding does not involve judgement.
Descartes brings all “the modes of thinking that we experience within ourselves” under two
general headings: perception and volition. According to Descartes, perception is “the
operation of the intellect”, which includes “sensory perception, imagination and pure
understanding”, while volition is “the operation of the will” which includes “desire,
aversion, assertion, denial and doubt” (1985, p. 204). As Descartes understands it, the
operation of the intellect itself does not make a judgement. Neither sensory perception nor
pure understanding is itself a judgement. According to Descartes, belief is assent to
perceptions,andassenttoperceptionsandhencemakingajudgementistheactofthewill.
Secondly, for Descartes, perception is a species of thinking only in the sense that it is
not about the truth of the world. According to Descartes, “I certainly seem to see, to hear,
and to be warmed. This cannot be false; what is called ‘having a sensory perception’ is
strictly just this, and in this restricted sense of the term it is simply thinking” (1996, p. 19).
Descartes thus admonishes us to take experience as it is, not to believe that the world is
really as we experience it. This then creates a gap between us and the world. Descartes is
not saying that we do not usually believe what we experience. He actually observes that we
veryfrequentlytakewhat weexperienceas thewaytheworld is. Hispoint is that weshould
notbelievewhatweexperience.
Hence, for Descartes, experience is not belief and we should take it that the world is as
we experience it. Thus the conception of experience as a mode of thinking only makes
Descartesqualifyasaquasi-gnosticist.
UnlikeDescartes, Leibnizand Spinozadonotthinkthatthelightofreasoninanysense
resides in experience. Leibniz considers us to differ from animals only insofar as we are
capable of a priori knowledge, rather than empirical knowledge. Empirical knowledge is
something he feels that even animals are capable of attaining, at least to some degree.
8 For
he holds that empirical knowledgeis basicallyamatter of memory, which animals have. He
therefore states: “Men act like animals in so far as the succession of their perceptions is
brought about by the principle of memory….In fact, we are mere empiricists in three
quarters of all our actions” (1965, p. 152). From which it follows that, to the extent that we
are mere empiricists, we are essentially no better than mere animals. Spinoza holds a view
similarto Leibniz.Henceboth LeibnizandSpinozashouldbeconsiderednongnosticists.
5. The fascination with knowledge of necessitycan also be found in empiricists. For Locke,
only intuitive and demonstrative knowledge which are concerned with necessary truth are
8 ThisismoreradicalthanLocke.AlthoughLockebelievesanimalsperceive,itdoesnotfollowforhimthattheyarecapable
ofknowledge.14
clear and certain (1975, p. 531; p. 537-8). Sensitive knowledge, according to Locke, goes
“beyond bare probability” and yet does not reach perfectly to the degrees of certainty of
eitherintuitiveknowledgeordemonstrativeknowledge”(1975, p. 537). Hencewhile Locke
holds that perception is “the first step and degreetowards knowledge, and the inlet of all the
materialsofit”,hedoesnotthinkperceptionitselfactuallyconstituteknowledge,not atleast
of any very interesting sort (1975, p. 149). Similarly, for Hume, “the only objects of the
abstract sciences or of demonstration are quantity and number, and that all attempts to
extend this more perfect species of knowledge beyond these bounds are mere sophistry and
illusion”. Hence “the sciences of quantity and number…may safely…be pronounced the
onlyproperobjectsofknowledgeanddemonstration”(1999,p.209).
The fascination with knowledge of necessity, again, does not itself disqualify
empiricists from being gnosticists. The first step that leads empiricists away from
gnosticism is the familiar Cartesian scepticism about the senses. The Cartesian
admonishment that we should not believe what we experience is crystallized in empiricism
by introducing ideas or impressions as the direct objects of experience.
9 Locke insists
observation supplies our understanding with all the materials of thinking”. But what he
means by “observation” is something “either about external, sensible objects; or about the
internal Operations of our Minds, perceived and reflected on by our selves” (1975, p. 104).
And when he does talk about observations about external, sensible objects, he insists what
we perceive directly is idea instead of the external world. Hence, according to him, “’Tis
evident, the Mind knows not Things immediately, but only by the intervention of the ideas
it has of them” (1975, p. 563; cf., e.g., Descartes, Third Meditation). Thus although he
insists that we do have “knowledge…of the existence of particular external Objects”, he
actuallythinks that we can only infer the existence of the external world, but never perceive
theworlddirectly(1975,p.537-8).
Berkeley follows Locke in saying that what we perceive directly are ideas instead of
the external world. He thus plainly denies we can have empirical knowledge of any kind.
According to Berkeley, “as it is impossible for me to see or feel anything without an actual
sensation of that thing, so it is impossible for me to conceive in my thoughts any sensible
thingorobject distinct from thesensation or perception ofit” (1982, p. 25). In Berkeley, the
empiricist idea leads directly to his rejection of the view that there is such a thing as
“matter” or a material substratum underlying and giving rise to our various perceptions.
Thisistolosetheworldcompletely.
Hume, too, follows Locke in believing what we perceive directly are impressions. He
claims that the common sense view which supposes that “the very images, presented by the
9 The understanding that what we perceive are ideas not the world is already found in Descartes. He writes: “from the fact
that I perceive by my senses a great variety of colours, sounds, smells and tastes, as well as differences in heat, hardness and
thelike, I amcorrect ininferringthatthebodieswhich arethesourceofthesevarioussensoryperceptionspossessdifferences
correspondingtothem,thoughperhapsnotresemblingthem(1996,p.56).15
senses,tobetheexternal objects”ismistaken. And“nothingcaneverbepresenttothemind
but an image or perception, and that the senses are only the inlets, through which these
images areconveyed, without being ableto produce anyimmediateintercoursebetween the
mind and the object” (1999, 12.1, p. 201). For Hume, “every thing, which appears to the
mind, is nothing but a perception, and is interrupted, and dependent on the mind” (2000,
1.4.2, p. 129). The reason for this, according to Hume, is that our perception of an object
may vary while the object itself remains the same. Hence what we perceive must be
something other than the objects, namely, their impressions which are “internal and
perishing existences” (1999, pp. 151-2). Thus, Hume claims, “no man, who reflects, ever
doubted that the existences, which we consider, when we say, this house and that tree, are
nothing but perceptions in the mind, and fleeting copies or representations of other
existences, which remain uniform and independent”. This leads him to scepticism
concerning our knowledge of “real existence and matter of fact” (1999, p. 108). If all
reasonings concerning matter of fact is founded on the relation of cause and effect, which is
onlydiscoverablebyexperience, and experiencecan onlygiveappearance, which is distinct
from the real object, then even knowledgeofparticulars would beimpossible. The reason is
that theconnection between appearances, which is provided byexperience, does not entail a
connectionbetweentherealobjects.
There is also asecond, more crucial, step which makes empiricists nongnosticists. This
is theideathat, as amatterof fact, experienceis devoid ofreason. Despitehis claim that it is
in experience that “all our knowledge is founded, and from that it ultimately derives itself”
(1975, p. 104), Locke is actually even further away from gnosticism than Descartes. The
reason is that the faculty of knowing for Locke is different from the faculty of knowing for
Descartes. For Descartes, the faculty of knowing is a capacity of understanding things in a
certain way, while for Locke, the faculty of knowing is a capacity of receiving materials
passively. Lockelikens human mind to an “emptyCabinet”or“whitepaper”(1975, p. 55, p.
104). Therearethen no innateideas as Descartes proposes. Whileit beingtruethat there are
no innate ideas, the image that the faculty of knowledge is simply an empty container
waitingtobefilledinisnolessproblematic.
Accordingto Descartes, all human beings are endowed with an equallygood facultyof
knowledge. He writes: “the power of judging well and of distinguishing the true from the
false—which is what we properly call ‘good sense’ or ‘reason’—is naturally equal in all
men, and consequently that the diversity of our opinions does not arise because some of us
are more reasonable than others but solely because we direct our thoughts along different
path and do not attend to thesamething”(1985, p. 111). In talking about this natural faculty
of knowledge, Descartes very easily gives the impression that he is advocating the idea of
innateknowledge.Butthisdoesnothavetobethecase.
Descartes does very frequently talks about innate ideas. According to Descartes, to16
secure the foundation of knowledge, we should “make use of the intellect alone, carefully
attendingto theideas implanted in it bynature”(1985, p. 224). However, what hemeans by
innate ideas is still faculty of knowing instead of innate knowledge. Particularly, empirical
knowledge, for Descartes, is not innate. He writes: “there is nothing in our ideas which is
not innate to the mind or the faculty of thinking, with the sole exception of those
circumstances which relateto experience, such as thefact that wejudgethat thisorthat idea
which we now have immediately before our mind refers to a certain thing situated outside
us”(1985,p.304).
For Descartes, innate ideas are more like the concepts we need to obtain knowledge.
According to Descartes, “the very ideas of the motions themselves and of the figures are
innate in us”. Furthermore, “The ideas of pain, colours, sounds and the like must be all the
more innate if, on the occasion of certain corporeal motions, our mind is to be capable of
representing them to itself, for there is no similarities between these ideas and the corporeal
motions”(1985,p.304).
Descartes himself is actually very cautious not to run into the position that holds that
we have innate ideas in the sense that we have innate knowledge. For Descartes, innate
ideas are not something distinct from the faculty of thinking, although he does observe that
there are certain thoughts which neither come from external objects nor determined by the
will, but which come “solely from the power of thinking” (1985, p. 303). He writes: “This
is the same sense as that in which we say that generosity is ‘innate’ in certain families, or
that certain diseases such as gout or stones are innate in others: it is not so much that the
babies of such families suffer from these disease in their mother’s womb, but simply that
they are born with a certain ‘faculty’ or tendency to contract them” (1985, p. 303-304).
Hence for Descartes, innate ideas are not anything other than “a natural power which
enables us to know” (1985, p. 309). Descartes makes it clear that he has never written or
even thought “that such ideas are actual, or that they are some sort of ‘forms’ which are
distinctfromourfacultyofthinking”(1985, p.309).
Admittedly, the idea of innate faculty is still problematic. However, it is important to
appreciate the rationalist insight that we need a proper faculty to take in knowledge. The
faculty of knowledge cannot be a container which passively takes in more and more
materials. Locke sometimes says something very close to this. In his description of the
acquisition of mathematical knowledge, he rightly observed that “A Child knows not that
Three and Four are equal to Seven, till he comes to be able to count to Seven, and has got
the Name and Idea of Equality” (1975, p. 55). A more accurate understanding of the matter
is that achild does not have the capacityto knowthat three and fourare equal to seven until
she is able to count to seven and has knowledge about equality. Hence what is lacking in
Locke is the rationalist insight that the faculty of knowledge has to be equipped with reason
and concepts.17
Now if we want to insist that a well-equipped faculty of knowledge is not innate, we
will have to admit that the faculty of knowledge, just as knowledge, is also acquired.
Children develop their faculties of knowing while developing knowledge. We certainly
develop our capacity of knowing when we get to know more. No one would envisage
teaching a baby advanced mathematics. Rationalists are wrong in saying that we have
innate ideas before encountering the world but right in saying that we need knowledge to
take in knowledge. Empiricists are right in saying that we do not have knowledge before
encountering the world but are wrong in considering our capacity for knowledge as a
passive, static white board ready for later inscription. We only have faculty of knowledge
when we have knowledge; and we develop our faculty of knowledge while developing
knowledge. The faculty of knowledge is a faculty equipped with knowledge. Both
rationalists and empiricists are wrong in thinking that the faculty of knowledge has to be
somethinginnate.
Now, as far as the issue of gnosticism is concerned, the problem for empiricists is that
there is no well-equipped faculty of knowledge, either innate or later developed, in
experience. It is thus impossible for experience to be knowledge. Hence empiricists do not
evenqualifyasquasi-gnosticists, asDescartesdoes.Withthenatural light ofreason residing
in experience, Descartes can at least understand experience as a mode of thinking.
Empiricists, however, without the protection of the natural light of reason, can only have an
experience completely devoid of reason or understanding. The analytical separation of
experience and reason we find in Plato and Descartes now becomes a factual separation.
Experience becomes something in no sense gnostic. For this reason, empiricists are
nongnosticists.
6. Kant clearly affirms the empiricist emphasis on the role experience plays in our
knowledge. For Kant, experience is the source of knowledge: “There can be no doubt that
all our knowledge begins with experience” (1929, B1). Hence, “In the order of time,
therefore, we have no knowledge antecedent to experience, and with experience all our
knowledgebegins (1929,B1).
However, this affirmation is a qualified one: “though all our knowledge begins with
experience, it does not follow that it all arises out of experience’(1929, B1). Kant considers
sensibility (receptivity) and understanding (spontaneity) as two fundamental sources of the
mind from which our knowledge springs. For Kant, “Intuition and concept constitute,
therefore, the elements of all our knowledge, so that neither concepts without an intuition in
someway corresponding to them, nor intuition without concepts, can yield knowledge”
(1929, A50/B74). Hence, for Kant, experience can only be the source of knowledge in the
sense that it is a cooperation of sensibility and understanding. Kant thus rejects the18
empiricist assumption that there can be a purely receptive apprehension of an object,
without any conceptualization. He sees clearly that anything we have in thought must be
firstofallcontainedinexperience.
Furthermore, for Kant, “the only use which the understanding can make of these
concepts is to judge by means of them” (1929, A68/B93). Kant characterizes concepts as
“predicates of possible judgments” (1929, A69/B94). Hence Kant is not just saying that
concept gives experience a structure. What he means is that concepts make it possible for
thesubjectto grasp anobjectbymakingjudgementsabouttheobject.Thiscan beseenfrom
hisdistinctionbetweenjudgementsofperception andjudgementsofexperience:
Empirical judgments, insofar as they have objective validity, are judgments of
experience, those, however, that are only subjectively valid I call mere judgments of
perception. The latter do not require a pure concept of understanding, but only the
logical connection of perceptions in a thinking subject. But the former always demand,
in addition to the representations of sensory intuition, special concepts originally
generated in the understanding, which are precisely what make the judgment of
experienceobjectivelyvalid.(2004,§18)
As Allison points out correctly: “The distinction between judgments of perception and
judgments of experience can be schematically formulated as the contrast between
judgments of the form ‘It seems to me that p’, and those of the form ‘It is the case that p’”.
Hence “The function of the categories is to convert claims of the former sort into the latter”
(1983, p.150).
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For this reason, experience has to be knowledge in the literal sense. Kant claims:
“Experience is an empirical knowledge, that is, a knowledge which determines an object
through perception” (1929, B218/A176). Kant is thus a perfect and explicit gnosticist.
According to Kant, understanding works up “the raw material of the sensible impressions
into that knowledge of objects which is entitled experience” (1929, B218/A176). He thus
claims, “empirical knowledge…is what we entitle experience” (1929, B147). Or,
“experienceisknowledgebymeansofconnectedperceptions”(1929, B161).
8. The aim of the thesis is to explore the Kantian insight and argue for the idea that
experienceisknowledge.
When I say experience is knowledge, I am following the traditional understanding of
10 Chignell, nevertheless, thinks that, in the strict sense, judgement for Kant “plays a role similar to that played by
‘proposition’ in contemporary English-language philosophy. It is the logical object of an attitude…and always has a
subject-predicatestructure”. Hence, heconcludes: “although Kant speakslooselyof“forming” or “making”judgments, what
hereallymeansisformingassentswhichhaveasubject-predicatejudgmentastheirobject”(2007,p.35).19
knowledge which says knowledgeis akind ofjustified truebelief. Hence gnosticism can be
rephrased as the idea that experience, in so far as it is the source of knowledge, is itself
knowledge, namely a kind of justified true belief. The traditional understanding of
knowledge is nevertheless not uncontroversial. The first task of the thesis is then to defend
thetraditionalunderstandingofknowledge.20
2.KnowledgeandJustification
1. Knowledge is essentially true. But knowledge is not to be equated with truth. Knowledge
is our grasp of truth. A typical way for us to grasp truth is to take truth as truth, that is, to
believetruthastruth. Forthisreason,wemaysay, knowledgeistruebelief.
Knowledge should not be true by luck.
11 The truth of knowledge, we may say, is
warranted in a certain way. It is important to note that I am here using the term “warrant” in
aspecialsense.When Isaythetruthofknowledgeiswarranted Imeanitisnot arrived atby
luck, I am not saying that the truth of knowledge is warranted as true. For this reason, I am
using the term “warrant” in a sense different from the term “justification”, which is usually
considered exchangeable with it. When I say knowledge is justified, I mean it is justified as
true, that is, the subject has a reason for taking the truth as true. When I say knowledge is
warranted, Imean it is warranted that thetruth ofknowledgeis not arrived at byluck, that is,
thereisakindofreliabilitybehindthesubject’s graspofthetruth.
A justification of knowledge is, of course, one way of warranting that the truth of
knowledge is not arrived at by luck. As rational animals, we mostly, if not always, hold a
belief for some reasons. By reason, Imean normative reason that provides one’s belief with
a rational base. The reason for holding a belief is then its justification. The justification of a
true belief provides a rational reliability for one’s grasp of truth and is thus a way of
warranting that one’s grasp of truth is not arrived at by luck. We may then say that
knowledgeneedstobewarrantedbyitsjustification.
That justification is a way of distinguishing knowledge from mere true belief or lucky
guessingis verywell recognized by, forexample,Plato. To thequestion “whyknowledgeis
prized far more highly than right opinion and why they are different”, Plato gives the
followinganswer InMeno:
For true opinions, as long as they remain, are a fine thing and all they do is good, but
they are not willing to remain long, and they escape from a man’s mind, so that they
are not worth much until one ties them down by (giving) an account of the reason
why…After they are tied down, in the first place they become knowledge, and then
they remain in place. That is why knowledge is prized higher than correct opinion, and
knowledgediffers fromcorrectopinioninbeingtieddown (1997b,97e-98).
To give“an accountofthereason why” iswhatwecalltoday“to justify”. HencewhatPlato
11 AccordingtoPeterUnger’snon-accidentalityanalysis,SknowsthatpifandonlyifitisnotatallaccidentalthatSisright
aboutitsbeingthecasethatp(1968).21
meansisthatknowledgeneedsjustification.
Knowledge, then, is true belief warranted by justification, namely justified true belief.
This,roughlyspeaking,isthetraditionalconceptionofknowledge.
The traditional conception of knowledge is a way of construing the basic
understanding that knowledge is a grasp of truth that is not arrived at by luck. The basic
understanding contains two principles. The first is “the grasp of truth” principle, the second
“notbyluck”principle.ThisbasicunderstandingofknowledgeItakeasuncontroversial.
However, the traditional conception of knowledge, as a way of construing the basic
understanding, is not wholly uncontroversial. First, it is argued that belief is not the only
wayofgraspingtruth. Henceknowledgedoes not haveto beaspecies ofbelief.Williamson
notably claims that knowledge is unanalysable and we should “abandon the attempt to state
necessaryand sufficient conditions forknowledgein terms of belief” (2000, p. 5).
12 Second,
it is argued that justification is not the only way of warranting that the truth of knowledge is
not arrived at by luck. It can then be argued that justification is not essential to knowledge.
Hence Williamson insists that knowledge occupies a central status in epistemology. He
claims, “Knowledge figures…primarily as what justifies, not as what gets justified” (2000,
p.9).Thismeansthattheessential featureofknowledgeisthatitjustifiesbelief,notthatitis
justified. Williamson complains that in traditional epistemology, “the concept of knowledge
was assumed to be unavailable for use in an elucidation of the concept of justification or
evidence, on pain of circularity” (2000, pp. 8-9). For Williamson, justification is to be
elucidatedintermsofknowledge,nottheotherwayround.
Williamson thus insists that knowledge is not analysable, that is, “the concept know
cannot be analysed into more basic concepts” (2000, p. 33). Particularly, knowledge is not
to be understood in terms of justification or belief. It is, in Williamson’s view, the other way
round: justification and belief are to be understood in terms of knowledge. Justification is
the feature or function of knowledge, while belief is what is justified by knowledge. For
Williamson, belief is not “conceptually prior to knowledge” (2000, p. 10). On the contrary,
knowledge is prior to belief in the order of explanation. In this way knowledge occupies a
conceptual priority in epistemology. We can thus call this alternative conception of
knowledgetheknowledgeprioritythesis.
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A salient feature of the knowledge priority thesis is its emphasis on the separation of
knowledge and belief. This may be traced back to Plato. In his Republic, Plato argues that
knowledge and belief are wholly different, indeed incompatible, powers or states of mind.
This is related to the distinction between the realm of Forms and the world of everyday life.
For Plato, the realm of Forms is organized beneath the Form of the Good and only
12 SeealsoWilliams1973,p.146-147.
13 The idea is couched in broader terms in Hyman by understanding knowledge as “the ability to be guided by the facts”
(2006,p.900).SeealsoHyman1999.22
graspable through reasoning, while the world of everyday life depends upon the realm of
Forms and is revealed by our senses. The world of everyday life is metaphysically and
hencecognitivelydeficient.Accordingly,Platodistinguishestwokindsofpeople,thosewho
know and those who opine (1997c, 476d). Those who know are philosophers; they“in each
caseembracethethingitself”(1997c,480).Thosewhoopine“opineeverythingbuthaveno
knowledgeofanythingtheyopine”(1997c, 479e). HenceforPlato, thosewho knowalways
know, those who opine always opine. This then naturallyseparates knowledge and belief as
different kinds of states or powers. Knowledge is an infallible power while opinion is a
fallible one (1997c, 477e). Hence knowledge and opinion take different things as their
objects. Knowledge and opinion “set over something different”, “the knowable and the
opinablecannotbethesame”(1997c,478b).
Although the sharp distinction between “philosophers” and lay people is no longer
considered plausible,theseparationofbeliefandknowledgesurvives.CookWilsonisa20
th
century advocate of the separation. He writes: “Belief is not knowledge and the man who
knows does not believe at all what he knows; he knows it” (1926, p. 100). This naturally
leads to the idea that knowledge is unanalysable. Cook Wilson thus claims: “We cannot
construct knowing—the act of apprehending—out of any elements” (1926, p. 803). This is
exactlytheideawefindintheknowledgeprioritythesis.
As I said at the beginning of the chapter, belief is a typical way of grasping truth and
justification warrants that the truth of knowledge is not arrived at by luck. Now, if we
follow the knowledge priority thesis and deny that knowledge is a kind of justified true
belief, we may then wonder how we can stay with the basic understanding of knowledge.
First, how can we grasp truth without believing truth as truth? Second, how can we warrant
thatthetruthofknowledgeisnot arrivedatbyluckwithoutour graspoftruthbeingjustified?
I am not saying that these two questions cannot be answered. The point is that these two
questions haveto besatisfactorilyanswered beforeanyalternativeconception ofknowledge
isestablished.
The advocates of the knowledge priority thesis nevertheless find the traditional
conception of knowledge unsatisfactory and thus claim that the knowledge priority thesis is
the only choice. First, Gettier’s counter-examples, if they work, seem to show that the
traditional conception is not sufficient. Second, Radford’s counter-examples seem to show
that the traditional conception is not necessary. Thirdly, the traditional conception, argues
Williamson, simply cannot be right because it involves a hybrid conception of knowledge
whichtakestruth asaseparableexternalconditionforknowledge.
The aim of this chapter is to defend a version of the traditional conception of
knowledge against the above objections. First, Gettier’s challenge can be met if we
understand the traditional conception of knowledge in the right way. Second, Radford’s
counter-examples do not count as knowledge and hence cannot show that the traditional23
conception is not necessary. Thirdly, there is a version of the traditional conception of
knowledge which is in direct contrast to the mistaken hybrid conception of knowledge.
Hence the traditional conception of knowledge is sufficient, necessary, and correct. The
conclusion of the chapter is that we can have a version of the traditional conception of
knowledge without losing the insight of the knowledge priority thesis, namely knowledge
plays aroleinjustification.
2. The traditional conception of knowledge is challenged by Gettier who argues that the
triple condition stated in it, which consists of truth, belief, and justification, does not
“constitute a sufficient condition for the truth of the proposition that S knows that P” (1963,
p. 13). Gettier presents two cases in which the triple condition is satisfied while it is not
correcttosaythatthesubjectpossessesknowledge.
In Gettier’s first case, Smith holds a justified conjunctive belief that “Jones is the man
who will get the job, and Jones has ten coins in his pocket”. Based on this belief, he infers
that “The man who will get the job has ten coins in his pocket”. But unknown to Smith, he
himself, not Jones, will get the job. And also unknown to Smith, he himself has ten coins in
his pocket. Hence Smith’s justified true belief that “The man who will get the job has ten
coins in his pocket” is not knowledge because Smith bases his belief “on a count of the
coins in Jones’s pocket, whom hefalselybelieves to betheman who will get thejob”(1963,
p.14).
In Gettier’s second case, Smith holds a justified belief that “Jones owns a Ford”. And
although heis totallyignorant ofhis friend Brown’swhereabouts,heisjustifiedin believing
it is true that “Either Jones owns a Ford, or Brown is in Barcelona”. As it happens, Jones
does not own a Ford, but is at present driving a rented car. And by the sheerest coincidence,
and entirely unknown to Smith, Brown is in Barcelona. Hence Smith’s justified true belief
that “Either Jones owns a Ford, or Brown is in Barcelona” is not knowledge since Smith
holdsthebeliefforthewrongreason.
In both cases, Smith holds a justified true belief which does not count as knowledge
for the reason that the justified true belief is arrived at by luck. Gettier concludes that this
shows that the triple condition is not sufficient for knowledge and hence justified true belief
isnotknowledge.
Gettier seems to be right in saying that the unqualified triple condition is not sufficient
for knowledge. But we need to be clear about why it is not sufficient and in what sense it
challengesthetraditionalconceptionofknowledge.
What Gettier’s cases really show seems to be that justification cannot warrant that a
true belief is not arrived at by luck. We then need to investigate what is wrong with the
justifications involved in thesetwo cases. It is clearthen in both thesetwo cases atruebelief24
is justified by a justified false belief. Hence the problem with the justification is that the
justifier is a false belief. And knowledge, of course, should not be justified by a false belief.
For a true belief’s being justified by a false belief does not help to warrant that the true
beliefisnotarrivedatbyluck.
The problem, really, is with Gettier’s understanding of the traditional conception of
knowledge. Gettier seems to construes the traditional conception as setting out a triple
condition for knowledge which has its three elements separated from each other. But this is
not a correct understanding of the traditional conception of knowledge. To see the point, we
shallstartwiththeconditionofjustification.
Gettier is certainly right in saying that “it is possible for a person to be justified in
believing a proposition that is in fact false” (1963, p. 13). This means that justification
should not beunderstood as somethingspecial forknowledge. Not onlyknowledge but also
belief may need justification. This is not just to say that there is always a reason for holding
a belief. There is obviously a difference between reason and justification. My reason (that
on which I base my belief) may not justify it. Justification requires a kind of normativity
between the justifier and the justified. In other words, justification involves correct
reasoning. Hence the point is that in many cases, belief, just like knowledge, also needs
justification in that it has to be derived from the justifier through a correct procedure of
reasoning. The only thing is that some beliefs are well justified, while some others are
poorly justified. Hence the difference between knowledge and mere true belief is not
necessarily that the former requires justification while the latter does not. The difference is
that the justification of knowledge is more demanding than the justification of mere true
belief or false belief. In Gettier’s two cases, what Smith has are in fact mere true, albeit
justified, beliefs. Theyaremeretruebeliefs becausetheyarepoorlyjustified, namely, based
onfalsebeliefs.Anditisforthisreasonthattheyarenotknowledge.
The problem is thus with Gettier’s understanding of justification. He seems to make
nodistinctionbetweenthejustificationoffalsebelieformeretruebeliefandthejustification
of knowledge. For Gettier, the justification of knowledge can be exactly the same as the
justification of false belief or mere true belief. For this reason, knowledge and mere true
belief or false belief are understood as sharing the same kind of justification. This obviously
is not the right understanding of the matter. The justification of knowledge is essentially
different from the justification of mere true belief or false belief. As I mentioned above, the
justification of knowledge is more demanding than the justification of belief. Then exactly
how demanding is the justification of knowledge? The first thing we should see is that
knowledge should not be based on a false belief. A false belief can justify either a false
belief or a mere true belief, but it cannot justify knowledge, as we have seen in Gettier’s
cases.Hencethejustificationofknowledgeshouldnotinvolveanyfalsity.
This mayallowsomeflexibility, though. Supposethatforfiresafetyregulation, school25
classes should be smaller than 50. A fire expert counts the class number as 47 and thus
believes it is less than 50 and henceknows it is withinthesafelimit. But theclass numberis
actually 48. In this case we may still want to say that the fire expert knows that the class is
within the safe limit, although her belief that the class is within the safe limit seems to be
based on a false belief, namely, the class is 47.
14 The “no falsity” requirement can
accommodate cases like this. The reason is that the fire expert’s knowledge is based on the
belief that the number of the class is less than 50, which is true, although the truth belief on
which his knowledge is based is not accurate. The fire expert’s belief about the number of
the class, as far as thesafelimit is concerned, is not false; it is just that it is not accurate. The
fire expert’s justification of her belief that the class is safe does not crucially depends on the
exact number of the class. Hence in this case the justification of the fire expert’s knowledge
doesnotinvolveordependonsomethingthatisfalse;itdoesnotrestonanyfalsebeliefs.
It can be objected, however, that there are cases in which even justification involving
no falsity is not sufficient for knowledge. Consider Goldman’s well-known case of
barn-facades (1976, p. 44-45). Henry drives through the countryside in which what appear
to be barns are, with the exception of just one, mere barn facades. From the road Henry is
driving on, these barn facades look exactly like real barns. Henry happens to be looking at
the only real barn and believes that there’s a barn over there. In this case, the true belief that
it is abarn is justified byan experience, in which no falsityis involved. Yet Henry’s beliefis
plausibly viewed as being true merely because of luck. Had Henry noticed one of the
barn-facades instead, he would also have believed that there’s a barn over there. Therefore,
according to the “not by luck” principle of the basic understanding of knowledge, Henry’s
beliefdoesnotqualifyasknowledge.
The case of barn facades is different from Gettier’s cases in that it is not so obvious
that there is any falsity involved in the justification. Hence it seems to suggest that even
justification that involves no falsity does not guarantee knowledge. But still, there must be
something wrong with the justification and we need to be clear about why the justification
inthiscasedoesnotwarrantthatthetruthofknowledgeisnot arrived atbyluck.
The crucial point is to see that the experience of seeing the facade of a barn is not
sufficient to justify the belief that there a barn there. Only the experience of seeing a barn
can justify the belief about a barn. And the experience of seeing the facade of a barn is
different from the experience of seeing a barn. To see a barn is not just to see its facade. We
see a barn not only by seeing its facade, but also by seeing its sides and back. Seeing its
sides and back gives us reason to believethat it is abarn instead of abarn facade. Hencethe
experience of seeing a barn has to be justified as an experience of seeing a barn by being
distinguished from the experience of seeing a mere barn facade. For this reason the justifier
14 IowethisexampletoJ.J.Valberg.26
hastobejustifiedaswell.
Hence, Henry’s belief does not qualify as knowledge because his belief that there is a
barn there is not based on the experience which is justified as an experience of seeing the
barn. From the road Henry is driving on, he is not able to tell the difference between a
barn-facade and a barn. And without being able to distinguish a barn from a barn-facade,
Henry cannot justify his experience as an experience of seeing a barn, even though he is
looking at a barn. All Henry can know is that he is either seeing a barn or a barn-facade, no
matter which one he happens to look at. For this reason, even when he happens to look at
thebarn,hisbeliefthatitisabarnisnotjustifiedbyhisexperience.
It can be objected that this is to ask for too much. As Moore observed, “generally,
when we talk of seeing an object we only mean seeing some part of it. There is always
more in any object which we see, than the part of it which we see” (1953, p. 33). But there
is a difference between seeing part of an object and being restricted to seeing part of an
object to the extent that the subject cannot tell if she is seeing the object or something else
which shares the same part with the object. Although seeing an object is almost always
seeing part of it, this does not mean seeing any part of an object is sufficient for seeing the
object. To see an object, we need to see the part of the object which is typical of the object
so that this part of the object is sufficient for distinguishing it from a different object. In the
barn facade example, seeing the facade of a barn is not sufficient for seeing a barn because
thefacadeofabarnisnotthepartofabarnwhichdistinguishesabarn fromabarnfacade.
15
It can be further objected that usually seeing the facade of a barn is sufficient for
seeing a barn—who would know there are barn facades in the area? There is then an
alternative explanation of the case. Henry’s belief that he is seeing a barn is based on the
false background understanding that there is no barn facade in the area.
16 Based on this
false background understanding, he is justified in seeing the facade of a barn as a barn.
Henry’s belief that he is seeing a barn is thus poorly justified, that is, justified by a false
belief.
Hence Henry’s belief is justified either by something that is not itself justified or by
something that is justified by a false belief. In whichever way we understand the case,
Henry’s belief that he is seeing a barn does not count as knowledge because the justifier is
defective,thatis,thejustifieris eitherunjustified orjustifiedbyafalsebelief.Thereis then a
further lesson we can learn from the case of barn facades: knowledge has to be justified by
something that itself is justified. The experience of seeing the facade of a barn cannot be
justified as an experienceofseeing abarn and henceis not sufficient forjustifying thebelief
thatitisbarnthatisoverthere.Thusthejustifierofknowledgehastobesufficientlyjustified,
namelyjustified byatruebelief.
15 Cf.Kalderon2008,p.941-2
16 IowethispointtoJ.J.Valberg.27
Now justification should involve no falsity and the justifier has to be sufficiently
justified. I shall call a justification that involves no falsity and has a sufficiently justified
justifier a sufficient justification. Knowledge can then be understood as sufficiently justified
truebelief. To distinguish this version ofthetraditional conception ofknowledgefrom other
versions ofthetraditional conception that might bevulnerableto Gettier’s counterexamples,
I shall call it the qualified traditional conception of knowledge. According to the traditional
conception ofknowledge, thejustifierhas to bebelief. It then follows that thejustifierhas to
be a sufficiently justified true belief, namely knowledge. It turns out that knowledge can
onlybejustifiedbyknowledge. This Icallthegnosticcriterionofknowledgejustification.
17
Knowledge justification is in a sense a sagacious procedure. The person who knows
not only holds a true belief that is justified, but also holds a true belief that is justified by
something that is justified and true. Knowledge has to be a true belief justified by
knowledge. In this way we can still staywith the traditional conception of knowledge while
appreciating Gettier’s point that an unqualified justified true belief does not count as
knowledge.
18
An apparent problem for the gnostic criterion of knowledge justification is that it
seems to give a circular analysis of knowledge. If knowledge is sufficiently justified true
belief and a sufficient justifier has to be knowledge, then it seems that we have to
understand knowledge in terms of knowledge. The gnostic criterion of justification, I shall
say, is not circular in the sense that we need to explain justification in terms of knowledge.
To sayknowledgejustifiesknowledgeis nottodefinejustificationin termsofknowledge. It
is onlyto set acondition forknowledgejustification.To justifyis to givenormativereasons.
Hencejustificationitselfdoes notneedto bedefinedintermsofknowledge. Nevertheless,it
is to be noted that there is a sense that the gnostic criterion is circular: it cannot explain
knowledge without appealing to the concept of knowledge, when trying to elaborate what
kind of justification is needed for knowledge. But what I mean to give here is a picture of
knowledge, not an analysis of knowledge. According to this picture, a piece of knowledge
cannot be understood isolated from other pieces of knowledge. Being justified by
knowledgeissufficientforatruebelieftobeknowledge.
Hence the lesson we can learn from Gettier’s counter-examples and the case of the
barn facades is that we need a rigorous criterion for knowledge justification. Knowledge
justifies knowledge. Knowledge justifies and is justified by knowledge. The qualified
traditional conception of knowledge, which says knowledge is sufficiently justified true
belief,namely,truebeliefjustifiedbyknowledge,isthussufficient.
17 Sellarssayssomethingveryclosetothiswhenhesays:‘incharacteringanepisodeorastateasthatofknowing, wearenot
givinganempiricaldescriptionofthatepisodeorstate;weareplacingitinthelogicalspaceofreasons,ofjustifyingandbeing
ableto justify what onesays’(1956,§36). Onlyoneamendment: knowledge isnot just somethingto justify what onesays; it
justifieswhatoneknows.Andbeliefwouldbesomethingjustifyingwhatonesays.
18 Feldman(1974)triestomendthedefectinGettier’sargumentandsuggestevenatruebeliefjustifiedbyknowledgecannot
beguaranteedstatusofknowledge.Butwhathefindsproblemwithisactuallyinductioninsteadofjustification.28
3. The gnostic criterion of knowledge justification shares with the knowledge priority thesis
the understanding that knowledge plays a justificatory role. Starting with this common
understanding, I shall now go on to argue that the traditional conception of knowledge is
indispensableornecessary.
Radford describes a number of cases to show that one may have knowledge that P
without being sure that P. Radford’s counter-examples, if they work in the way he suggests,
seem to show that the traditional conception is not necessary. Specifically, knowledge needs
neithertobebeliefnortobejustified.
In Radford’s first example, a man claims that he knows he locked the car but is not
absolutelysurethathedidand decidestogoback andcheck.Radfordthinksthatinthiscase
the man knows that helocked the caralthough heis not sure about it. Hethus claims that “a
man couldknowthatPand yetnotbesurethatP”(1966,p.1).
But we certainly should not think that the man knows that he locked the car just
because he claims so. There must be an independent criterion for ascribing knowledge.
According to the basic understanding of knowledge, knowledge has to be a grasp of truth
that is not arrived at by luck. The way that the man grasps the truth seems to be his claim
that he knows that he locked the car. But it is not clearin what sensehis grasp of the truth is
not arrived at by luck. If his claim is based on remembering checking when leaving the car
or anyother relevant details, then wemaysayhis grasp ofthe truth is not arrived at byluck.
But this obviously is not the case, otherwise he would not be uncertain about it and feel the
need to go back and check. We may then suppose that his grasp of the truth is based on his
background understanding of his own habit: he always locks the car but is never certain
about this. And in this sense, wemaysay, his grasp ofthetruth is not arrived at byluck. But
if it is true that the man possesses this background understanding, then he should not be
uncertain about whether or not he has locked the car. His background understanding is
obviously not sufficient for him to be sure that he has locked the car and hence cannot be
thekindofthingthatwarrantsthattheman’s graspofthetruthisnotarrived atbyluck.
In ascribingknowledge, we need to be clearabout theman’s basis forclaiming that he
possesses the relevant knowledge. The reliability of the man’s habit can certainly be a
rational basis for the claim. The problem rests, however, in the fact that the man obviously
does not takeit as arational basis for his “knowing”that hehas locked the car, otherwisehe
would not decide to go and check. Hence although the man claims that he knows, he
actuallydoesnotreallythinkthatheknows.
Wedo not haveto cleaveto thetraditional conception ofknowledgein orderto seethe
point. The knowledge priority thesis is in an even better position to see that the man in the
above example does not really know that he locked the car. According to the knowledge29
priority thesis, knowledge justifies belief. Now if the man knows that he locked the car, he
should be justified in believing that he locked the car and there is no need to go back and
check. But as it is described in the case, the man in fact believes that he needs to go back
and check. If we follow the knowledge priority thesis and insist it is essential that
knowledge justify belief, then there is no reason to believe that the man knows that he
locked the car. Hence, according to the criterion set by the knowledge priority thesis, the
example actually shows that when the man is not sure that he locked the car, he does not
knowthathelockedthecar.
It can be objected that, although it is the function of knowledge that it justifies belief,
there might be cases that knowledge, for whatever reasons, fails to perform the function.
But this reply is not plausible. First, if knowledge is defined by its function of justifying
belief, then it is not easyto see how we can attribute knowledge to the subject when there is
nothing there to perform the function. Second, even if we grant that there might be cases
where knowledge fails to perform the function of justifying belief, there is still no reason to
insist that the subject possesses the relevant knowledge. All we can say is that we do not
know,inthiscase,whetherornotthesubjectpossessestherelevantknowledge.
In Radford’s second example, alibrarian thinks butisnot surethat theyhavesold W.J.
Locke’s novel for pulp, so she decides to go and check. Her colleague’s comment is that
“she isn’t sure about anything”, although “she knows everything about this library”. This is
a case of third person knowledge ascription. The reason that her colleague makes the
comment is that every time when the librarian says something about the library, it always
turns out that she is right, although she is never sure about what she says. Radford thinks
that this is another case that a person knows that P without being sure that P. But again,
according to the priority thesis, if the librarian does know that the novel has been sold for
pulp, then she should be justified in believing that there is no need to go and check. Hence
the very fact that the librarian decides to go and check shows that she does not actually
know that thenovel has been sold. Or, we should at least say, in this case, thereis no reason
toinsistthatthelibrarianpossessestherelevantknowledge.
Another problem with this second example is that, judging by the context, the
librarian’s colleague ascribe knowledge that P to her without knowing that P is true. The
ascription of knowledge is based on the librarian’s own reliability. This seems to be a very
unusual case of third person knowledge ascription. It seems very implausible that one can
ascribeknowledgethatPtosomeonewithoutone’sknowingthatPistrue.
The above two examples are supposed to be the cases where the subject knows that P
while is not sure that P. Radford’s third example is more ambitious. It means to show that
there can be knowledge when there is no belief at all. The third example is as follows. In a
bet, Jean gets the dates of some events in English history correct without believing that he
knows or has ever learnt anything about these. Radford claims this shows that “although in30
thissituationJeanknewthatP,hewasnot certain, orsure,orconfidentthat P. Indeedhewas
fairlycertainthathisanswertothequestionwas wrong,i.e.thatnot-P,sincehebelieveditto
be a pure guess in a situation where onlyone of many such guesses could be correct” (p. 4).
Moreover, Jean is not justified to be sure because he has forgotten that he has learnt
something about these. According to Radford, we then have a case where knowledge is
devoidofbothbeliefandjustification.
It is important to be clear about in what sense there is no belief involved in Jean’s
guess work. We can detect two reasons in Radford’s example for saying that Jean’s
knowledgedoes not involve belief. First, when beinginvited to do a quiz in English history,
he is very unwilling to do it and claims he does not know any English history. He only
agrees to do it when he is prepared to guess and is glad that the bet is not for real money.
Second, although he can sometimes (but not always) give correct answers when pressed, he
still refuses to doubleup. But it seems that theseonlysuggest that Jean does not believethat
heknows that P when he guesses P, not that hedoes not believethat P when he guesses that
P. A guess can be considered as a weak form of belief. As a special case, a total blind guess
is not a belief at all, since in this case, the subject would not believe what she guesses. But
Jean does not seem to be making a blind guess. So there must be a certain degree of belief
involved. It is nevertheless truethat what Jean possesses is not afirm belief, and it is forthis
reasonthatitisaguess.
We may feel that there are good reasons to ascribe knowledge to Jean in this case.
First, although Jean takes himself to be guessing, it is very unlikely that one can really get
the dates correct just by guessing. Hence, we may say that Jean’s grasp of truth is
manifested bythecorrect answers he gives. Second, although Jean at first claims that hehas
never studied any English history, he later suspects that perhaps he picked that up in a
Shakespearecourseorsomewhereelseand finallyremembers that hedid oncehaveto learn
some dates. Jean’s grasp of truth is then warranted not being arrived at by luck by the fact
thathehasstudiedthematerialsandhasthusbeen exposedtotherelevantfacts.
Nevertheless, we may also have reasons to think that Jean does not really possess the
relevant knowledge. First, Jean only believes his answer is correct when his interlocutor
assures him this. If his interlocutor told him that the incorrect answer he gives is correct, he
would also believe him and take his incorrect answer as correct. We can then say that Jean
does not really grasp the truth. Second, the fact that one has been taught something does not
warrant that one’s grasp of truth is not arrived at by luck. It is always possible that one has
not learnt what one was taught and forgets what one has learnt. And judging by the way
Jean behaves, he seems to have forgotten some part of what he has learnt, and as to the part
hehasn’tforgottencompletely, hecannotrememberitclearly.
Hence the right way to describe the situation seems to be as follows. Jean used to
possess the relevant knowledge; but strictly speaking, he does not possess the knowledge31
when he is being asked the questions, since he cannot remember it with certainty. Jean only
re-obtains the relevant knowledge when the correct answer he gives is assured and the
incorrect answer is corrected by his interlocutor, if he can now remember the correct dates
with certainty. The only reason that Jean can re-obtain the relevant knowledge is that he
believeswhathisinterlocutorsays.Thisshowsbeliefisnecessaryforknowledge.
We do lose substantial part of our knowledge from time to time. Some we forget
completely. Some we remember partly. Some we remember vaguely. The possession and
loss of knowledge do not always have a clear cut. It is sometimes a matter of degree. But
we still need a conception of knowledge which gives us the idea about the kind of
knowledgewereallypossess, not thekind ofknowledgewehalfpossess. And thecases that
do not measure up the standard of knowledge we really possess do not count as knowledge,
although they may in a certain sense be close to it. And whenever we really possess
knowledge,weholdtherelevantbeliefaswell.
Williamsondescribes acasesimilartoRadford’sthirdexample:
When the unconfident examinee, taking herself to be guessing, reliably gives correct
dates as a result of forgotten history lesson, it is not an obvious misuse of English to
classify her as knowing that the battle of Agincourt was in 1415 without believing that
itwas. (2000,p.42)
We then have a case where one has knowledge without holding the corresponding belief,
namely, oneknowsthatPwithoutbelievingthatP.
Williamson seems to be right in saying that the nervous examinee does not believe
that P. His reasoningis likethis. Iftheexamineetakesherselfto be guessingthatP, then she
does not believe that P is true. And if she does not believe that P is true, then she does not
believe that P. This seems to be a correct reasoning. We nevertheless need to note that the
examinee’s not believing P does not necessarily mean that she believes not-P. It is more
likelythecasethatsheisjusttoonervoustothinkclearlyandcannotjudgeifitistruethatP,
whatsheisdoingisjusttowritedownwhateveroccurstoher.
But is it true that the nervous examinee knows that P? We can detect two reasons for
answering the question affirmatively. First, the answers she gives are reliably correct. This
shows her grasp of the truth. The examinee’s reliability in giving correct answers may also
show that her grasp of the truth is warranted not being arrived at by luck. It’s very unlikely
that she can hit on correct answers like this solely by chance. This seems to suggest that the
correct answers given bytheexamineearesupportedbysomethingmorereliableand robust.
It seems that there must be something with her which makes her give the correct answers.
And this something, as Williamson sees it, is knowledge. Second, the examinee’s grasp of
thetruth maybefurtherwarranted bythe fact that shehas studied thematerials and has thus32
beenexposedtotherelevantfacts.
Given that thenervous examinee gives reliablycorrect answers, wemayagreethat she
grasps the truth in a certain sense. But it is not clear in what sense her grasp of the truth is
warranted as not being arrived at by luck. We all know that people are liable to make
mistakes when they are nervous. In this sense it is a lucky thing that the nervous examinee
does not make mistakes. If the nervous examinee takes herself to be guessing, she will also
takeit to be aluckythingthat she gets all theanswers correct. And it is indeed aluckything
to be able to do so, given her nervous psychological condition. The very fact that she is
nervous and cannot judge if the answers she produces are correct makes her grasp of truth
unwarranted.
Moreover, there is a further reason to think that the examinee does not possess the
relevant knowledge. Maybe the nervous examinee can luckily fare well in her exam. But a
slightly different situation would show more clearly that what she possesses is not
knowledge. Suppose the nervous examinee is now a nervous interviewee for a teaching job
in history. Being asked about the dates of some historical events, she gives the correct
answer but admits that she is guessing. Would she be considered qualified to teach history?
This answer is obviously “No”. To teach is to pass on knowledge to the students. The
nervous interviewee certainly cannot teach if she takes herself to be guessing. The reason is
thatshedoesnotpossesstheknowledgetopassontosomeoneelse.
The point is not that one will lose one’s knowledge once one gets nervous. It is that if
one is so nervous that she cannot judge whether or not P is true, then she loses her
knowledgethat P toacertain extent. One’s possession ofknowledgethat Pis affected to the
extent that one’s belief that P is affected. This only shows the close connection between
knowingthatPandbelievingthatP.
To conclude, Radford and Williamson’s cases show that justified belief is essential to
knowledge. First, one’s grasp of truth can only be warranted not being arrived at by luck
when it is a justified belief. This means both belief and justification are essential to
knowledge. Belief is the only way of grasping truth that may get a chance to be warranted
not being arrived at by luck, and justification is the only way one’s grasp of truth get
warranted. Second, one’s grasp of truth can onlybe used to justify a belief when it is itself a
justified belief. Knowledge has to be justified belief. This is required by its capacity of
justifyingbelief. Inorderforknowledgetobeabletojustifybelief,ithastobeitselfjustified
belief. When one is not justified in believing that P, one does not possess the ability to
justifyotherbeliefswithP.
The idea that knowledge has to be a justified belief can be found in Kant’s distinction
betweenopining,believing,andknowledge:
The holding of a thing to be true, or the subjective validity of the judgment, in its33
relation to conviction (which is at the same time objectively valid), has the following
three degrees: opining, believing, and knowing. Opining is such holding of a judgment
as is consciously insufficient, not only objectively, but also subjectively. If our holding
of the judgment be only subjectively sufficient, and is at the same time taken as being
objectively insufficient, we have what is termed believing. Lastly, when the holding of
a thing to be true is sufficient both subjectively and objectively, it is knowledge. The
subjective sufficiency is termed conviction (for myself), the objective sufficiency is
termedcertainty(foreveryone).(1929, B850/A822)
ForKant, knowledgeis “theholdingofathingto betrue”that is sufficient both subjectively
and objectively. To be sufficient objectively, of course, is to be true. And to be sufficient
subjectively is to be a justified belief, or as Kant terms it, to be a conviction. Knowledge is
not only true but also a conviction. This is what I mean by saying knowledge is sufficiently
justified true belief. Knowledge cannot justify a belief without being itself a justified belief.
Or, to put it in Kant’s terminology, something that is not subjectively sufficient cannot give
rise to a conviction which is subjectively sufficient. And knowledge would fail its
justificatoryfunctionifitcannotleadtoaconviction.
4. I have argued that Radford and Williamson’s cases actually show that knowledge cannot
justify belief without itself being justified belief. And hence, if we follow the knowledge
priority thesis and understand the function of justifying belief as the primary feature of
knowledge, we will have to say that knowledge has to be a species of justified belief. This,
nevertheless, does not mean that the justificatory role of knowledge could be substituted by
the justificatory role of justified belief, although it is true that the justificatory role of
knowledgecouldbesubstitutedbysufficientlyjustifiedtruebelief.
One reason that Williamson thinks that knowledge is not a species of belief is that the
justificatory role cannot be substituted by the justificatory role of justified true belief, if the
latter does play a role as such. This is how Williamson depicts the way knowledge justifies
belief:
Knowledge can justify a belief which is not itself knowledge, for the justification
relation is not deductive. For example, Imay be justified in believing that someone is a
murderer by knowing that he emerged stealthily with a bloody knife from the room in
which the body was subsequently discovered, even if he is in fact innocent and I
thereforedonotknowthatheis amurderer.(2000,p.9)
Williamson is right in saying that “knowledge can justify a belief which is not itself34
knowledge” when “the justification relation is not deductive”. But we should also note that
knowledge justifies knowledge when the justification relation is deductive. A deductive
justification leads us from knowledge to knowledge. Knowledge justifies knowledge, while
merebeliefjustifiesmerebelief.
On the other hand, if all we want is to justify a belief which is not itself knowledge,
then a justified belief can do an equally good job here. I may be justified in believing that
someone is a murderer by being justified in believing that he emerged stealthily with a
bloody knife from the room in which the body was subsequently discovered. In fact, the
reason that Icanjustifymybeliefthatthepersonisthemurdereris exactlythat Ibelievethat
he emerged stealthily with a bloody knife from the room. If the scene was present to me
without my believing it is true, I would not be able to justify the relevant further belief with
this.
Williamson’s point, nevertheless, is exactlyto denythat belief plays a justificatory role
in the same way knowledge does. Williamson insists that knowledge can do a better job
than belief in justifying a belief that is not itself knowledge. He claims that knowledge is
whatjustifiesbeliefabsolutely:
A belief is justified relative to some other beliefs from which it has been derived in
some appropriate way (perhaps by deduction), but it is not justified absolutely unless
those other beliefs are justified absolutely. Where does the regress end? On the
assumption that it ends at evidence, the equation of evidence with knowledge implies
that one’s belief is justified absolutely if and only if it is justified relative to one’s
knowledge.Theregressofjustificationendsatknowledge. (2000,p.9)
Williamson’s idea is that in the end, belief needs to be justified by knowledge, since
for Williamson, belief justification only stops at evidence. And evidence, according to
Williamson, is to be equated with knowledge, by which he means only knowledge counts
as evidence.
19 It thus turns out that justification stops at knowledge. Hence he claims:
“knowledge, and only knowledge, justifies belief” (2000, p. 185). The idea, really, is that
eventually it is knowledge which justifies belief. And this leads Williamson to “a very
modest kind of foundationalism, on which all one’s knowledge serves as the foundation for
all one’s justified beliefs” (2000, p. 186). Knowledge here cannot be substituted by justified
true belief. Williamson claims: “if one is disposed to respond rationally to future evidence,
then one’s future prospects are better if one now has knowledge than if one now has mere
justifiedtruebelief”(2000,p.184).
What concerns Williamsonhereis theconsideration that merejustified truebeliefmay
19 Thisequationofknowledgeandevidenceseemstobedifficulttounderstand.Evidencearefactsthatmakeonebelievethat
somethingistrue.Knowledgeisnotjustevidence;itisone’sgraspofevidence.35
not be sufficient for knowledge and cannot play an equally satisfactory justificatory role.
But as I argued in §2, we can admit that unqualified justified true belief is not sufficient for
knowledge without losing sight of the fact that knowledge is indeed a species of justified
true belief. All we need to do is to see that knowledge has to be sufficiently justified true
belief, namely true belief justified by knowledge. Hence, the fact that knowledge is
something more than a mere justified true belief does not mean that knowledge is not a
species of justified true belief, just as that true belief is something more than a mere belief
does not mean that a true belief is not a species of belief. In other words, that mere justified
truebeliefis not sufficient forknowledgedoes not mean it is not essential forknowledge. In
any case, Williamson cannot show how knowledge can justify belief without itself being
justified belief. Knowledge needs to be justified belief in order to justify belief. Knowledge
can only justify belief in virtue of being what one believes and what one is justified to
believe.Theknowledgeprioritythesis cannotdenyknowledgeis aspeciesofjustified belief
ifitinsiststhatknowledgejustifiesbelief.
The core idea of the knowledge priority thesis is that knowledge justifies. This I
believe is absolutely correct. But we then need to see what is justified by knowledge can
also be knowledge. A belief justified by knowledge through correct reasoning is actually
knowledge, not just a true belief. We can then see things in two directions. Knowledge is
not only that which justifies, but also that which is justified by knowledge. We cannot insist
that knowledge justifies belief without seeing what is correctly justified by knowledge is
actually knowledge.
20 Knowledge justifies knowledge. This is exactly the qualified
traditionalconceptionofknowledgeIinsistthatweshouldstaywith.
Hence the idea that knowledge justifies does not contradict the traditional conception
of knowledge which insists that knowledge is justified. As far as justification is concerned,
the knowledge prioritythesis can be incorporated within the qualified traditional conception
of knowledge. While the knowledge priority thesis starts with what knowledge can do, the
traditional conception starts with how knowledge is acquired. To complete the story, we
only need to have both and insist that knowledge not only justifies but also is justified. In
fact,theveryreasonthatknowledgejustifiesisthatitissufficientlyjustified.
There are then two points we can start with in understanding knowledge. First, we can
start with theideathat knowledgeneeds to bejustified, as thetraditional understandingdoes,
and endupwiththeideathatthejustifierhastobeknowledge.Second,wecanstartwiththe
idea that knowledge justifies, as knowledge priority thesis does, and end up with the idea
that knowledge can only justify in virtue of being sufficiently justified true belief, and that
which is justified by knowledge is knowledge. In either way, we end up with the idea that
knowledge,whichissufficientlyjustifiedtruebelief,justifiesknowledge.
20 Onlyinthiswaycanweleaveroomforinferentialknowledge.36
Even Williamson finds it hard to deny the essential connection between knowledge
and belief. In his attempt to understand belief in terms of knowledge, Williamson claims:
“Knowing is … the best kind of believing. Mere believing is a kind of botched knowing. In
short, belief aims at knowledge (not just truth)” (2000, p. 47). Apart from truth, justification
is a crucial element which connects belief with knowledge. A sufficiently justified true
belief is knowledge; a belief that is not true or not sufficiently justified is a belief which is
notknowledge.
This concludes my defence of the traditional conception of knowledge against
Radford and Williamson’s cases. We can now be satisfied that the traditional understanding
ofknowledgeisindispensableornecessary.
5. I have defended a version of qualified traditional conception of knowledge which is
sufficient and necessary. Knowledge, according to the qualified traditional conception I
recommended, is sufficiently justified true belief. But it can be further objected that the
traditional conception of knowledge is simply incorrect, whether or not it is sufficient and
necessary. Wefindthisobjection,again,inWilliamson.
Williamson’s main objection to the traditional conception of knowledge is that
“Knowledge is a mental state” or “factive attitude” while true belief is not (2000, p. 21). He
argues that any analysis of knowledge which involves truth as its components must be
incorrect since truth is a non-mental concept and should not be an element of the concept
know, which is a mental concept (2000, p. 30). Thus the problem for the traditional
conception of knowledge, according to Williamson, is that it fails to see knowledge is a
mental state. This is typically the case when the denial of knowledge as a mental state goes
together with content internalism. Williamson points out: “Having denied that knowing is a
mental state, internalists naturally seek to factorize it into mental and non-mental
components” (2000, p. 55). This factorization of knowledge, however, does not have to
involve a commitment to content internalism. As Williamson makes it clear: “Because
believing is such an obvious candidate, even those who concede externalism about mental
content may be inclined to internalism about the attitude of knowing, regarding it as a
mixtureofmentalandnon-mental elements”(2000,p.56).
What Williamson means by saying that knowledge is a mental state is that one counts
as having knowledge just by being in a certain mental state, and that no further external
condition is required. For this reason, Williamson claims “there is a mental state being in
which is necessary and sufficient for knowing p” (2000, p. 21). In other words, truth is
constitutive of the concept of knowledge, not an external condition for knowledge. By
contrast, in judging a belief as true, we have to refer to external conditions; the truth of
belief cannot be found in the belief itself. In other words, knowledge is essentially true37
while belief is not. Williamson thus insists that truth is not an analytic element of
knowledge.
Cassam’s response to this is that knowledge is not a pure mental concept and can thus
accommodate a non-mental element in it (Cassam 2009). This is to deny that knowledge is
a mental state. Theproblem with this response is that it seems to losesight of the distinction
between knowledge and mere true belief, which is essential to the traditional conception of
knowledge.
Wemayfind it hard to accept that knowledgeis amental state, given the fact that truth
is determined by the external world. But to say knowledge is a mental state is not to say
knowledge is a pure inner state, if we take an externalist understanding of mental state.
According to content externalism, the meaning of a mental state is determined by external
factors. “S believes water is essential for life” entails there is water on the earth. Hence
belief is a mental state although its meaning is determined by external factors. We can
understand knowledge in the same way. Just as the meaning of belief is not to be found in
the subject’s inner state, the truth of knowledge is not to be found inside either. “S knows
water is essential for life” entails that it is true that water is essential for life. But this should
not prevent us from saying that knowledge is a mental state. Knowledge is a mental state
despitethefactthatitstruthisdeterminedbyexternal facts.
Hence, to say knowledge is a mental state is not to say we can ascribe knowledge
solely by investigating one’s inner state. Just as we cannot ascribe belief without looking at
the environment, as content externalism correctly insists, nor can we ascribe knowledge
withoutlookingattheenvironment.
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This is true for both first person knowledge ascription and third person knowledge
ascription. For first person knowledge ascription, one knows that one knows not by looking
inward, but by looking outwards upon the world. We look at the world when we decide if
what we have is knowledge. One does not decide if one knows by looking inwards, but
ratherbylookingupontheworld.
For third person knowledge ascription, we cannot ascribe knowledge just by looking
inside the subject. When ascribing knowledge, we investigate both the subject and her
environment. Suppose someone says “it’s raining outside”. To decide if her claim counts as
knowledge, we need to investigate the world and see if it is really raining outside. Just as
when we say “S believes there is water in the cup”, we investigate S’s environment to
decide if S does believe there is water (instead of T-water) in the cup, when we say “S
knows it’s raining outside”, we investigate what is happening outside and decide if it is true
that it’s raining outside. We need to investigate the subject as well. First, we need to make
sure that the subject is uttering her belief instead of a guess or simply a random sentence for
21 Fortheideathatoneknowsone’sbeliefbylookingoutwardstowardstheworld,seeEvans1982,p.225.38
fun. Once it is established that the subject is indeed uttering her belief, we then need to
investigate what basis she has for holding the belief. If she just came in from the outside or
is looking out of the window, then we may consider her belief as sufficiently justified and
decide she really knows that it’s raining outside. When we ascribe knowledge that P to
someone, we judge that the subject holds a true belief that P and has a rational base for its
truth. In contrast, a mere true belief is understood as a lucky guessing which is devoid of
sufficientjustification.
Hence the idea that knowledge is a mental state does not commit us to the idea that
knowledge is a pure inner state with its truth internally determined. The idea is that truth is
the essential feature of knowledge, not an external condition of it. Only in this sense can we
understand the difference between knowing and believing truly by luck. As McDowell
points out, true belief needs not amount to knowledge because “a belief leaves it open that
thebelieverhasholdofthetruthbyaccident,andknowledgeexcludesthat”(1995,p.884).
Nowthequestion is: does thequalified traditional conception ofknowledgecommit to
the kind of mistake pointed out by Williamson? Is it true that the traditional conception of
knowledge has to commit to the hybrid view which takes truth as an extra external
condition? My answer to the question is negative. To see the point we need to see exactly
how knowledge excludes the possibility that the believer has hold of the truth by accident.
Theideaisbest elucidatedbyMcDowell.
6. McDowell starts with the Sellarsian idea that knowledge “is a certain sort of standing in
the space of reasons”. His target is a deformation of this Sellarsian idea which is “an
interiorization of the space of reasons, a withdrawal of it from the external world”. The
deformation happens “when we suppose that we ought to be able to achieve flawless
standings in the space of reasons by our own unaided resources, without needing the world
todousanyfavors”(1995,p.877).
The best way to understand this is to consider sense data theories which assert that we
base our belief on appearance that may not be the way the world is. The problem with this
ideaisthescepticthreat that wewouldnotbeableto get knowledgeifwebaseourbeliefon
appearance. As McDowell puts it, “However careful one is in basing belief on appearances,
if one’s method falls short of total freedom from risk of error, the appearance plus the
appropriate circumstances for activating the method cannot ensure that things are as one
takesthemtobe”(1995,p.880).
One response to this is to surrender to scepticism and accept “it must be a mistake to
thinkwecanachieveknowledgethroughperception”(1995,p. 881).This responsedoesnot
seem to be desirable. The second is to stay with “a rather touching a priori faith in the
power of human reason to devise fully effective protections against the deceptive capacities39
of appearance” (1995, p. 881). This second response is unrealistic. We may then want to
turn to a third option and embrace “the hybrid conception” according to which knowledge
is a hybrid combination of an internally justified belief and an external condition, namely
truth. As McDowell puts it, for the hybrid conception, “knowledge is a status that one
possesses byvirtueofan appropriatestandingin thespaceofreasons when—this is an extra
condition, not ensured by one’s standing in the space of reasons—the world does one the
favourofbeingsoarrangedthatonetakestobesoisso”(1995,p.881).
However, McDowell finds this third option problematic as well. McDowell compares
the hybrid conception with a full-blown externalist approach, which simply denies the
Sellarsian idea that knowledge is a certain sort of standing in the space of reasons. As
McDowell puts it: “According to a full-blown externalist approach, knowledge has nothing
to do with positions in thespaceofreasons: knowledgeis astateoftheknowerlinked to the
state of affairs known in such a way that the knower’s being in that state is a reliable
indicator that the state of affairs obtains” (1995, p. 882). For a full-blown externalist
approach, reliability must be external to the space of reasons. The hybrid conception rejects
the externalist idea that reliability must be external in this sense. However, without the
external fact included in the reliability, the hybrid conception is the view that “a satisfactory
standing in the space of reasons is only part of what knowledge is; truth is an extra
requirement”(1995,p.884).
To avoid the hybrid conception, which draws a clear distinction between the space of
reasons as an inner sphereand truth as an external element, McDowell insists that facts play
a role in justification. Of course, facts themselves do not justify anything; it is their
availability to the subject that counts as the subject’s entitlement to knowledge and hence
plays a role in justification. McDowell insists that we should not “separate truth…from
reliabilityinpoliciesorhabitsofbelief-formation”(1995,p. 883).
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base one’s judgment on truth would be a failure of rationality, not just a bad luck.
McDowell writes: “Suppose one is subject to a misleading appearance that one has a proof
of something. In that case, surely, one must have misconducted oneself in the space of
reasons; it cannot be that the world is the only thing one can blame for what has gone
wrong” (1995, p. 879). Should we make mistakes about the world, we should not just
repineatourbadluck, butratherreflectonthewayweapproachtheworldaswell.
McDowell’s ideathat truth plays arolein justification explains whyknowledgecan be
understood as justified true belief without making truth a condition of knowledge which is
external to the space of reasons. The crucial idea is that justification is not an isolated
element added to meretruebelief, noris it an element shared byknowledgeand ameretrue
belief or a false belief. Justification of knowledge is essentially different from justification
22 Note that McDowell is here talking about belief-formation. This shows that McDowell has no intention to separate
knowledgeandbelief.40
of mere true belief. For one thing, justification of knowledge should involve no falsity. This
implies that truth cannot be an isolated element of the triple condition. If knowledge has to
be justified by a true belief, then truth already plays a role in justification and hence cannot
workasaseparateconditionforknowledge,namelyaconditionexternaltojustification.
Truth contributes to knowledge justification and is thus not any more a condition of
knowledge which is external to justification. For this reason knowledge can be understood
as a mental state. Justification ensures that a mental state is knowledge by including truth
within its procedure as a justifier. Williamson is right in emphasizing the distinction
between mere true belief and knowledge. But the only way that knowledge is distinguished
from mere true belief is that it is sufficiently justified. This is exactly the point of
emphasizing that knowledge has to be sufficiently justified true belief. Knowledge has truth
internally built in the relevant belief through sufficient justification. This is what McDowell
means when he says justification of knowledge needs the world to do us a favour. Hence in
a sufficiently justified true belief, truth is not any more a condition external to belief and
justification.Thisiswhyknowledgeassufficientlyjustifiedtruebeliefcanbeamentalstate.
Hence to say knowledge is sufficiently justified true belief is not to say there are three
independent elements in knowledge which are truth, belief, and sufficient justification.
Particularly, truth is not a condition for knowledge which is separated from justification and
belief. A sufficiently justified belief is justified bytruth. A sufficientlyjustified true belief is
nottruthcombined withbeliefplussufficientjustification.
When we say knowledge is sufficiently justified true belief, we are not saying it is
sufficient justification plustruebelief. Atruebeliefwhich is sufficientlyjustified is different
from a true belief which is unjustified or poorly justified. The former is firm, or, as Plato
putsit,stable,whilethelatterisweakanduncertain,aswefindinRadford’sexamples.
McDowelldeniesknowledgeisahybrid combinationofaninternaljustifiedbeliefand
an external truth condition. But this is not to deny that knowledge is a species of belief.
McDowellseemstobehappywiththetraditionalconception andinsistknowledgehastobe
belief. Commenting on an example that one had an experience of seeing without realizing
thattheexperiencewas indeed aseeing,McDowell remarks:“Onedid notform therelevant
belief, let alone get to know that that was how things were” (2003, p. 681). In any case,
McDowell’s criticism of the hybrid conception of knowledge does not necessarily commit
him to the idea that knowledge is not belief. The point of McDowell’s criticism is not that
knowledge cannot be a belief; but rather that truth condition is not an external element
whichmakesno contributiontotheinternaljustificationofknowledge.
McDowell’s point is not to equate the traditional conception of knowledge with the
hybrid conception of knowledge. His intention is to guard against a mistaken account of the
traditional conception of knowledge which interiorises the space of reasons in such a way
that truth is only considered an isolated condition for knowledge which makes no41
contribution to the justification of knowledge. By criticising the mistaken account of the
traditional conception of knowledge, McDowell actually at the same time establishes a
correct account of it, according to which truth essentially contributes to the justification of
knowledge and is no longer an isolated condition for knowledge. We can then understand
knowledge as a species of justified true belief without factorizing knowledge as consisting
ofthreeisolated,independentelements.
Forthisreason,thetraditional conceptionofknowledge, properlyunderstood,does not
commit to the hybrid conception of knowledge criticised by McDowell. What McDowell is
doing is actually pointing in the direction of proposing a correct version of the traditional
conceptionofknowledge.
Williamson’s objection is based on the understanding that the traditional
understanding of knowledge divides knowledge into three components, namely, belief,
truth, and justification. But this does not have to be the case. In fact, the central idea of the
traditionalconceptionisthatknowledgeis aspeciesofbelief.Justificationisconcernedwith
the process of arriving at the belief. Most, if not all, beliefs are somehow justified. But
knowledge is sufficiently justified in that it is obtained through a valid, reliable process.
Truth is concerned with the value of belief. Hence both justification and truth are actually
qualifiersofbelief,insteadofseparatecomponentsofknowledge.
The real insight of McDowell’s attack on the hybrid conception of knowledge is that
the truth of knowledge is arrived at by the relevant belief’s being justified by the truth, not
by adding a condition external to the belief. Belief aspires to truth. Knowledge is the
fulfilment of the aspiration through a rational procedure. It is in this sense we say
knowledgeissufficientlyjustifiedtruebelief.
The gnostic criterion of justification gives truth a justificatory role while insisting truth
can only play a justificatory role in virtue of being what one believes and being what one is
justified to believe, namely being what one knows. When the gnostic criterion says
knowledge can only be justified by justified true belief, it is not to understand truth as an
independent element. Truth is only a constitutive element of the three aspects mentioned.
Knowledgeis eitherjustified bytruth that is taken as truth through sufficient justification, or
justified by belief which is sufficiently justified as true, or justified by a sufficiently justified
beliefwhichistrue.
Hence McDowell’s idea that truth plays a role in knowledge justification actually
defuses Williamson’s accusation that the traditional conception of knowledge commits to
the mistaken hybrid conception of knowledge. The traditional conception of knowledge is
thus established as a correct understanding of knowledge, as well as sufficient and
necessary.42
7. Nevertheless, the idea that truth plays a role in knowledge justification does not lead
McDowell to the gnostic criterion of justification. McDowell does not require that
knowledge be justified by what the subject knows; he only requires that knowledge be
justified by a fact that is available to the subject. And the availability of a fact to a subject
means neither that the subject takes the fact as a fact, nor that she is justified in taking the
fact as a fact. This, in effect, is exactly the view of justification we find in the knowledge
prioritythesis.
ForMcDowell, a fact playa justificatoryrole without being what onebelieves orwhat
is justified. This is his “third person approach to epistemology”, in contrast to “a first person
(and present tense) approach to epistemic entitlement” (2003, p. 681). For McDowell,
“epistemology’s topic should be, not what subjects know, but what they are in a position to
know, which is separated from the first topic precisely by cases in which opportunities to
knowarenot taken—casesin which subjectshaveentitlementsthat arenot beliefs”(2003, p.
681). According to McDowell, it is possible that “one had, at the relevant past time, an
entitlement that one did not then realize one had” (2003, p. 681). What McDowell calls
“entitlement” is “the availability of a fact to a subject in an episode or state of sensory
consciousness” which may be “possessed without one’s then realizing it” (2003, p. 681).
McDowell believes that one may have entitlement to a piece of knowledge without
realizing this. “One was in a position to acquire a bit of knowledge about the world, but
because of a misapprehension about the circumstances, one did not avail oneself of the
opportunity. One did not form the relevant belief, let alone get to know that that was how
things were” (2003, p. 681). Moreover, for McDowell, a fact can be used for knowledge
justification without being justified as a fact. In fact, the reason that the subject may not
believethatafactisafactisexactlythatsheisnotjustifiedtodoso.
McDowell’s third person approach to epistemology spoils his insightful idea that truth
should not be external to the space of reasons. Truth can only be internal to the space of
reasons by being internal to the subject, namely, being what the subject believes and what
the subject is justified in believing. The subject has to take a fact as a fact in order for the
fact to play a role in justification. In effect, a fact cannot be available to the subject without
the subject taking it as a fact. The protest is well-recognized by McDowell: “One could
hardly countenance the idea of having a fact made manifest within the reach of one’s
experience, without supposingthat that would makeknowledgeofthefact availableto one”
(1988, pp. 214-5). Hence McDowell’s criterion of knowledge justification, namely that the
availability of a fact justifies knowledge or belief, is not sufficient. McDowell’s own
understanding of justification is insufficient in that, as it is in the case of the knowledge
priority thesis, the subjective conditions for justification are left out. Only knowledge,
namely sufficiently justified true belief, justifies knowledge. We thus have to insist on the
gnosticcriterionofjustification.43
8. I have defended a version of the traditional conception of knowledge as sufficient,
necessary, and correct. First, I defend the traditional conception of knowledge as sufficient
byintroducingthegnosticcriterionofknowledge, which shareswith theknowledgepriority
thesis the view that knowledge essentially plays a justificatory role. Second then, I defend
the traditional conception of knowledge as indispensable by arguing that knowledge can
only justify a belief in virtue of being a justified belief. I finally defend the traditional
conception of knowledge as correct by joining McDowell in insisting that truth plays a role
in knowledge justification. This allows us to understand knowledge as a kind of justified
true belief without falling into the mistaken hybrid position which treats truth as an isolated
conditionforknowledgethatisexternaltojustificationandbelief.
The version of the traditional conception of knowledge I defended construes
knowledge as sufficiently justified true belief. Then to say experience is the source of
knowledge is to say it is a sufficient justification of knowledge. According to the gnostic
criterion of knowledge justification, only knowledge justifies knowledge. This means that,
experience, insofar as it is the justifier of knowledge, has to be itself knowledge. This is the
idea of gnosticism I proposed in the last chapter. And following the qualified traditional
conception of knowledge I defended in this chapter, it follows that experience, insofar as it
is the justifier of knowledge, has to be itself sufficiently justified true belief. This is the
revisedversionofgnosticism.
Therest ofthethesis is to argueforand defend gnosticism. This is mainlyachieved by
reflecting on McDowell’s unsatisfactory understanding of experience which is closely
related to the abovementioned defect of McDowell’s epistemology. But before setting out
to criticise McDowell’s own conception of experience, I shall first join him and argue that
experience has to be conceptual. This takes us to the next chapter where I criticise
nonconceptualismasepistemologicallyinsufficient.44
3.NonconceptualismandtheMythoftheGiven
1. Gnosticism says experience, in so far as it is the justification of knowledge, has to be
itself knowledge, namely sufficiently justified true belief. This implies experience is
essentially conceptual or an exercise of conceptual capacities. The idea that experience is
conceptual is called conceptualism, as opposed to nonconceptualism, which asserts that
experience is nonconceptual in that it is independent of the conceptual capacities the subject
may possess. In this chapter, I shall reject nonconceptualism by arguing that experience
cannot justify belief without being conceptual. The idea that a nonconceptual Given plays a
justificatoryroleinempiricalknowledgeisonlyamyth.
Nonconceptualism has a close affinity with traditional empiricism. Concerning the
nature of experience, there are two closely related elements in traditional empiricism. The
first is the idea that no conceptual capacities are involved in experience. The second is the
idea that what is directly experienced is impression, not the world. Sense data theories
inherit both of these two elements. Sense data are independent of conceptual capacities and
are the direct objects of experience. The idea that there is a mediating object between the
subject and the world faces insurmountable difficulties and is not any more in favour.
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Nevertheless the idea that knowledge is derived from experience which is independent of
anyconceptualcapacitiesisstillappealing.
We may think the two elements of traditional empiricism I mentioned above, the idea
that experience is nonconceptual and the idea that what we directly experience are
impressions, are independent claims, and it just so happens that traditional empiricists put
them together as their distinct understanding of experience. Thus we may feel it is possible
to separate these two elements and insist experience is independent of conceptual capacities
without committing to the idea that there is a mediating object between the subject and the
world.Thisisthepositiontypicalofcontemporarynonconceptualism.
Nonconceptualism says that experienceis nonconceptual.
24 Evans might bethefirstto
use the term in this way. While emphasizing the connection between experience and a
conceptual subject, Evans contrasts experience with concept, that is, to understand
experience itself as independent of concept. Despite his claim that “conscious perceptual
experience…serves as the input to a thinking, concept-applying and reasoning system”
(1982, p. 158), Evans does not require that “the content of conscious experience itself be
23 JohnFosterisoneofthefewwhoisstillarguingforthisposition(2000).SeealsoJackson1976,1977.
24 Some nonconceptualists, say, Byrne (2009), Crane (1992, 2009), Evans (1982), Peacocke (2001), Tye (2006) adopt an
intentional approach and insist experience has some form of representational content, while some others, say, Martin (1997,
2002) and Travis (2004), hold experience is non-representational. I shall nevertheless bracket this difference among
nonconceptualistsinthischapter.45
conceptual content”. He actually claims “The informational states which a subject acquires
throughperceptionarenon-conceptual,ornon-conceptualized”(1982,p.227).
This is later joined by many others who take a mixed position and claim that at least
some content of experience is nonconceptual.
25 As McDowell puts it, on this “mixed
position”, “the content of experience is partly conceptual and partly nonconceptual” (1994,
p. 59). The idea of the mixed position is this. We may sometimes exercise conceptual
capacities in experience, but conceptual capacities are not essential to experience. In some
circumstances we may not exercise conceptual capacities in experience, either because we
simply do not have the relevant concepts, or because we just do not exercise the conceptual
capacities we may possess. We then have two kinds of nonconceptual experience. The first
is the kind of nonconceptual experience that in no way leads to empirical knowledge, since
there would be no relevant thought if we simply do not have the relevant conceptual
capacities. This is the kind of nonconceptual experience the richness argument aims to
argue for. The second is the kind of nonconceptual experience that does lead to empirical
knowledge, since we do possess the conceptual capacities for the relevant thought, which
needs to be based on the nonconceptual experience. These two kinds of nonconceptual
experiencerequireseparatetreatments.
A quick response to the first kind of nonconceptual experience is that it does not seem
to be of much import. This kind of nonconceptual experience cannot be a source of
empirical knowledge, since we simply do not have the relevant knowledge, due to the lack
of relevant conceptual capacities. Forthis reason, the first kind of nonconceptual experience
shouldbelessinterestingtous.
Nevertheless, it is important to note the difference between the subject having the
relevant conceptual capacities and her having a name for an object or property. For those
objects or properties we do not have names for, the experiences of them can still be
conceptual, in that our conceptual capacities are not restricted to naming an object or
property. Hence experiences of objects and properties for which we do not have names are
still the source of empirical knowledge and deserve careful treatment. For this reason it is
important that we have a reply relating to this kind of nonconceptual experience. I shall
returntothisinchapter5.
The second kind of nonconceptual experience seems to be more pervasive and
damaging. To say experience is nonconceptual in thissense is to saywe experience without
exercising the conceptual capacities we may possess. And yet this nonconceptual
experience is accessible to us and is the source of empirical knowledge, which is articulated
by using the conceptual capacities we may possess. It is this second kind of nonconceptual
25 Apart from some self-claimed nonconceptualists, most of which take the mixed position and only insist some contents of
experiencearenonconceptual,therearealsomanyotherphilosopherswhoneverclaimthemselvesasnonconceptualistsbutin
fact take a nonconceptualist understanding of experience. Quine and Davidson are well-qualified nonconceptualists in this
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experience I shall focus on in this chapter. My attack on the second kind of nonconceptual
experience would nevertheless apply to the first kind of nonconceptual experience as well.
It is to attack the idea that we may base empirical knowledge on experience which is not
itselfconceptual.
The main task of the chapter is to argue that nonconceptual experience cannot
rationally justify empirical knowledge. Nonconceptualist epistemology is based on the idea
that there is a systematic relation between nonconceptual experience and thought. I argue
that this systematic relation can only be established when one exercises one’s conceptual
capacities to conceptualize one’s nonconceptual experience. The crucial point is: to
conceptualize a nonconceptual experience is simply to have a conceptual experience.
Nonconceptualexperience,whateveritis,turnsouttobesomethingirrelevant.
Ishall also considertwo other attempts to base empirical knowledgeon nonconceptual
experience. One is to justify empirical knowledge in an externalist way, the other to base
empirical knowledge on nonconceptual experience without justification. I argue that both
areproblematic.
The conclusion of the chapter is that nonconceptual experience cannot in any sense be
thesourceofempiricalknowledge.
2. Before setting out to argue against nonconceptualism, I shall make it clear that when I
talk about conceptual capacities, I actually equate them with language ability. Concepts are
constituents of thought. When we think in language, there are no additional concepts
expressed by language. Language is the concepts we think in, not an expression of the
conceptsthatmayhavetheirindependent existence.
The equation of conceptual capacities and language ability is essentially a
Wittgensteinian understanding of concept. Wittgenstein is explicitly against the idea that
when we think in language, there is an additional occurrence accompanying the verbal
expression of thought: “When I think in language, there aren’t ‘meanings’ going through
my mind in addition to the verbal expressions: the language is itself the vehicle of thought”
(1953, §329). This is against the following picture: “what he really ‘wanted to say’, what he
‘meant’ was already present somewhere in his mind even before we gave it expression”
(1953, §334). To the idea that one has the thought before finding the expression,
Wittgenstein asks the following question: “What did the thought consist in, as it existed
before its expression?” For Wittgenstein, “Thinking is not an incorporeal process which
lends life and sense to speaking, and which it would be possible to detach from speaking,
rather as the Devil took the shadow of Schlemiehl from the ground” (1953, §339). Thus,
following Wittgenstein, Dummett claims there are no “naked thoughts” which are “devoid47
oflinguisticorotherrepresentationalclothing”(1989,p.192).
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But what if someone says “It is this big”, showing the size of an object with the
distancebetweenherpalms?
27 In thiscase,itseemsthattheconceptofthesizeoftheobject
is expressed by a gesture, not language. But we need to see language does not have to use
acoustically conveyed sound pattern; it can instead use visually transmitted sign pattern. In
fact, this is where sign language comes from. Language does not have to take the form of
words;itcanalsotaketheformofgestures,pictures, etc.
It can be objected that we do not always think in language. We may sometimes, say,
think in images. But to think in images is not to think in concepts. To say we can think in
images is just to say there are constituents of thought other than concepts; it is not to say
images areconcepts. Aconcept,evenaconceptlike“chair”or“table”,hastobegeneralina
certain sense. The concept “chair” does not refer to any particular chair, or any particular
kind of chair, but rather applies to any, or any kind of, chair. An image, in contrast, cannot
begeneralinthesamesense.
It can be further objected that creatures with no language ability may also be able to
think and arguably possess concepts in a certain sense. But even if we allow for the
possibilitythat non-linguisticcreatures think, wehaveto specifyin virtueofwhat theythink.
If they think in language (it doesn’t have to be human language), then we can still say
conceptual capacities arelanguageability. Iftheythink in images, then theyarenot thinking
inconcepts.Conceptshavetobegeneralinacertainsense,andonlylanguagepossessesthis
function. To learn a concept is to learn the language. Some may think we can use image to
represent certain kind of thing and thus make image work in a general way. But if image
can really be used in this way, it is used as a language. And only in this way, it can function
assomethinggeneralandworkasaconcept.
The separation of conceptual capacities and language ability has recently been
advocated by Ginsborg, as a way of reconciling the conceptualist insight with “the
empiricist principle that experience precedes thought” (2006a, p.356). On the one hand,
Ginsborg admits that “it is hard to suppose that experience can present us with objects
unless those objects are also presented to us as having features or properties” (2006a, p.
354), and this implies experience can only present us with objects when it has conceptual
content (ibid., p. 355). On the other hand, she insists that we should respect “the empiricist
principlethat ourways ofthinkingabout theworld are indebted to ourways of perceiving it,
rather than the reverse” (2006a, p. 365). For Ginsborg, “our concepts are determined by the
way in which we experience things rather than the other way round” (2006a, p.365). She
thus agrees with nonconceptualist that “experience precedes thought, rather than the other
wayround”(2006a, p.350).
26 SeealsoBrandom1994,Davidson1975,Dummett1993.
27 MythankstoPaulSnowdonforraisingthequestionduringtheviva.48
Ginsborg thus believes we can have a version of conceptualism which “does not
commit us to a view on which experience is shaped by a set of concepts which we possess
antecedently to any experience. Rather it makes room for the idea that empirical concepts
are possible only in, and through, experience” (2006a, p. 357). Ginsborg then states that the
problem with nonconceptualists is that they have a more demanding understanding of
concepts; that is, they identify conceptual capacities with capacities for inference or
reasoning (as in the case of Crane and Martin), or even with the possession of a linguistic
capacity (as in the case of Ayers; ibid., p. 355-6). According to Ginsborg, it is this
demandingunderstandingofconceptswhichrendersconceptualismimplausible.
As I argued above, it is not clear what conceptual capacities can be if they are not
language ability. Ginsborg realizes that the less demanding understanding of concepts (as in
Peococke 1983), which characterizes a concept as a “way of thinking” or a “mode of
presentation” and “allows that thinkingincludes thehavingofexperiences and themodes of
presentation may be perceptual”, only makes conceptualism a “vacuous” view (2006a, p.
356). For Ginsborg, conceptual capacities do not “demand that one has mastered a
language” (ibid., p. 359). But this does not mean she agrees with (early) Peacocke that we
should understand a concept as a mode of presentation. She suggests: “Rather than
construing thepossession of a concept as amatter merelyofbeing able to perceive things in
a certain way…we can take it to involve, in addition, the consciousness that they ought to
be perceived in that way” (ibid.). But the problem is, how can experience involve the
consciousnessthatthings oughtto beperceived in“that way” if“that way” isnotdesignated
by language? There is no way of understanding conceptual capacities without
understandingitaslanguageability.
More importantly, the proposed rapprochement is at the expense of the basic idea of
conceptualism. First, for conceptualists, conceptual capacities have to be linguistic affairs.
Second, it is essential to conceptualism that there cannot be experience before the
acquisition of conceptual capacities, namely, language ability. Neither would this
reconciliation satisfy nonconceptualists. For those nonconceptualists who insist that
conceptual capacities are language ability, what Ginsborg calls conceptualism is just a
versionofnonconceptualism.
Hence there are also strategic reasons for equating conceptual capacities with language
abilityin this thesis. First, this is the understanding both Sellars and McDowell are happy to
follow. And to argue for conceptualism in this sense is to argue for real conceptualism.
Second,ifwecanshowthat experiencepresupposeslanguageability, thiswouldalsosatisfy
those who hold a less demanding understanding of conceptual capacities. Hence, in arguing
against nonconceptualism, the equation of conceptual capacities and language ability will
satisfyboth conceptualistsand nonconceptualists.49
3. Nonconceptualism understands experience as independent of the relevant conceptual
capacities we may possess. A nonconceptual experience is also called a Given. The term
“Given” is to be understood in contrast with “concept”. C. I. Lewis might be the first to
introduce the term “Given” in contemporary philosophy. According to Lewis, the Given is
“the immediate data, such as those of sense, which are presented or given to the mind”, and
the concept is “a form, construction, or interpretation, which represents the activity of
thought”(1929,p. 39). Whiletheconcept istheproduct oftheactivityofthought,theGiven
is independent of such activity. The Given is something in my experience which is
“qualitativelyno different than it would beif Iwere an infant oran ignorant savage”. Hence
according to Lewis, the Given has three features. It is the sensuous feel quality of
experience, it is what remains unaltered in experience, and it is ineffable. While “The pure
concept andthecontentofthegivenaremutuallyindependent;neitherlimitstheother”.
Lewis does not take experience as a pure Given, but rather claims that experience has
the Given and a conceptual interpretation of the Given as its two elements. According to
Lewis, it is something generallyrecognized that “there are in experience these two elements,
something given and the interpretation or construction put upon it” (1929, p. 48). But the
idea that there is a nonconceptual, certain, and indubitable Given that is immediately aware
of by the subject is taken to be established. The interpretation in experience, although
claimed to be in experience, is actually a separate element and does not change the way the
subject is aware of the Given. It is thus very natural that contemporary nonconceptualists
take the idea of the Given while discarding Lewis’s point that there is also an interpretation
oftheGiveninexperience.Experience,then,becomesapureGiven.
Philosophers may conceive the Given in different ways. For traditional empiricists, the
Given are ideas or impressions. For sense-data theorists, the Given are sense data. For
adverbial theorists like Chisholm, the Given is appearance. For theorists of appearing like
Alston, the Given is again appearance which is supposed to entail the existence of an
external object. For Evens, the Given is the information we get from the world which has a
kind of objective meaning. For Peacocke, the Given is the nonconceptual content in
experience which can be correct or incorrect. For Naive realists like Martin and Travis, the
Given is simply the world that presents in experience. In whatever way the Given is
conceived, the essential feature is that it is independent of the conceptual capacities we may
possess.
While nonconceptualists take the empiricist idea that experience is independent of
conceptual capacities, they take care to avoid another component of traditional empiricism,
namely, the idea of direct object. Hence one distinct feature of nonconceptualism is its
divergence from the sense data theories. Evans, for example, is anxious to distinguish
himself from sense data theorists. He criticises traditional epistemologists for considering50
sensation as data “intrinsically without objective content”, into which the subject is
supposed “to read the appropriate objective significance by means of an (extremely shaky)
inference” (1982, p. 122-3). For Evans, “The only events that can conceivably be regarded
as data for a conscious, reasoning subject are seemings—events, that is, already imbued
with(apparent)objectivesignificance”(1982,p.123).
Similarly, Alston makes it clear that theories of appearing are to be distinguished from
sense data theories in that they hold “In normal perception the direct, nonconceptual
awareness involved is awareness of the external object perceived” (2002, p. 72). According
to theories of appearing, “X  appears  φ to S  entails x  exists” (2002, p. 72). Thus the
appearance entails the relation between a perceiving subject and a perceived object. Alston
writes: “the heart of sense perception of external objects consists of facts of ‘appearing’,
facts that some object or other looks, sounds, smells, or tastes in a certain way to a
perceiver”(2002,p.71).
Peacocke insists that the nonconceptual representational content is “with a correctness
condition”. According to Peococke, an observational concept F can be “plausibly
individuated partly by its relations to a particular sort of nonconceptual content” and “the
holding of the correctness condition for the nonconceptual content in question ensures the
holdingofthecorrectnessconditionfortheconceptualcontentThat’sF”(2001,p.254).
Martin adheres to a version of disjunctive understanding of the object of experience,
according to which the object of perceptual experience is the physical world, while a
non-perceptual experience may not have an object at all. Hence, for Martin, “the actual
objects of perception, the external things such as trees, tables and rainbows, which one can
perceive, and the properties which they can manifest to one when perceived, partly
constitute one’s conscious experience, and hence determine the phenomenal character of
one’s experience”(1997,p.83).
Denying that experience is something which mediates between the subject and the
world, nonconceptualists are confident that they can base empirical knowledge on
nonconceptual experience. I shall follow Sellars and call these positions the doctrine of the
Given. The doctrine of the Given is the idea that we can base empirical knowledge on
nonconceptualexperience,namelytheGiven.
It is notso easytoseehowthisideaoftheGiven could work. Thequestionis:howcan
we base knowledge on something which is not knowledge? One version of the doctrine of
the Given is to insist that the Given is knowledge. This is the idea that experience, though
nonconceptual, can still be knowledge and thus provide foundation for inferential
knowledge. This version of the doctrine of the Given has been adequately attacked by
Sellars.
An initial strategy in Sellars’s attack on the Given is to attack the idea that
nonconceptual experience can be knowledge. According to Sellars, any kind of knowledge,51
inferential or non-inferential, has to be acquired, has to involve concept formation, and has
to presuppose knowledge of many other things. Sellars thus claims that we cannot have
knowledge without having the relevant concepts. The point is that, if we agree that
nonconceptual experience is knowledge, we will have a species of knowledge “not only
noninferential”, but also “presupposing no knowledge of other matter of fact, whether
particular or general” (1956, §32). This is to suppose knowledge is unacquired, which,
according to Sellars, ruins the most important point of empiricism. To stay with the
empiricist idea “that all classificatory consciousness, all knowledge that something is
thus-and-so…involves learning, concept formation, even the use of symbols”, we have to
insistthatnonconceptualexperienceisnotknowledge(1956, §6).
Sellars’s point is that the justificatory role of experience requires that it be knowledge,
and the latter in turn requires that experience presuppose conceptual capacities. This initial
attack only works for those who agree that experience has to be knowledge in order to
justifyknowledge. But most nonconceptualists insist that nonconceptual experiencejustifies
empirical knowledge, while happily agree that nonconceptual experience is not knowledge.
It isthefallacyofthissecondversionofthedoctrineoftheGiven Ishallnowaimtoexpose.
4.Therecanbedifferentways ofunderstandingnonconceptualexperienceasthefoundation
of empirical knowledge. Some nonconceptualists take a very positive attitude to this. They
take certain judgements and beliefs to be rationally grounded in the non-conceptual content
possessed by experience. Others insist we can justify empirical knowledge in an external
way. Still others think we can base empirical knowledge on experience without justification.
I shall now concentrate on the first version and will comment on the other two briefly
afterwards.
Peacocke argues that there is a rational linkage between nonconceptual content of
experience and beliefs or judgments. For him, “the nonconceptual protopropositional
content of experiences” can afford “not merely reasons but good reasons” for judgements
and beliefs (1992, p. 80). Peacocke admits that an experience of square “will indeed also
have a representational content involving that concept if the thinker possesses the
observational concept square”. But the point is that, for him, the rational linkage of
experience and judgements does not rely on the fact that the subject possesses the concept.
According to Peacocke, the nonconceptual content in experience “has a correctness
condition that concerns the world”, and “when the correctness condition of the relevant
nonconceptual contents is fulfilled”, theobject will reallybe as experienced (1992, p. 80). If
the correctness condition of the experience of a square is fulfilled, the object will really be
square. The nonconceptual experience can be true or false, this gives a rational reason for a
belieforjudgementwhichisbasedonit.52
Peacocke emphasizes that the “ways which feature in nonconceptual content are then
at the conscious, personal level, and are not merely subpersonal”. Hence “As features of the
subjective experience, their presence can entitle a thinker to make a particular judgment, or
toformacertainbelief”(2001,p.253).Peacockethusclaims:
A thinker can be rational in making a transition from an experience with a certain
nonconceptualrepresentational contentto ajudgmentwith acertain conceptualcontent,
in particular in making a transition to judging a content in which an observational
concept is predicated of presented objects or events. Such a transition is rational when
the thinker is entitled to take her experience at face value, and when the observational
concept is individuated in part at least as one that the thinker must be willing to judge
when experience has a certain kind of nonconceptual representational content (and is
beingtakenat facevalue).(2001, p.254)
Similarly, Ayers argues that experience does not need to have conceptual content in
order to stand in a rational relation to belief. He thinks that something propositional can be
based on something that is not only non-propositional, but also could not possibly be
propositional(2004,p.247).
Both Peacocke and Ayers believe that nonconceptual experience provides reason for
empirical knowledge. Then exactly what is the reason? Nonconceptual experience certainly
cannot work as the reason, since what we get in experience is only that “it looks that way”.
And exactly what that way is is still to be decided. Hence the first problem is: how can we
get from that way to, say, square? How can we know to look that way is to look square?
The only reason that you can point at a shape and by doing so mean a certain shape is that
you already see that shape as a certain shape, that is, you already employthe concept of that
shape in your visual experience. Now without the concept of that certain shape being
employed inexperience,wewouldnotbeabletoknowwhatthatshapeis.
For experience to justify empirical knowledge in a rational way, we have to know
what the experience is. To present experience as a reason for empirical judgement, one has
to be able to articulate it in language. This leads us to the problem of self-knowledge of
experience. For experience to justify empirical knowledge in a rational way, one has to
know what one’s experience is. This I consider as the minimum requirement for rational
justification. What justifies empirical knowledge has to be something that can be used for
justification. The subject has to have self-knowledge of her experience in order to justify
otherbeliefs withherexperience.
This is why McDowell urges us to respect the “time-honoured connection between
reason and discourse” (1994, p. 165). McDowell criticises Peacocke for severing “the tie
between reasons for which a subject thinks as she does and reasons she can give for53
thinking that way”. For McDowell, reasons have to be articulable, and this requires that
reasons be conceptual. He thus claims: “Reasons that the subject can give, in so far as they
arearticulable,mustbewithinthespaceofconcepts”(1994, p.165).
There should be no problem for self-knowledge of experience if we understand
experience itself as conceptual: self-knowledge of experience is simply experience itself.
Understood in this way, to self-ascribe an experienceis just to look at theworld and havean
experience. This is very much like self-knowledge of one’s belief: to have self-knowledge
of one’s belief is just to have the belief. As Evans happily agrees, “in making a
self-ascription of belief, one’s eyes are, so to speak, or occasionally literally, directed
outward—upontheworld”(1982, p.225).
But without experience presupposing conceptual capacities, the subject will not be
ableto haveself-knowledgeofher experiencein thisway. Nonconceptualism has to explain
how we can have knowledge of our own experience if experience is not itself conceptual.
Nonconceptual experience itself certainly does not count as self-knowledge of experience.
Nonconceptualists thus have to treat self-ascription of belief and self-ascription of
perceptualexperienceindifferentways.ThisisexactlythecasewefindinEvans.
For Evans, the self-ascription of experience follows a different model from the
self-ascription of belief. According to Evans, one’s self-knowledge of experience is exactly
the judgment to be based on the experience. Thus “a subject can gain knowledge of his
internal informational states…by re-using precisely those skills of conceptualization that he
usestomakejudgements abouttheworld”.Hewrites:
He goes through exactly the same procedure as he would go through if he were trying
to make ajudgement about howit is at this placenow,but excludinganyknowledgehe
has ofan extraneouskind.(Thatis,heseeks todeterminewhat hewouldjudgeifhedid
nothavesuch extraneousinformation.)(1982,p.227-8)
Evans is suggesting that one conceptualizes one’s experience when trying to give a
description of it. In fact, this may be the only solution available to him. And he claims what
the subject gets from the procedure “will necessarily be closely correlated with the content
of the informational state which he is in at that time”. The distinct feature of this kind of
self-knowledge is that “he may prefix this result with the operator ‘It seems to me as
though…’”. In this way, according to Evans, the subject can produce in himself, and give
expression to, “acognitivestatewhosecontent is systematicallydependent upon the content
of the informational state”, and “the systematic dependence is a basis for him to claim
knowledgeoftheinformational”(1982,p.227-8).
Now, according to Evans’s picture, to have self-knowledge of one’s experience is to
conceptualize the experience, and the conceptualization of experience relies on the54
systematic relation between experience and the judgment based on experience. This first of
all draws our attention to the alleged systematic relation between nonconceptual experience
and empiricalknowledge.
5. No matterhow the epistemological relation between experienceand thought is conceived,
nonconceptualists always insist there is a systematic relation between nonconceptual
experience and thought. Evans writes, “the subject’s thoughts, plans, and deliberations are
alsosystematicallydependentontheinformationalpropertiesoftheinput”(1982,p.158).
However, given theclaim that experienceis independent ofconceptual capacities, how
can nonconceptualists secure the systematic relation between experience and the judgement
based on it? Nonconceptualists seem to assume that there is a structure in the Given, which
is correspondent to the structure we have in thought. But from where does the Given get its
structure? If there is a structure in the content of the experience, this structure will only
come from the conceptual capacities we exercised in it. If there are no conceptual capacities
exercisedinexperience,therewillbenostructuretobefoundinit.
It is exactly this supposed systematic relation between nonconceptual experience and
thought that falls prey of Sellars’s attack on the Given. Sellars denies that “there is any
awareness of logical space prior to, or independent of, the acquisition of a language” (1956,
§30). He points out that the idea “is committed to a stratum of authoritative nonverbal
episodes (‘awareness’) the authority of which accrues to a superstructure of verbal actions,
provided that the expressions occurring in these actions are properly used” (1956, §34). He
writes:
The idea that observation “strictly and properly so-called” is constituted by certain
self-authenticating nonverbal episodes, the authority of which is transmitted to verbal
and quasi-verbal performances when theseperformances aremade “in conformitywith
the semantical rules of the language,” is of course, the heart of the Myth of the Given.
(1956, §38)
The alleged systematic relation between nonconceptual experience and thought is a radical
mistake which Sellars first of all finds in sensedatatheories, according to which, “epistemic
facts can be analyzed without remainder—even ‘in principle’—into non-epistemic facts”
(1956, §5).
This also applies to other versions of the idea of the Given, say, theories of appearing.
Sellars remarks: “The essence of the view is the same whether these intrinsically
authoritative episodes are such items as the awareness that a certain sense content is green
or such items as the awareness that a certain physical object looks to someone to be green”55
(1956, §34). It is this self-structured Given which is taken as the foundation of knowledge.
As Sellars points out: “For the given, in epistemological tradition, is what is taken by these
self-authenticating episodes. These ‘takings’ are, so to speak, the unmoved movers of
empiricalknowledge”(1956,§38).
For Sellars, there is no systematic relation between the Given and thought. This makes
it impossible for the Given to justify thought. Thus according to Sellars’s attack on the
Given, for experience to be within the space of concepts, it has to presuppose conceptual
capacities.
If experience is considered as independent of our conceptual capacities, then it will be
difficult to understand how we can relate experience to conceptual knowledge, and hence
derive knowledge from experience. According to nonconceptualism, when I see a plant in
front of me, the way I experience the plant, say, the greenness I sense, has nothing to do
with the concept “green” which I may possess. Then the problem is, how can I have the
thought “the plant is green” if the greenness I sense is not related to the concept “green” in
thefirstplace?
The reason there is no systematic relation between nonconceptual experience and
thought is that language does not gain its existence from nonconceptual experience. The
structure determined by our conceptual capacities is not derived from the alleged structure
pre-existent in nonconceptual experience. What is problematic is exactly the empiricist idea
thatexperienceprecedesthought.
Nonconceptualists may have a response to this. Although experience itself is not an
exercise of conceptual capacities, it presupposes conceptual capacities in a general sense.
We are alreadyin alanguage system, and against this language system, there is asystematic
relation between a nonconceptual experience and a description of it. The idea is: the
systematic relation between a nonconceptual experience and a description of it can be
established onceweexerciseourconceptual capacities and conceptualizethenonconceptual
experience.
Nowweneedtoexaminewhatitistoconceptualizeanonconceptualexperience.
6. According to nonconceptualism, our language ability makes it possible for us to relate
nonconceptual experience to thought. This is called the conceptualization of nonconceptual
experience. Evans, for example, insists judgments based upon experience “necessarily
involve conceptualization”. Hence, “in moving from a perceptual experience to a
judgementabouttheworld(usuallyexpressibleinsomeverbalform),onewillbeexercising
basic conceptual skills” (1982, p. 227). In the same vein, Crane says “belief formation
conceptualizes the content of perceptual states” (1988a, p. 153). The idea is that, as concept
users,wehavenoproblemin conceptualizinganonconceptual experienceandassigningit a56
conceptual content. And it is the conceptualization of nonconceptual experience which
providesreasonforempiricalknowledge.
Thequestionisthen:whatisittoconceptualizeanonconceptualexperience?
The first thing we should note is that to conceptualizea nonconceptual experience is to
conceptualize the object of experience. Hence the question is refined as: how to
conceptualizetheobjectofexperience?
Suppose Iam looking at achair. Without myexperiencebeing conceptual, Ido not see
the chair as a chair or anything else. Now I begin to conceptualize my experience, or more
precisely, the object of my experience, namely the chair. If I am still looking at the chair,
then to conceptualize my experience of the chair is simply to have a conceptual experience
of the chair. Hence what I end up with is a different experience, not a conceptualization of
the same experience. If we agree with nonconceptualists that it is in fact the
conceptualization ofnonconceptual experiencewhichgives reason forempiricalknowledge
and admit that to conceptualize an experience is actually to have a conceptual experience,
then we have to accept it is conceptual experience which provides reasons for empirical
knowledge.Nonconceptualexperience,ifthereissuchathingatall,dropsasirrelevant.
Suppose, conversely, that I am determined to conceptualize the original experience
and not to shift to a different experience. What I need to do is to turn away from the object
of experience and try to conceptualize it in my memory. This would require that I have a
vivid, snapshot-like memory which captures every detail of the object without putting it
under a description. It is not clear that we can have a memory like this, however let’s grant
this possibility for the sake of argument. I can now conceptualize the object in my memory
and decide it is a chair that I was experiencing. This, however, is still not to conceptualize
experience; it is to conceptualize the memory of the experience, or, more accurately, the
memory of the object of the experience. Moreover, once my memory is conceptualized in
this way, I now have a different memory of the same object. There are then two points to
note. First, we still cannot conceptualize the nonconceptual experience. All we can do is to
conceptualize the memory of the experience. Second, to conceptualize a memory is to have
a conceptual memory. Hence even the conceptualization of a nonconceptual memory is not
possible.
Thus, to conceptualize a nonconceptual experience, if there is an experience as such at
all, is either to have a conceptual experience, or to have a conceptual memory. Then what
plays the justificatory role is either a conceptual experience or a conceptual memory, the
nonconceptualexperienceormemorydoesnotinanysensecontributetothejustification.
Martin has a special case against this. He invites us to imagine that Archie, having
failed to find the cuff link in the drawer, later searches his memory of the contents of the
drawerandpays attentiontoorconceptualizesthecufflinkinhismemoryofthedrawerand
eventuallyfindsthecufflinkintherealdrawer(1992,p.749-750).57
The idea that the subject searches his memory for the cuff link does not seem to be
plausible. It is understandable that we may search the drawer without being able to find the
cuff link which is not only in the drawer but also well in our view field. This explains why,
when two people are searching the same drawer from equally good points of view, one
finds the cuff link while the other does not. (As I understand it, to be in one’s view field is
not the same as to be in one’s experience). But if the subject is uncertain about the result of
his search of the drawer, it is more likely that she searches the drawer again instead of
searching her memory. In any case, as Martin himself admits, eventually the key has to be
foundinthedrawer,notinhismemory.
More importantly, Martin seems to commit to a snapshot view of experience and
memory, which is very problematic. For Martin, experience is like a snapshot which can be
retained in memory without losing any details or undergoing any changes. The snapshot
conception of experience assumes that when we see, we have all the details of the object in
experience. But as Noë points out correctly: “We don’t have the detailed world in
consciousness all at once” (2004, p. 51). Hence “The world is present to me now, not as
represented,butas accessible”(2004,p.192).
28
Thesnapshot viewofexperienceis falsified bythephenomenaofdifferenceblindness,
in which the subject fails to spot a visible difference that has been made to the scene when
the change that gives rise to the difference is not viewed by the subject. Suppose you are
looking at your friend and talking to her. Something else draws your attention and you turn
to it briefly. When you turn away, your friend changes the position of her arm. You turn
back to your friend but don’t notice the difference between the two scenes. The lesson we
may learn from this is that we do not see the difference because we do not see every detail
of the scene. As Noë remarks, “vision is, to some substantial degree,
attention-dependent…youonlyseethattowhich youattend.”(2004,p. 25).
Dretske’s response to the case of difference blindness is that we see both scenes,
although wedon’t seethedifferencebetween thetwo scenes. Seeingthedifferencebetween
the two scenes, according to Dretske, demands extra attention (2004). However, it is
important to note the difference between different senses of seeing. Suppose I briefly see
two sheets of white paper, both of which are fully printed with English words, without
seeinganyparticularwords on thesheets. In this caseIcertainlycannot tell ifthetwo sheets
of paper are printed with the same words in the same order. And this, of course, is not
because I have seen all the words on the sheets but cannot tell the difference between the
words on the two sheets. The reason is that I simply haven’t seen any particular words on
the two sheets. Hence, seeing two sheets of paper printed with English words is different
from seeing all the English words printed on the two sheets of paper. In the same vein,
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seeing a room full of furniture and toys is different from seeing all the furniture and toys in
the room. My experience of seeing a sheet of paper printed with English words is then not
somethinglikeasnapshotofthesheet which Icanlaterrefertoandconceptualize.
Consequently, to haveamemoryofexperienceis notto retain asnapshot. In fact,what
is retained in memory is already something conceptual. As Quine remarks correctly:
“Actual memories mostly are traces not of past sensation but of past conceptualization or
verbalization” (1960, p. 3). One’s experiential memory changes when one’s understanding
of the matter changes. I might think someone smiled to show her friendship. But later I
realize she is not really a friendly person and was not friendly to me at that particular
occasion. I may then change my way of understanding and say “she smiled to fake
friendship”. Now the point is: a sincere smile is essentially different from a fake smile. So,
intryingtorecallhowshesmiled, Imaynowhaveadifferentimage.
Hence both experience and memory of experience are already conceptual. Neither is a
snapshot to be conceptualized. In fact, the problem for Martin’s example is exactly the
problem for the idea of conceptualizing a nonconceptual experience. To conceptualize
nonconceptual experienceis simplyto havea conceptual experience. And ifweagreethat it
is the conceptualization of nonconceptual experience which plays a justificatory role, then
we have to admit that it is conceptual experience which justifies belief. The rational link
between nonconceptual experience and thought is then a myth. This is exactly what Sellars
callstheMyth oftheGiven.
I shall now move on to consider the suggestion that nonconceptual experience justifies
beliefinan externalistway.
7. It can be suggested that it is good enough if nonconceptual experience justifies empirical
knowledge in an externalist way, and that for this reason, we don’t need to worry about the
rational relation between experienceand knowledge. This is thestrategy, forexample, taken
byAlston.
Alston admits that “adult human perception” is “heavily concept laden”. He agrees
that “Perception is, typically, a certain kind of use of concepts, even if…the cognition
involved is not only that”. His contention is that “there is a cognitive component of
perception that is non-conceptual” and “it is this element that gives perception its distinctive
character vis-a-vis other modes of cognition”. For Alston, “this nonconceptual direct
awareness of objects is fundamental to conscious perception” (2002, p. 73), or, “These
appearings arenonconceptualin character”.Hewrites:
There is a crucial distinction between ‘The tree looks green to S’, on the one hand, and
‘S takes the tree to be green’or ‘S applies the concept of green (of tree) to what S sees’59
on the other…In order for the tree to look green to S it is only necessary that S visually
discriminate the tree from its surroundings by its color (not necessarily only by its
color).(2002,p.71-72)
Alston’s understanding of looking green is obviously not plausible. As Rosenberg
points out correctly, “S will presumably also ‘visually discriminate the tree from its
surroundings by its color’whatever color it looks to her” (2006, p. 160). What we need to
specify here is exactly that the colour is green rather than any others. And this cannot be
donebysimplydiscriminatingthetreefrom its surroundingwhich, presumably, is eithernot
greenoradifferentshadeofgreen.
Alston nevertheless insists that “our direct awareness of X’s…provides a basis
(justification, warrant…) for beliefs about those X’s” (2002, p. 71). According to Alston,
“nonconceptual appearings can provide justification for beliefs about the objects that
appear” (2002, p. 82). The reason is that “how things appear is a reliable, though fallible,
guide to how they are” (2002, p. 73). He claims, “if , as Ihave been arguing, looking Pis in
itself a nonconceptual mode of experience, however much it may be blended with
subsequent conceptualization, belief about what is perceived can be justified by a
nonconceptualexperiencefromwhichtheyspring”(2002,p,83).
Alston’s strategy is to insist that there is a causal relation between nonconceptual
experience and perceptual beliefs, and this causal relation, is not only compatible with the
rational relation but also presupposed by the latter. According to him, “if the belief were not
engendered by the looking, it would not be nearly so plausible to suppose that the looking
justifies thebelief” (2002, p. 84). Hethus insists thatbeliefcan bejustified byappearancein
an externalist way. For Alston, “one can be prima facie justified in believing that X is P by
virtue of that belief’s stemming from X’s appearing to S as P”. Thus for Alston, although
the subject does not herself have any cognitive grasp at all of the reason for her belief, her
belief is still justified by the appearance in that it is caused by the appearance. What Alston
has is then a third person conception of justification: “One can be justified in believing
manythingsthatonehasnotjustifiedand,indeed,isnotabletojustify”(2002,p.85).
Similarly, what Evans has can only be an externalist story, since, for him, there is only
acausalrelationbetweeninformationstatesand experientialjudgments:
In general, we may regard a perceptual experience as an informational state of the
subject: it has a certain content—the world is represented a certain way—and hence it
permits of a non-derivative classification as true or false. Judgements are then based
upon (reliablycaused by) theseinternal states; when this isthecasewecan speak ofthe
information being ‘accessible’to the subject, and, indeed, of the existence of conscious
experience. (1982,p.227-8)60
The externalist understanding of justification is problematic. First, this is not the
normal way we understand justification. When we say S is justified in believing P on the
basis of X, we mean S takes X as her reason for believing P. Justification is thus essentially
a reason-giving activity, which cannot be replaced by a causal relation. Second, it is not true
that a subject cannot cite her experience as her reason for holding a belief. If one’s belief
stems from a certain experience, then one usually knows that one’s belief is derived from
the experienceand can thus citetheexperienceas one’s reason forholdingthebelief. Hence
what we need is to explain this reason giving activity, not to deny it. Thirdly, it is simply a
mistake to say that a belief is caused by something, either experience or something else. As
a matter of fact, our beliefs are mostly based on reasons, not physically caused by
something. That is the nature of our rationality. Fourthly, a causal relation between
nonconceptual experience and belief cannot be sustained because there is no one to one
relation between a nonconceptual experience and a belief which is supposed to be caused
by it. Anonconceptual experience does not have the capacity to cause a belief. The reliable
causal relation between nonconceptual experience and the judgement based on it is itself a
MythoftheGiven.
8. It can even be suggested that experience can work as the tribunal of thought without
justification.ThisistheideawefindinQuine.
Quine claims that “our statements about the external world face the tribunal of
experience not individually but as a corporate body” (1953, p. 41). But he conceives
experience as “the stimulation of…sensory receptors” (1969, p. 75). Hence what he means
by the tribunal of experience is something very different from what we may expect.
Accordingto Quine, “surfaceirritations generate, through language, one’s knowledgeofthe
world” (1960, p. 26). And “it is to such stimulation that we must look for whatever
empirical content there may be” (1960, p. 26). For Quine, the base blocks of the arch of
knowledge “are sentences conditioned…to non-verbal stimuli” (1960, p. 11). He writes:
“So theproposition that external things areultimatelyto beknown onlythrough theiraction
on our bodies should be taken as one among various coordinate truth, in physics and
elsewhere,aboutinitiallyunquestionedphysicalthings”(1960,p.4).
Hence Quine does not think that we can base theory on sensations in the way
traditional epistemologistsconceiveit. For Quine, sensation orexperienceis nonconceptual.
This is what he calls the “unsullied stream of experience” (1960, p. 10). He is thus against
theideaof trying“to abstract out apurestream ofsense experienceand then depict physical
doctrine as a means of systematizing the regularities discernible in the stream” (1960, p. 2).
According to Quine, “two men could be just alike in all their dispositions to verbal61
behaviour under all possible sensory stimulations, and yet the meanings or ideas expressed
in their identically triggered and identically sounded utterances could diverge radically, for
the two men, in a wide range of cases” (1960, p. 26). For Quine, there is a definite
distinction between the invariant content and the variant conceptual trappings, between
“report and invention, substance and style, cues and conceptualization”. And the
“conceptual sovereignty” is the domain within which one can “revise theory while saving
the data” (1960, p. 5). Quine thus points out the mistake of “seeking an implicit
sub-basementofconceptualization,orlanguage”insensedata(1960,p.3).Hewrites:
…we have no reason to suppose that man’s surface irritations even unto eternity admit
of any one systematization that is scientifically better or simpler than all possible
others…Scientific method is the way to truth, but it affords even in principle no unique
definition of truth. Any so-called pragmatic definition of truth is doomed to failure
equally.(1960,p.23)
Quine correctly maintains that there is no systematic relationship between a sense
datum and a later conceptualization. Then how can we account for knowledge which is
supposed to start from experience? Quine’s suggestion is that we should give up the goal of
justifying science on the basis of observation and instead study the ways in which we form
beliefs. According to Quine, “The stimulation of his sensory receptors is all the evidence
anybody has had to go on, ultimately, in arriving at his picture of the world. Why not just
seehowthisconstructionreallyproceeds?Whynotsettleforpsychology? (1969,p.75)
Quine thus recommends that we study the psychological processes that take us from
sensory stimulations to beliefs about the world. For Quine, “Epistemology, or something
like it falls into place as a chapter of psychology and hence of natural science” (1969, pp.
82-3). He thus thinks that the question of “reason” is not essential for epistemology and we
can instead do epistemology by answering the question of “cause”. It is not essential to
know what the reason is for holding a belief. We can instead satisfy ourselves by
investigating what is causally responsible for one’s holding a belief. He thus thinks the talk
of “cause” can replace the talk of “reason” in epistemology. This is the idea of Quine’s
“naturalizedepistemology”.
Unlike all thenonconceptualists mentioned above, Quine sees it clearlythat thereis no
systematic relation between nonconceptual experience and thought. Hence it is not possible
to cite nonconceptual experience as the reason for thought, whether it is in an internalist or
an externalist sense. Quine thus considers experience as the tribunal of thought without
endowingitwithajustificatoryrole.
However, it is not clear that this “surrender of the epistemological burden to
psychology” is satisfactory. First, as it is widelyrecognized, rational relation is distinct from62
and irreducible to causal relation. Belief is a rational state and needs a rational basis; a
causal explanation cannot serve the purpose. Second, as I said at the end of last section, as
rational animals, webaseourbeliefs on reasons. Beliefis not somethingblindlycaused bya
physical happening; we simply do not formulate belief in this mechanical way. Thirdly,
there is no reliable causal relation between “surface irritation” and a generated belief. As
Quine himself well recognizes, there is no systematic relation between the surface irritation
and thought. Thereis thenno reason to thinkthat sciencecould eventuallyprovideus with a
satisfactory story about the causal relation between sensation and thought. Hence
nonconceptual experience cannot even work as a causal tribunal of thought, if there is a
kindoftribunalassuch.
29
9. The problem with nonconceptualism is that once experience is conceived as
nonconceptual, it would immediately lose the kind of structure on which we need to base
thought. There is then no way to establish a connection between thought and experience.
Nonconceptual experience thus cannot in anyway work as a foundation of thought, either
rational or causal. It cannot be the source of knowledge exactly because it is not accessible
to thought. And the reason that nonconceptual experience is not accessible to thought is that
the world is not accessible to nonconceptual experience. Nonconceptual experience does
notsayanythingabouttheworld.Thatiswhyitcannottellusanythingabouttheworld.
29 Forcriticismsofnaturalizedepistemology,see,forexample,Kim1988,Lennon2000&2003.63
4.ConceptualismandtheNewMythoftheGiven
1. McDowell’s conceptualism says the content of experience is conceptual, that is,
experienceis itselfan exerciseofconceptual capacities. This is to opposenonconceptualism
which states that the content of experience is nonconceptual. The most important
motivation for conceptualism is an epistemological consideration. What much engages
McDowell’s attention is the debate between the empiricist form of foundationalism which
embracestheMythoftheGivenand Davidson’s“unconstrained coherentism”(McDowell’s
terminology) which,accordingtoMcDowell,is“thethesisthattherearenoexternal rational
constraints on exercises of spontaneity” (1994, p. 143). McDowell believes conceptualism
canreconcilethetruthinbothwithoutfallingintotheerrorsofeither.
The idea of nonconceputalism is that experience is independent of any conceptual
capacities the subject may possess. That is, experience is itself nonconceptual or
nonconceptualized; it is something waiting to be conceptualized. We can distinguish two
different ways of envisaging the relation between nonconceptual experience and empirical
knowledge and thus distinguish two different versions of nonconceptualism. First, there is
an effort among nonconceptualists to take nonconceptual experience as the foundation of
our empirical knowledge. What they have is therefore the empiricist form of
foundationalism. Since what is considered as the foundation of knowledge is a
nonconceptualGiven,itisalso calledthedoctrineoftheGiven.
The main problem with this version of nonconceptualism, according to McDowell, is
that it cannot explain how we can justify empirical knowledge with experience. The reason
is that nonconceptual experience cannot provide reasons for empirical knowledge. This is
based on Sellars’s attack on the doctrine of the Given. Sellars’s reasoning is like this. If
experience is to be able to justify empirical knowledge, it has to be itself knowledge. And if
experienceis to beknowledge, it has to presupposeknowledgeofmanyotherthings, that is,
to possess the relevant conceptual capacities. Hence it is a myth that experience which
presupposes no conceptual capacities can justify empirical knowledge. McDowell joins
Sellars in his attack on the Myth of the Given. He insists nonconceptual experience cannot
justify empirical knowledge: “‘Intuitions without concepts’ are mute; they can pass no
verdicts” (1999, p. 92). The reason is that the relation between nonconceptual experience
and belief is causal instead of rational and “a merely causal relation cannot do duty for a
justificatoryrelation”(1994,p.71,n.2).
In the light of this, a nonconceptualist may also envisage experience as having nothing
rational to do with empirical knowledge, as Davidson does. This is the second version of
nonconceptualism. This version of nonconceptualism denies it is necessary to base our64
empirical knowledge on experience. Davidson admits “meaning and knowledge depend on
experience, and experience ultimately on sensation”.
30 But according to Davidson, “this is
the‘depend’ofcausality, not ofevidenceorjustification”. This leads him to epistemological
coherentism which denies “knowledge is grounded on something that counts as an ultimate
source of evidence” (1983, p. 146). For Davidson, “the search for epistemological
foundations in preconceptual experience” is “pointless” (1988, p. 47). Hence the second
versionofnonconceptualismembracescoherentismtoavoidtheMythoftheGiven.
McDowell is equally unsatisfied with this second version of nonconceptualism. He
urges us to guard against Davidson’s “unconstrained coherentism” which excludes
experience from our belief system. McDowell insists that experience has to work as a
rational constraint on thought, that is, to provide justification for empirical knowledge. On
the one hand, “our activity in empirical thought and judgment” must be “recognizable as
bearing on reality”. Hence “there must be external constraint” on thought (1994, p. 9). On
the other hand, it is the “cognitive predicament” (1996, p. xii) of human beings to confront
the world by means of experience. Hence the only way for thought to be constrained by the
world is for it to be constrained by experience. This requires that we consider experience as
a foundation or tribunal of empirical knowledge. Thought must be subject to a verdict from
experience.Thisistheideaofhisminimalempiricism.
But how can we make experience a rational constraint on thought without falling into
the Myth of the Given? Both Sellars and McDowell believe the only obstacle for the idea
that experience justifies empirical knowledge is the idea that experience is non-linguistic or
nonconceptual. Thus for Sellars and McDowell, the only problem for nonconceptualism
and the Myth of the Given is that nonconceptual experience does not speak and hence
conveys no verdict. The solution would then be to see that experience actually speaks and
conveys a verdict. In this sense, Sellars’s attack on the Given actually at the same time
pointstoasolution.Andhereishispsychologicalnominalism:
…all awareness of sorts, resemblances, facts, etc., in short, all awareness of abstract
entities—indeed,allawareness evenofparticulars—isalinguisticaffair. (1956,§29)
For Sellars, “perceptual experience also involves a conceptual or propositional
component—a ‘thinking’in a suitably broad sense of this accordion term”. “In perception,
the thought is caused to occurto one…” And thebest term to call such athought, according
to Sellars, is “taking something to be the case” (1975, pp. 129-130). This gives a positive
understanding of experience: experience has a thinking component in it. And the positive
understandingofexperienceinturnleadstoapositiveunderstandingoftherelationbetween
30 ItisnotextremelyclearwhatthedistinctionbetweensensationandexperienceissupposedtobeforDavidson.65
experience and knowledge. Being a linguistic affair, and hence being “in the logical space
of reasons”, experience can now play a justificatory role for empirical knowledge. As
Sellars puts it, “in characterizing experience as a state of knowing, … we are placing it in
the logical space of reasons, of justifying and being able to justify what one says” (1956,
§36).
The basic idea of McDowell’s conceptualism is actually Sellars’s psychological
nominalism.
31 According to McDowell, “The relevant conceptual capacities are drawn on
in receptivity” (1994, p. 9). Hence “the world’s impressions on our senses are already
possessed of conceptual content” (1994, p. 18). This means experience is already
conceptual and does not need further construction. “When experience makes conceptual
content available to one, that is itself one’s sensibility in operation, not understanding
puttingaconstructiononsomepre-conceptualdeliverancesofsensibility”(1994,p.67).
Thus conceptualism seems to be able to solve the epistemological problem
successfully. As Sellars and McDowell understand it, once we realize experience is
linguistic or conceptual, the rational relation between experience and belief is established
and there should be no problem in bestowing a justificatory role upon experience. And for
McDowell, this means “appearances can constitute reasons for judgements about objective
reality” (1994, p. 62). Hence according to McDowell, once we realize experience is
conceptual, there is then no problem for confronting our beliefs with the tribunal of
experience. And the foundation of our empirical knowledge is secured. We can “avoid the
Myth of the Given without renouncing the claim that experience is a rational constraint on
thinking” (1994, p. 18). This is the alleged epistemological advantage of conceptualism
overnonconceptualism.
I agree with Sellars and McDowell that it is necessary that experience is linguistic or
conceptual for it to play a role in belief justification. But is this sufficient? This crucially
depends on what Sellars means by saying that experience is “a linguistic affair” or “a state
of knowing” and what McDowell means bysaying that experience is “conceptual”. In what
follows, I shall argue that being linguistic or conceptual in the sense Sellars and McDowell
proposeisnotsufficientforexperiencetoplayaroleinbeliefjustification.
31 It isimportant to note Sellarshimself never uses theterm“conceptualism” to dub his position. And where he doesuse the
term “conceptualism,” he relates it to the idea of “treating sensations as though they were absolutely specific, and infinitely
complicated,thoughts”(1956,§26).And“thisassimilationofsensationstothoughts”isexactlythecentralideaoftheMythof
theGiventhatSellarsmeanstoattack(1956,§25).ButSellars’sattackontheideaoftheassimilationofsensationstothoughts
actuallypavesthewayforhispsychologicalnominalism.ForSellars,thedistinctionbetweensensationandexperienceisclear
and crucial. In Sellars, the positive understanding of experience, namely, experience presupposes conceptual capacities, is at
the same time a negative understanding of sensation, that is, without presupposing conceptual capacities, sensation cannot be
assimilatedtothought.AsSellarshimselfmakesitclear,“theprimaryconnotationof‘psychologicalnominalism’isthedenial
that there is any awareness of logical space prior to, or independent of, the acquisition of a language” (1956, §31). Hence
given the divergence of the use of the terminology, the basic idea of Sellars’s psychological nominalism and McDowell’s
conceptualism is essentially the same. And for the sake of simplicity, I assume it does not do much harm to call Sellars a
conceptualist. But it is also important to note a difference between Sellars and McDowell. For McDowell, experience is
conceptual through and through, while for Sellars, “perceptual experience involves a sensory element which is in no way a
formofthinking,howeverintimatelyitmaybeconnectedwiththinking”(1975,p.129).66
2. Saying experience is conceptual, conceptualism may give the impression that it insists
experienceis belief. But this is not the case. Both Sellars and McDowell agreeexperienceis
not belief. For Sellars and McDowell, that experience presupposes conceptual capacities
does not mean it is itself a belief. In this sense, they are with Evans. Evans insists that we
“reserve ‘belief’ for the notion of a far more sophisticated cognitive state” (1982, p. 124).
This is to “takethenotion of being in an informational state with such-and-such contents as
a primitive notion for philosophy, rather than to attempt to characterize it in terms of belief”
(1982, p.123).
For McDowell, as it is for Evans, there is a disconnection between experience and
belief. “Its appearing to me that things are thus and so is not obviously to be equated with
mybelievingsomething. Certainlynot with mybelievingthat things arethus andso”(1994,
p.140;seealso2002a,p.278).McDowell’s conceptualismrequiresonlythis:
In experience one takes in, for instance sees, that things are thus and so. That is the sort
ofthingonecan also,forinstance,judge. (1994,p.9)
What McDowell requires for experience to be conceptual is only that experience possesses
the kind of conceptual content we can also judge; it is not that experience is itself a
judgement.
It might be worth mentioning that for McDowell, there is a distinction between
judgement and belief, according to which, “judging, making up our minds what to think, is
somethingforwhich weareresponsible—somethingwefreelydo, as opposed to something
that merely happens in our lives”, while “a belief is not always, or even typically, a result of
our exercising this freedom to decide what to think” (1998, p. 434). McDowell does not
require that we always acquire a belief by making active judgement. And he agrees
perceptual belief acquisition is not typically a matter of active judging. Hence when he says
experience is not belief, he is not just saying that we do not make active, critical judgement
in experience. What he means is that there is no acceptance in experience. To acquire
perceptual belief, “having it look to one as if things are a certain way” has to become
“acceptingthatthingsarethewaybyasortofdefault”(1998,p.439).
Hence McDowell says experience is conceptual not in the sense that experience is
belief; it is only in the sense that experience is propositional. The content of experience is
considered as something merely presented, not actually accepted, in experience. We may
define a belief as a doxastic propositional attitude and understand belief as a doxastic67
attitude which is propositional.
32 For McDowell, experience is propositional but not a
doxasticattitude;itisnotaproperpropositionalattitude.
Things seem to be more complicated in Sellars. Sellars happily agrees that
“observings” are “knowings” (1956, §36). On one occasion he writes: “Thus, on the
occasion of sensing a certain color configuration, one takes there to be an object or situation
of a certain description in one’s physical environment” (1975, pp. 129-130). This may give
theimpressionthatSellarsthinksthat experienceinvolves attitudeorjudgement.Butamore
carefulstudyofSellarssuggeststheopposite.Sellarswrites,
…to say that a certain experience is a seeing that something is the case, is to do more
than describe the experience. It is to characterize it as, so to speak, making an assertion
orclaim,and—whichisthepoint Iwishtostress—toendorsethat claim.(1956,§16)
Sellars here makes a distinction between saying that “a certain experience is a seeing
that something is the case” and describing the experience. The former is to characterize
experience as making an assertion or claim and to endorse that claim, while the latter only
describes experience as it is. For Sellars, to experience is to be presented with a conceptual
content but not to endorse that content. Hence what Sellars is trying to say is actually this.
To describe an experience as seeing something is the case is to take an attitude towards the
content oftheexperience. Theattitude, namelytheendorsement, is notin experience; it isin
thought. Thus Sellars’s talk of endorsing the claim in experience suggests that there is no
attitudeinexperienceandtheattitudeisintheendorsementoftheclaim.
It can be objected that Sellars’s saying of endorsing experience does not simply mean
there is no attitude in experience. Sellars also talks of experience as making an assertion or
claim, and this, the objection goes, implies that he thinks experience involves attitude, since
an assertion or claim should be something like a judgement or belief. For this reason
Williams suggests that, for Sellars, when we endorse an experience, “what we endorse are
claimings, not claimables”. He thus thinks that “Sellars takes the assertional character of
experienceveryseriously”(2006, p.312).
According to Williams’s reading, Sellars’s understanding would allow judgement in
both the endorsement of the claim and the claim itself. To endorse the claim is to endorse
the judgement contained in experience, that is, to judge a judgement. This seems to suggest
that Sellars has two judging subjects in mind. One is the experiencing subject, the other the
thinking subject; and the thinking subject seems to be a higher subject and judges what the
experiencingsubjectjudges.WhileitistruethatSellars doessometimes givetheimpression
that hehas in mind two subjects, especiallywhen hetalks about “ahighercourt”,theideaof
32 Itisimportanttonotethat,forme,apropositionalattitudeisnotanattitudetowardsaproposition,butratherapropositional
attitudetowardstheworld.68
two judging subjects within one person does not seem to be promising (1956, §16).
Furthermore, even if Sellars does say that there is a lower level judgement in experience, it
still will not be right to say that this lower level judgement is belief. The lower level
judgement is not belief since it is not something endorsed by the subject. Most importantly,
Sellars’s own remarks about the claim contained in experience do not seem to support the
reading that the claim is indeed a judgement. To see the point, we need to be clear about
whatSellarsreallymeansby“assertion”or“claim”.
According to Sellars, we can judge an experience in three different ways: say, as “a
seeing that something is green”, as “a case of something’s looking green”, and as a case of
something’s merelylooking green (1956, §16). Ishall followMcDowell and call thesethree
cases “a trio of possible experiences” (1998, p. 443). As Sellars describes it, in the case of
judging one’s experience as seeing that something is green, one ascribes the claim that
something is green to one’s experience and endorses it. In the case of judging one’s
experience as something’s looking green, one ascribes the same claim but does not endorse
it. In the case of judging one’s experience as something’s merely looking green, one
ascribesthesameclaimbutrejectsit.
Sellars says that “the experience of seeing that something is green is…the occurrence
of the propositional claim ‘this is green’” (1956, §16). But for Sellars the same claim is
contained in the other two cases of the trio as well. The three experiences “may be identical
as experiences”, that is, “indistinguishable” from each other, and yet one be properly
referred to as a seeing that something is green, the second merely as a case of something’s
looking green, and the third as a case of something’s merely looking green (1956, §16). If
the three experiences can share the same claim, then it is very unlikelythat the claim can be
a judgement. We can see this more clearly when Sellars shifts his angle from a third person
judgementtoafirstpersonreport.Hewrites:
Thus, when I say “X looks green to me now” I am reporting the fact that my
experience is, so to speak, intrinsically, as an experience, indistinguishable from a
veridical one of seeing that x is green. Involved in the report is the ascription to my
experience of the claim ‘x is green’; and the fact that I make this report rather than the
simple report “X is Green” indicates that certain considerations have operated to raise,
so to speak in a higher court, the question ‘to endorse or not to endorse.’ I may have
reasontothinkthatx maynotafterallbegreen.(1956,§16)
We can see from the above passage that for Sellars, the experiences reported as “X
looks green to me now” and “X is green” contain the same claim “x is green”. And this
should be the same for the experience reported as “X merely looks green to me now”.
Hence all the three cases of the trio contain the same claim “x is green”. That experience69
contains this claim, of course, does not mean it is true that x is green. Nor does it mean that
the subject believes orjudges that x is green. And thecrucial thingis: nordoes it even mean
thatthereisalowerleveljudgementinexperiencewhichsays thatx isgreen.
For Sellars, the three experiences in a trio of possible experiences present the same
propositional content and hence contain the same claim. In fact, the three cases of the trio
share the same experience which can only be reported in different ways according to the
different judgements made about the experience. What we find in experience is a neutral
assertion orclaim which is not in anysense ajudgement. Hencewhat Sellars means hereby
propositional assertion or claim is just proposition. This suggests that forSellars, experience
is only propositional, not judgement-involving. The belief or judgement is only in the
endorsementorrejectionofexperience.
Hence for Sellars, to endorse the claim contained in experience is not to endorse the
judgement made by experience, or, to judge a judgement. It is to endorse a neutral
proposition. Williams might be right in saying that for Sellars, when we endorse an
experience, “whatweendorseareclaiming,not claimables”. But thepointis that forSellars,
a claiming is a claiming only in the sense that it is propositional. There is no judgement in
the claiming. Assertion or claim understood in this way is not concerned with truth. As
Sellars makes it clear, only when “characterize S’s experience as a seeing”, we “apply the
semanticalconceptoftruthtothatexperience”(1956,§16).
Thisunderstandingofexperienceas anassertionwithoutjudgementiscompatiblewith
the aim of Sellars’s attack on the Given. All Sellars means to do at this stage is to show that
‘looks’-talkpresupposes‘being’-talk.Hewrites:
The point Iwish to stress at this time, however, is that the concept of looking green, the
abilityto recognizethat somethinglooks green, presupposes the concept ofbeing green,
and that the latter concept involves the ability to tell what colors objects have by
looking at them—which, in turn, involves knowing in what circumstances to place an
objectifonewishestoascertainitscolorbylookingatit.(1956,§18)
The idea is that things cannot look to one in a certain way without one being able to see
things in a certain way. And to be able to see things in a certain way is to possess the
relevant conceptual capacities. Hence things cannot look to one in a certain way without
onehavingtherelevantconceptualcapacities.Andthiswouldeventuallydefeattheideathat
one can enjoy a certain kind of phenomenal “looks” before one has the relevant conceptual
capacities. The idea that phenomenal “looks” may come before thinking and transmit its
content to thinking is exactly the “heart of the Myth of the Given” Sellars means to attack
(ibid., §38). Hence the attack on the Given is not about whether or not experience is
judgement. For Sellars, it is not essential that experience be a judgement about the world.70
What is crucial for Sellars is the idea that experience presupposes conceptual capacities to
such an extentthat things can look to onein acertainway. And it is thisideathat is taken by
McDowell in advocating his conceptualism. Hence at this point, McDowell agrees with
Sellars completely:
The conceptual episodes Sellars is concerned with, when he speaks of visual
experiences as “containing” claims, are not as such cases of judging. Even if one does
judge that things are as they look, having them look that way to one is not the same as
judgingthattheyarethatway. (1998, p.439)
Sellars’s claim that experiences are episodes or states of knowing goes together with a
special understanding of “states of knowing”. For him, as McDowell puts it nicely and
agrees readily, “‘epistemic’ can amount to no more than ‘concept involving’” (1998, p.
436).
Now it should be clear what Sellars and McDowell mean when they say experience is
“a linguistic affair” or is “conceptual”. For Sellars and McDowell, to experience is to
exercise one’s conceptual capacities in a certain way. But for both of them, experience is
only an exercise of conceptual capacities in such a way that it may provide propositional
content for belief which is an endorsement or rejection of the content. According to this
understanding, experience can only be something to be believed or disbelieved. No matter
how closely experience is related to perceptual belief, it can never be the belief itself. There
isalways agapbetweenexperienceandbelief.
Moreover, a further gap between experience and the world lurks. Conceptualism
actually gives a very strange picture of experience. According to this picture, experience
speaks (it is propositional). But it does not mean to speak about the truth of the world, since
the three experiences in a trio of possible experiences speak the same thing. No matter what
the world is like, experience would speak in the same way. This means experience is not
sensitive to the truth of the world. There is then a gap between experience and the world:
experiencemayremainthesamenomatterwhattheworldisreallylike.
McDowell may give the impression that he wants no gap between experience and the
world. For McDowell, conceptualism would equip us “to understand experience as
openness to the world”, since it takes “receptivity itself to impinge rationally on belief”
(1994, p. 143). This works together with his disjunctive understanding of experience.
McDowell is against “the idea of emissaries that either tell the truth or lie” (1994, p. 143).
Unlike sense-datum theorists, McDowell denies there is a “highest common factor”, which
intervenes between us and the world, shared by “deceptive” and “nondeceptive” experience
(1988, p. 210). According to his disjunctive understanding of experience, whereas in the
case of deceptive experience, “what is given to experience is a mere appearance”, which in71
asense“intervenesbetweenus and theworld”, inthecaseofnondeceptiveexperience, “itis
thefact itselfmademanifest”(1988, p.214; 1994, p. 143). HenceMcDowell claims: “When
we are not misled by experience, we are directly confronted by a worldly state of affairs
itself, not waited on by an intermediary that happens to tell the truth”.
33 We thus have
“fallibleopenness”totheworld(1994,p.143).
But we have seen that for McDowell, as it is for Sellars, experience is still a neutral
appearance despite being conceptual. And a neutral appearance can be neither fallible nor
openness to theworld. It cannot befalliblebecauseit does not mean to speak about thetruth
of the world and cannot be said to be false even when the content of experience is different
from the way the world is. It cannot be openness to the world because it is open to three
different ways the world might be and is thus not sensitive to the truth of the world. As
Stroud points out correctly, “if all impressions are ‘appearances’ whose contents always fall
short of implying anything about the independent world, the ‘openness to reality’ that
McDowellrightlydemandsofasatisfactoryaccountofexperienceislost”(2002,p.88).
McDowell claims: “the real trouble with conceiving experiences as intermediaries is
that we cannot make sense of experiences, so conceived, as purporting to tell us anything,
whether truthfully or not” (1994, p. 143). And he thinks we can get rid of the trouble by
seeing that experience indeed tells us something, that is, experience has a conceptual
content. But the problem is that, although nondoxastic conceptual experience does seem to
tell us something, it does not purport to tell us anything about the world, whether truthfully
or not. And for this reason experience, so conceived, is still an intermediary between the
subjectandtheworld.
We can then find two gaps in conceptualism, a gap between experience and belief and
a gap between experience and the world. Hence for conceptualism, experience is not belief
and is not sensitive to the truth of the world. In brief, experience is not belief about the
world. This is the view I call nondoxasticism. A nondoxasticist can be either a
nonconceptualist or a conceptualist. Conceptualism is thus the conceptualist version of
nondoxasticismwhichsays experienceispropositionalbutnotdoxastic.
3. Despite their commitment to nondoxasticism, Sellars and McDowell still insist
experience plays a justificatory role in empirical knowledge. Particularly, for McDowell,
“experiencemust constituteatribunal, mediatingthewayourthinkingis answerableto how
things are” (1996, p. xii). According to McDowell, facts can work as external constraints on
thought if they can manifest themselves in experience, and for facts to manifest themselves
in experience is for experience to be conceptual. Hence the conceptuality of experience
33 IguessMcDowellactuallymeans“whenexperienceisnotmisleading”,giventhatheallowsexperiencetobemisleading
withoutusbeingmisled.Seechap.6formoreofthis.72
provides an external constraint on thought which is “from outside the activity of
thinking…though not from outside what is thinkable, so not from outside the space of
concepts”(1994,p.144).
Sellars is in a sense well recognized as a coherentist. Sellars’s attack on the Given
destroys the empiricist form of foundationalism by showing that experience cannot be a
foundation in the “static” sense (1956, §38). For Sellars, non-inferential knowledge, like
inferential knowledge, presupposes knowledge of other facts. The foundations of our
empirical knowledge are not “self-authenticating…unmoved movers” (1956, §38). This is
to abandon “the traditional empiricist idea that observational knowledge ‘stands on its own
feet’” (1956, §36). Sellars claims, “Empirical knowledge…is a self-correcting enterprise
which can put any claim in jeopardy, though not all at once”. Thus, “if there is a logical
dimensionin which otherempiricalpropositionsreston observationreports,thereis another
logicaldimensioninwhichthelatterrestontheformer”(1956,§38).
But Sellars’s epistemology, if there is a sense of coherentism in it at all, is essentially
different from Davidson’s “unconstrained coherentism”. LikeMcDowell, Sellars also wants
experience to be the source of knowledge. For Sellars, this first of all means experience
should play a justificatory role in our belief system. Moreover, Sellars has no intention of
saying that “empirical knowledge has no foundation”. He insists that empirical knowledge
is not “empirical knowledge so-called”. Empirical knowledge has to have a foundation in a
certain sense. Sellars writes: “There is clearly some point to the picture of human
knowledge as resting on a level of propositions—observation reports—which do not rest on
other propositions in the same way as other propositions rest on them” (1956, §38). All
thesesuggestthat,forSellars, experiencehasaspecialstatusinbeliefjustification.
In any case, both Sellars and McDowell insist experience plays a justificatory role in
virtueofbeingpropositional.McDowellwrites:
No doubt when it appears to me that things are thus and so, I usually (at least) believe
that it appears to me that things are thus and so, but it is not obvious that the appearing
is the belief; and whether it is or not, we can innocuously credit the appearing itself
withrationalimplicationsforwhat Ioughttothink.(1994,p.140)
We may then wonder how experience, which is not a belief about the world, can
justifyour beliefs about the world. Given the two gaps we find in conceptualism, that is, the
gap between experience and belief, on the one hand, and the gap between experience and
the world, on the other hand, it is not clear how a rational connection between experience
and thought is supposed to be secured. The two gaps seem hard to bridge. First, to justify a
belief, experience has to provide not only a content to believe but also a psychological
attitude of believing. It is hard to see how a nondoxastic experience can provide thought73
with an attitude of believing. Secondly, to justify a belief about the world, experience has to
be itself about the truth of the world. It is hard to see how experience, which is not an
assertion about the truth of the world, can provide thought with the truth of the world. As
Stroud puts it nicely, howcould appearance, which does not implyanything about thetruth
of an independent world, “ever give one reason to believe anything about what is not an
‘appearance’”(2002,p.89)?
McDowelldoesnotseemtoseeanydifficultieshere.Hewrites:
…suppose one asks an ordinary subject why she holds some observational belief, say
that an object within her field of view is square. An unsurprising reply might be
“Because it looks that way”. That is easily recognized as giving a reason for holding
thebelief.Justbecauseshegives expressiontoitindiscourse… (1994,p.165)
According to McDowell, for experience to justify a belief, all we need is that the subject
gives expression to experience in discourse. And this is made possible by the conceptuality
of experience. Hence what McDowell requires for a rational justification is simply that the
supposed reason must be expressible in language. What is behind this is actually a special
criterion of justification, according to which, all we need for justification is that what does
the justifying is in the space of reasons, that is, is something propositional or something
expressibleinlanguage.Wemaycallthisthepropositional criterionofjustification.
The propositional criterion of justification strikes us as very unusual. It seems to
suggest a line of reasoning such as the following. If (1) X is entertaining a proposition p
(which does not imply X endorses p); (2) X believes if p then q; then (3) X is justified in
believing q. This obviously is not what we expect for an ordinary inferential justification.
We can see clearly what is missing here, that is, X’s commitment to or acceptance of p in
(1). In belief justification, what needs to be justified is a belief, namely, a state with an
attitude of believing, not just a proposition. What needs to be justified is not only why one
believes this, but also why one believes this. It is the psychological state of believing that
justifies the logically related psychological state of believing. One cannot be justified in
believing the logical consequence of p if one does not believe p. Only what one believes
justifies what one believes. Nothing one does not believe can justify what one believes,
whether it is conceptual or not. Or, more generally, only an attitude justifies an attitude; a
contentcannotjustifyan attitude.
34
Therefore, to justify a belief, the justifier has to be a belief. That is, it has to be a
propositional attitude, not just a proposition. We can then put the reasoning of inferential
justification as follows. If (1a) X believes p; (2a) X believes if p then q; then (3a) X is
34 ForaverysimilarviewseeStroud2002,p.89.74
justified in believing q (although X may not actually believe q for some reason, say she has
not related (1a) and (2a) properly). Thus only a belief can justify a belief. This I call the
doxastic criterion of justification. I take it that the doxastic criterion is essential for an
ordinaryinferentialjustification.Hencethepropositional criterionisnotsufficient.
It is important to note that when I say the propositional criterion is not sufficient, I am
not saying it is not essential. I agree with Sellars and McDowell that it is essential that a
justifier be propositional. And I believe this is why nonconceptual experience as a pure
Given cannot justify empirical knowledge. On the other hand, when I say the doxastic
criterionisessential, Iamnotsayingthatitissufficientforjustification. Itisobviousthatthe
doxastic criterion is not sufficient for knowledge justification; what justifies knowledge has
to be something true. But it is also important to note that the doxastic criterion is not
sufficient for belief justification either. For belief justification, what does the justification
has to be at least an equal of what is to be justified, that is, a belief. But being a belief is not
sufficient for being a justifier. For a belief to be able to justify another belief, it has to be
somethingmorethan abelief, that is, abelief with abetter epistemicstatus. And itis exactly
forthis reason that coherentismdoes notwork. Ishallreturnto thisin§5 where Idiscuss the
problem with Davidson’s coherentism. The main target of the paper is nevertheless Sellars
and McDowell’s conceptualism and for this purpose we shall concentrate on the positive
aspect of the doxastic criterion of justification, that is, it is essential for justification. The
doxastic criterion is essential for both belief justification and knowledge justification,
althoughitissufficientforneither.
If we apply the doxastic criterion to the case of experience, then it requires that
experience be belief in order to justify other beliefs. It is obvious that, given their
endorsement of nondoxasticism, Sellars and McDowell’s understanding of experience fails
thedoxasticcriterion ofjustification. It then seems that neitherSellars norMcDowell would
beabletobestowexperienceajustificatoryrole.
McDowell would disagree that the doxastic criterion is essential for knowledge
justification. His “third person approach to epistemology” does not require that knowledge
be justified by what the subject believes or knows (2003, p. 681). McDowell is against “an
interiorization of the space of reasons, a withdrawal of it from the external world” (1995, p.
877). He points out rightly that justification cannot be an internal process independent of
external fact. He thus introduces truth into the process of knowledge justification. However,
for him, this only requires that the relevant fact be available to the subject, which means
neither that the fact is what the subject knows nor that it is what the subject believes. For
McDowell, a fact can play a role in knowledge justification without the subject taking the
fact as a fact. To apply this to the case of experience, McDowell does not require that the
subject take the fact manifested in experience as a fact. For him, experience would be able
to justify empirical knowledge if only it can be a manifestation of the world. And this,75
according to McDowell, is ensured by the understanding that experience is openness to the
world.
McDowell’s understanding of knowledge justification is, however, problematic. First,
while it is true that fact plays a role in knowledge justification, it is not clear that fact can
justify knowledge simply by being available to the subject. Fact can only play a role in the
space of reasons as a fact by being taken as a fact. McDowell’s “third person approach to
epistemology” contradicts with the nature of the space of reasons. The space of reasons
shouldnotbeaninternalsphere, tobesure, butithastobeamatterofthefirstperson inthat
fact can function as a fact in the space of reasons only if it is what the subject believes.
Second, the problem with McDowell’s understanding of knowledge justification is more
obvious when we remember that knowledge is not only something true but also something
taken as true. That is, it is essential that knowledge be belief.
35 And if knowledge is a
species ofbelief, then it has to bejustified as belief as well as true. And to justifyabelief, as
we saw above, the justifier has to be belief. We can then conclude from the above two
points that thedoxastic criterion is essential for knowledgejustification, just as it is essential
forbeliefjustification.Andforexperiencetojustifyempiricalknowledge, ithastobebelief.
We nevertheless need to note that when Sellars and McDowell say experiencejustifies
empirical belieforknowledge, theyarenot talkingabout an ordinaryinferential justification.
ForSellars and McDowell, experienceis not itself belief, hence what needs to be justified is
actually a basic belief or an observational belief which has the same content as the relevant
experience. Call this basic justification. Basic justification is different from an ordinary
inferential justification. In ordinaryinferential justification, weinfer abelief from a different
belief, that is, a belief with a different content. But in basic justification, experience is
expected to justify a belief with the same content, that is, to justify basic belief with its
contentendorsedinthebasicbelief.
Hence there might be a chance for basic justification to avoid the doxastic criterion of
justification. There would then be a chance for experience to possess a justificatory role
without being doxastic. We now need to see if the doxastic criterion of justification, which
is essential for an ordinary inferential justification, is avoidable for basic justification. For
thisweneedtoseehowSellars andMcDowellrespondtothedoxasticcriterion.
4. As I quoted in the above section, according to McDowell, to give a reason for holding an
observational belief, an ordinarysubject might say “Because it looks that way”. But it is not
clear how something’s looking “that way” can justify the belief that it is really the case that
35 As I mentioned in chapter 2, §6, it is Williamson’s contention that knowledge is not a species of belief (2000). But
McDowellseemstostaywiththetraditionalunderstandingandinsistknowledgehastobebelief.Commentingonanexample
inwhichonehadanexperienceofseeingwithoutrealizingthattheexperiencewasindeedaseeing,McDowellremarks:“One
didnotformtherelevantbelief,letalonegettoknowthatthatwashowthingswere”(2003,p.681).76
it is that way. Something’s looking that way could equally justify the belief that “it looks
that way” or “it merely looks that way”. Hence there is a gap between “it looks that way”
and “Ibelieveitisthatway”.
McDowell’s reply to the difficulty is that “An impression is something like an
invitation—apetition…toacceptapropositionabouttheobjectiveworld”(2002a,p.278):
I think we need an idea of perception as something in which there is no attitude of
acceptance or endorsement at all, but only, as I put it, an invitation to adopt such an
attitude, which, in the best cases, consists in a fact’s making itself manifest to one.
(2002a,p.279)
It is understandable that McDowell introduces the idea of invitation at this point. For
McDowell, although experience is a neutral appearance, there is a good chance, though not
a specific reason, that experience is the way the world is. Hence the subject might feel
disposed to takeit as amanifestation oftheworld. Butthis does not seem tohelpverymuch
withthequestionweneedtodealwith.Aninvitationissomethingtobeacceptedorrejected.
And what we need is an acceptance or belief. The acceptance of an invitation should not be
takenforgranted andstillrequiresjustification.
Hence the crucial point here is whether or not the acceptance of the invitation can be
justified. If McDowell can show us a way of justifying our acceptance of the content of an
experience without making experience itself a belief, he would then be able to bestow
experience a justificatory role without making it a belief. But for McDowell, the invitation
becomesacceptancequiteautomatically. Hewrites:
Unless there are grounds for suspicion, such as odd lighting conditions, having it look
tooneas ifthingsareacertain way– ostensiblyseeingthingstobethat way—becomes
acceptingthatthings arethatwaybyasortofdefault…(1998, p.439)
According to McDowell, experience becomes belief “by a sort of default”. This is
obviouslyaverythinsenseofjustification,ifitisajustificationatall.Weshallseethateven
this very thin sense of justification demands experience to be belief. McDowell actually
suggests that experience becomes belief without any positive reasons. There can only be
two ways for this to happen. First, experience causes a belief with the same content. In this
case, the relation between experience and belief is causal instead of rational. This obviously
is not the option McDowell would be willing to take. Then the only alternative is that
experience is itself belief. If experience produces belief with neither a causal procedure nor
a rational connection, then it has to be itself the belief. Hence McDowell cannot show how
experience can become belief “by a sort of default” without identifying experience with77
belief.
But maybe McDowell also has in mind a stronger sense of justification. According to
McDowell, we accept the invitation of experience when there is no reason not to accept it.
This maysuggest we do need ajustification when wereject theinvitation. And the rejection
of the invitation is supposed to be justified by knowledge of “odd lighting conditions”.
However, our knowledge about the lighting conditions, like other empirical knowledge,
also needs to be justified by the relevant experience, namely the experience of the lighting
conditions. And to follow McDowell’s suggestion, in order to use the experience of the
lighting conditions to justify one’s knowledge of the lighting conditions, one has to accept
the invitation of the experience of the lighting conditions “by a sort of default”. And this, as
we saw above, requires that the experience of the lighting conditions be belief, if we don’t
wanttoassumeacausalrelationbetween experienceandbelief.
Hence McDowell cannot justify the acceptance or rejection of the invitation of
experiencewithoutunderstandingexperienceasbelief.
Like McDowell, Sellars’s understanding of experience as nondoxastic makes it
impossible to satisfy the doxastic criterion of justification. But unlike McDowell, Sellars
does make a notable effort to show that experience can be justified. For Sellars, to justify
experience is to justify it as veridical. And to justify experience as veridical is to justify that
the viewing conditions are normal.
36 Sellars insists that basic belief as an endorsement of
experience is justified inferentially. According to Sellars, when the subject forms a belief
that “there is a red apple in front of him” on the basis of experience, “he is inferring from
thecharacterand contextofhisexperiencethatitisveridicaland thatthereis good reasonto
believe that there is indeed a red apple in front of him” (1975, p. 130). Hence, according to
Sellars, the justification of an observational belief is in fact an inferential justification. For
Sellars, the endorsement of the content of experience is justified by inferring from the
characterandcontextofone’s experiencethatitisveridical.
If experience can be justified as veridical in this way, then we may have good reasons
to derive a belief from experience without experience itself being a belief. That is, to form a
belief with the content of experience endorsed in it. The basic belief is then justified and is
partly justified by experience. In this way, experience plays a justificatory role in a limited
sense.
36 McDowell disagrees with Sellars that “the reporter must be able to give evidence of her reliability in reporting the sort of
stateofaffairsinquestion”(2002,p.100).ButitseemsthatMcDowellistalkingaboutadifferentkindofreliability.Thekind
of reliability McDowell has in mind is the reliability of my being able to “tell a green thing when I see one (in the right
conditions of illumination)”, that is, I am a reliable concept user. And for this kind of reliability, I think McDowell is right in
sayingthat“Itisheldfirmformebymywholeconceptionoftheworldwithmyselfintouchwithit,andnotastheconclusion
of an inference from some of that conception” (2002, p. 101). But what Sellars means here is the reliability of one’s
experience, not the reliability of one’s conceptual capacities. And for Sellars, the reliability of one’s visual experience, in a
certain circumstance, depends on the right illumination condition. Hence for Sellars, what needs to be justified is that the
illumination condition is right, not that when the illumination condition is right I can tell a green thing when I see one. What
Sellarsmeanstojustifyistheviewingcondition,notone’sconceptualcapacities.78
This may seem to suggest a way for a proposition to contribute to the justification of a
belief, if not to justify a belief solely by itself. A proposition can be used for further belief
justification if it is justified as being from a reliable source. In this way while experience
cannot justify a belief solely in virtue of being propositional, it may contribute to the
justification of a basic belief by being justified as a reliable source of content and hence
providecontent forthe basic belief.
37 Thus theremight be a chance for Sellars to escape the
doxastic criterion of justification. If the subject is justified to endorse the content of an
experience, then she can form a basic belief with the content of the experience endorsed in
the belief without the experience itself being belief and justify other beliefs with the basic
belief thus formed. In this way, nondoxastic experience can play a justificatory role in that
itscontent contributestothebasicbeliefwhichinturnjustifiesotherbeliefs.
However, one’s belief about “the character and context” of one’s experience needs to
be justified by the experience of the character and context of one’s experience. This in turn
requires that the experience of “the character and context” of one’s experience be justified
as veridical. To avoid an infinite regress, we have to stop at a point where experience is
belief. Eventually the justifier has to be an experience which is belief. The moral is:
justification can only be completed by an experience which is belief. Hence Sellars cannot
justify experience as veridical without making experience itself a belief. Denying
experienceisbelief,Sellarscannotjustifybasicbeliefsuccessfully.
We see that experience cannot play an ultimate justificatory role solely in virtue of
being propositional. Basic justification, like ordinary inferential justification, has to satisfy
the doxastic criterion of justification as well. To justify a belief, experience has to be itself
belief. Conceptualism, as a version of nondoxasticism, cannot bestow experience a
justificatoryrole.
5. I have argued that it is essential that basic justification, that is, justification of an
observational belief, meet the doxastic criterion of justification. The doxastic criterion of
justification, I shall argue, is what Davidson has in mind when he denies experience a
justificatoryrole.
McDowell claims that the propositional criterion of justification is what Davidson
requires when he says “nothing can count as a reason for holding a belief except another
belief” (Davidson 1983, p. 141). He thinks “there is more than an excess of simplicity in
Davidson’s formulation” and suggests the following emendation: “nothing can count as a
reason forholdingabeliefexceptsomethingelsethatis alsointhespaceofconcepts”(1994,
37 IshouldmakeitclearthatIdonotbelievethattojustifyexperienceistojustifyitasreliable.ButIshallnotpursuetheissue
here.Andforthesakeofargument,IshallgrantSellarsthattojustifyexperienceasreliableisawayofjustifyingexperience.79
p. 143).
38 We have said enough about what McDowell means by saying experience is “in
thespaceofconcepts”. NowweshallturntoDavidson’sslogan.
In his further explanation of the slogan, Davidson says that he agrees with Rorty when
Rorty says: “nothing counts as justification unless by reference to what we already accept,
and thereis no wayto getoutsideour beliefs and ourlanguages so as to find sometest other
than coherence” (1980, p. 178). This seems to suggest that what Davidson requires for
justification is a proper belief, that is, something “we already accept”, and not just
something “in the space of concepts” or something propositional. It is for this reason that
Davidsonchallengesanyversionoffoundationalismwiththefollowingtwoquestions:
All such theories must explain at least these two things: what, exactly, is the relation
between sensation and belief that allows the first to justify the second? And, why
should we believe our sensations are reliable, that is, why should we trust our senses?
(1983, p.141)
While the first question challenges the idea that sensation can justify belief, the second
challenges the idea that sensations can be justified as trustworthy. Let’s start with the first
challenge.
Davidson thinks that there is no reason to think that sensation can justify belief. First,
“sensations themselves, verbalized or not”, cannot “justify certain beliefs that go beyond
what is given in sensation” (1983, p. 142). The reason is that sensations are not to be
identified with certain beliefs. Davidson insists that we distinguish “between perceiving a
green spot and perceiving that a spot is green” (1983, p. 141). What Davidson means here
seems to be this: perceiving a green spot is only to have a sensation prompted by a green
spot while perceiving that a spot is green is to believe or judge that a spot is green. For
Davidson, to have a sensation prompted by a green spot is different from believing or
judging that a spot is green. It will not help if we “formulate judgements that do not go
beyond stating that the perception or sensation or presentation exists” (1983, pp.141-2). For
one thing, “if the basic beliefs do not exceed in content the corresponding sensation, they
cannot support any inference to an objective world” (1983, p.142). On the other hand,
“there are no such beliefs” at all. We see Davidson believes that what sensation lacks is a
beliefabouttheworld.
Second, Davidson thinks that one may have a sensation without being aware that one
has the sensation. Hence the problem, as Davidson sees it, is that a sensation may not be a
38 McDowell later understands Davidson’s slogan in a different way and claims that we do not need to follow Davidson’s
criterionofjustification:“Davidson’sso-calledcoherentismisencapsulatedintheclaimthat‘nothingcancountasareasonfor
holding a belief except another belief’. The case I have described violates this dictum; it is a case in which there was an
entitlementthatwasnotabelief.Ofcourseitispreciselybecausetheentitlementwasnotabeliefthatthesubjectdidnotform
thebeliefthattheentitlementinfactwarranted.Butitwasanentitlementevenso,asthesubjectlaterrealizes”(2003,p.681).80
conscious state and hence is not a belief (1983, p.142). For Davidson, sensation seems to be
somethingratherphysical.It issomethingwecanbeawareof,butisnotitselfawareness.
In brief, Davidson’s worry is that sensation is not conscious belief about the external
world and hence cannot be used as a justification of beliefs which go beyond what is given
insensation.Basedonthis,Davidsonwrites:
Therelation between a sensation and abelief cannot be logical, since sensations arenot
beliefs or other propositional attitudes. …the relation is causal. Sensations cause some
beliefs and in this sense are the bases or ground of those beliefs. But a causal
explanationofabeliefdoesnotshowhoworwhythebeliefisjustified.(1983,p.143)
WenowmoveontoDavidson’ssecond challengetofoundationalism.
Davidson sees no reason for giving experience special epistemic status. According to
Davidson, there is no reason that we should “believe our sensations are reliable” and “trust
our senses” (1983, p. 141). Davidson’s complaint is not just that a certain piece of
experience cannot bejustified as reliable. What hehas in mind arecases such as the brain in
the vat, and the worry is that “not only may our senses sometimes deceive us; it is possible
that we aresystematicallyand generallydeceived”(1988, p. 43). His worryseems to bethat
experience in general is not concerned with the truth of the world, or, as he puts it, in
sensation, “no question of truth can arise” (1982, p. 163). Hence for Davidson, “empiricism
is the view that the subjective (‘experience’) is the foundation of objective empirical
knowledge” (1988, p. 46). It is exactlyfor this reason that Davidson denies a person can tell
if all his beliefs about the world are true by confronting the totality of his beliefs with the
tribunal of experience. He claims, “No such confrontation makes sense, for of course we
can’t get outside our skins to find out what is causing the internal happening of which we
are aware” (1983, p. 144). For this reason, Davidson insists that experience, or sensation as
hecallsit,cannotbethefoundationofknowledge:
If the ultimate evidence for our schemes and theories, the raw material on which they
are based, is subjective in the way I have described, then so is whatever is directly
based on it: our beliefs, desires, intentions, and what we mean by our words…like
sensations,theycouldbejustastheyare,andtheworldbeverydifferent.(1988,p.43)
Davidson’s complaint, again, is not that experience or sensation can be wrong, but rather
thatexperienceisnotconcernedwiththetruthoftheworld.
We see Davidson has two reasons for denying experience a justificatory role. First, for
Davidson, experience is not a conscious belief. By this he means that experience is not a
propositional attitude, not that experience is not propositional. Second, Davidson thinks81
experience is subjective in the sense that it is not concerned with the truth of the world. In
brief, for Davidson, experience cannot justify a belief because it is not a belief about the
world. It is clear then the doxastic criterion of justification is what Davidson has in mind
when he says “nothing can count as a reason for holding a belief except another belief”.
And as I argued earlier in this chapter, the doxastic criterion is essential for belief
justificationandistheoneSellars andMcDowell’sconceptualismcouldnotsatisfy.
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The doxastic criterion of justification, nevertheless, does not lead Davidson to the
correct epistemological conclusion. This has to do with his understanding of experience.
Understanding experience as nondoxastic, the only choice for Davidson is to embrace a
versionofcoherentismwhich denies experienceajustificatoryrole. AccordingtoDavidson,
“although sensation plays a crucial role in the causal process that connects beliefs with the
world, it is a mistake to think it plays an epistemological role in determining the contents of
those beliefs” (1988, p. 46). He claims that “empirical knowledge has no epistemological
foundation, and needs none” (1988, p. 46). The problem with this is that it makes thought
lose contact with the world. As McDowell puts it, Davidson’s coherentism is only “a
versionoftheconceptionofspontaneityasfrictionless”(1994,p.14).
Davidson’s reply to this is that experiential belief is caused by experience, which,
according to him, is in turn a direct contact with the world. He insists that “What the senses
‘deliver’ (i.e., cause) in perception is perceptual beliefs, and these do have an ultimate
evidential role” (1999, p. 106). Hence Davidson sees no problem for a coherentist to show
that thought is in direct contact with the world. He says he is a coherentist only in the sense
that “the beliefs that are delivered by the senses are always open to revision, in the light of
further perceptual experience, in the light of what we remember, in the light of our general
knowledge of how the world works”. And this, according to Davidson, does not prevent
him from thinkingthereis a contact between thought and reality. Heinsists: “Theremust be
‘friction’ between the world and our thoughts if our thoughts are to have any content at all,
and I find this friction right here, in the external causes of our perceptual beliefs” (1999, p.
106).
There are three problems with the causal relation between sensation and belief
conceived by Davidson. First, Davidson seems to take it for granted that the senses are able
to “deliver” perceptual beliefs. But the senses can only deliver beliefs if there are beliefs in
experience to be delivered. And according to Davidson’s understanding of experience, it is
obvious that there is no belief for the senses to deliver. Second, Davidson cannot even
explain where the conceptual content in thought comes from. As Sellars’s attack on the
Given reveals, it remains mysterious how a nonconceptual experience can provide
39 Henceobserves Ginsborg: “McDowell’sown viewon thequestion ofreasonsfor beliefis weaker than Davidson’s,in that
he allows reasons for belief to include not only other beliefs but also states with unasserted propositional contents, which is
whathetakesexperiencetobe”(2006,p.351).82
empirical knowledge with a conceptual content, no matter what the relation between
experience and belief is, causal or rational. It is essential that sensation be conceptual, even
as a cause of belief. Hence Davidson’s nonconceptual sensation cannot cause the basic
belief which has a conceptual content. The third problem for Davidson’s picture is that a
causal relation between sensation and belief cannot really get our belief system in touch
with the world. Remember Davidson’s complaint about sensation is that it is subjective and
cannot take us to the objective world. Then we may wonder how we can get in touch with
the world byhaving beliefs caused bysubjective sensations which are not themselves direct
contactwiththeworld.
Coherentism is not satisfactory any way. As I mentioned in §3, while being essential,
the doxastic criterion of justification is not sufficient. A belief does not justifyanother belief
just because it is a belief. The justifying belief must have a better epistemic status than the
belieftobejustified. Theremustbesomethinginthejustifyingbeliefwhichmakes itableto
justify another belief. Hence the kind of justification Davidson’s coherentism appeals to is
not a proper justification. The coherence of a set of beliefs does not make these beliefs
sufficiently justified. A coherent false story is still a false story. As far as our beliefs about
the world are concerned, what we want is truth, not just coherence, and the coherence of a
set of beliefs does not justify the truth of these beliefs. A justifier has to have its individual
credit.Coherentisminfacthas asetofbeliefsnoneofwhichisproperlyjustified.
Hence it is essential that empirical knowledge have a foundation. And this foundation
has to be found in experience. It is clear then Davidson’s problem is with his understanding
of experience. With his understanding of experience as a pure Given, neither can a causal
relation between sensation and belief be sustained, nor can the causal relation (if it does
exist)connectourbeliefsystemwiththeexternalworld.
Davidson’s understanding of experience is problematic in two ways. On the one hand,
experience is understood as something not accessible to the subject; it is not belief and the
subject may not even be aware of it. On the other hand, experience is understood as
something not open to the world. Experience is said to be subjective in such a way that we
cannot depend on it to get the truth of the world. And to solve the problem we have to work
in both directions. On the one hand, experience should be something the subject is
committed to, namely belief. On the other hand, experience should be about the truth of the
world. Briefly, experience has to be belief about the world. Only in this way can thought be
connectedwiththeworldthrough experience.
6. It is Sellars and McDowell’s merit that they make an important move in the right
direction, that is, to understand experience in a different way. For them experience is
conceptual and can thus provide a conceptual content for thought. This explains where the83
content of the basic belief comes from and at the same time makes the relation between
experienceandbeliefrationalinsteadofcausal.
But this only solves part of the problem. Experience’s being conceptual is not
sufficient for making the relation between experience and belief a justificatory one. Sellars
and McDowell actually share Davidson’s understanding of experience in an important
sense, that is, experience is not a belief or assertion about the truth of the world. Hence, as
Davidsoncorrectlypointsout,forMcDowell, experience“isnotabelief,but apropositional
attitudeforwhich wehaveno word.Wethendecidewhetherornot totransformthisneutral
attitude into a belief” (1999, p. 107). In Davidson’s wording, McDowell gives no
explanation of “why an attitude which has no subjective probabilitywhatever can provide a
reason for a positive belief”. Here, by “attitude”, Davidson actually means proposition. For
this reason, McDowell “seems committed to epistemic intermediaries, the propositional
contentswe‘takein’,betweentheworldandouropinionsabouttheworld”(1999,p.107).
McDowell may not see this as a problem. He confesses that while Davidson focuses
on concerns about “the possibility of knowledge”, he himself focuses on concerns about
“how content is possible” (1994, pp. 146-7). His aim is only to show that experience
provides content for belief, not that it provides attitude for belief. While McDowell may
well solve the problem of content, he leaves the problem of attitude or “the possibility of
knowledge”untouched.
McDowell’s criticism of nonconceptualism is that “the idea of the Given offers
exculpations where we wanted justifications” (1994, p. 8). But if all a conceptualist can do
istopointto whateverisinfrontofherwhenbeingasked forreasons forherbelief,then she
is still offering exculpations where we wanted justifications—although what is used as
exculpations are conceptual experiences instead of nonconceptual experiences. Without
beingdoxastic,experienceas conceptualistsunderstandit can onlybesomethinggiventous
to be accepted or rejected. In this sense, anondoxasticconceptual experienceis still aGiven,
althoughnotapureGiven.WecanthusidentifyaresidueoftheGiveninconceptualism.
To see the point, we need to distinguish two different senses of the Given. The first
sense of the Given is what Sellars means to attack and McDowell intends to avoid.
Experience as a Given in this sense is understood as something nonconceptual or
nonpropositional; it is something given to the subject to be conceptualized. We find the idea
in different versions of nonconceptualism. The Given in the second sense makes a
distinction between what we experience and what we believe. Experience as a Given in this
second senseis understood as somethingnondoxastic;it is somethinggiven to the subject to
beacceptedorrejected. ItisthissecondsenseoftheGiventhatwefindin conceptualism.
Insisting experience presupposes conceptual capacities, conceptualism does make an
important contribution to fighting the idea of the Given in the first sense. But understanding
experience as nondoxastic, conceptualism commits itself to the Given in the second sense.84
While attacking the first sense of the Given, conceptualism still considers experience as
something given to us, instead of something we take as a belief. To treat a conceptual
content as something to be endorsed or rejected is to treat it as a Given, although a
conceptualGiven.
As Rorty observes correctly, the point of Sellars’s attack on the Given is his attack on
“thedistinctionbetween what is ‘given to themind’and what is ‘added bythemind’”(1997,
p. 5). But the understanding of experience as something waiting to be endorsed or rejected
makes,initsownway, adistinctionbetween whatis giventothemindand whatis addedby
the mind. Devoid of attitude or judgement, conceptual experience is still a Given which
needs to be endorsed or rejected. While we do not need to add a conceptual scheme to
conceptual experience, we still need to add attitude or judgement to it. For this reason, a
nondoxasticconceptualexperienceisstillaGiven.
Hence I agree with Wright when he accuses McDowell of recasting a new version of
theGiven:
…this amounts not to a rejection of the Given as such, but a recasting of it. What is
given in experience is essentially of propositional form that so-and-so is the case…In
rejectingtheMyth of theGiven, McDowell intends to reject amythologyabout what is
Given,andhow,butnottheveryideathatanythingis.(1998, p.397)
While denying experience is a nonpropositional Given, McDowell insists experience is a
propositionalnondoxasticGiven.
The Given in the second sense has its root in Descartes. Descartes admonishes us to
treat experienceas aGiven. That is, when theobject ispresented to theintellect, theintellect
should intuit it “in a fashion exactly corresponding to the way in which it possesses the
object”, instead of judging that the world is as it is represented in experience (1985, p. 47).
In thisway, Descartesthinks,wecanavoidbeingdeceivedbyanyexperience.Experienceis
thus disconnected from the believing subject and becomes pure (though perhaps conceptual)
data to be judged. For Descartes, there is a distinction between experience, which is a
nondoxasticGiven, andtheintellect,whichmakesjudgement.
ThemotivationforthesecondsenseoftheGivenistwodimensional.Ontheonehand,
as we find in Descartes, it is motivated by the intention to avoid being deceived by
experience. This rationalist motivation is based on the consideration that experience is not
always reliable and “the intellect” is in a better position to decide what to believe. On the
other hand, there is an empiricist motivation to base empirical knowledge on experience.
And it is thought that the only way of doing this is to make sure experience is free of the
contaminationofjudgementabouttheworld.
Both the rationalist and empiricist motivation for the second sense of the Given are85
ill-founded. First, with respect to the rationalist consideration, to avoid being deceived by
experience, we do not have to deprive experience of all trace of judgement. What we need
to do is to experience the world carefully and to revalue the judgement made in previous
experience when in doubt. Second, concerning the empiricist consideration, to isolate
experience from belief about the world would only disconnect experience from the world.
Thus the only way to base empirical knowledge on experience is to make a real connection
between experience and the world, that is, to make experience itself a belief or judgement
abouttheworld.
There is no doubt that we should avoid coherentism and insist experience justifies
empirical knowledge. And the only way to do this is to see that experience is belief.
Experience as conceptualists understand it cannot play the justificatory role as McDowell
requires, nor is it able to provide the kind of “observational reports” on which other
propositions rest, as Sellars claims. The Given in the second sense that we find in
conceptualism makes it impossible for conceptualism to bestow experience a justificatory
role. To denouncecoherentism without insisting experienceis belief can onlylead to aNew
MythoftheGiven.
The Myth of the Given that Sellars means to attack is a myth that a nonconceptual
experience can provide a conceptual content for thought. The New Myth of the Given, to
which both Sellars and McDowell are committed, is a myth that experience which is not a
belief about the world can justify a belief about the world. The New Myth of the Given is a
myth that what onedoes not believecan justifywhat onebelieves, and what is not about the
worldcanjustifywhatisabouttheworld.
7. One of conceptualism’s greatest enticements is its epistemological advantage. But
conceptualism, in effect, includes the rider that to be conceptual is only to be propositional.
Hence conceptualism is a version of nondoxasticism which says experience is conceptual
but not doxastic. Nondoxasticism endorsed by conceptualism falls foul of its
epistemological ambition. Experience understood as nondoxastic cannot justify a belief.
This epistemological difficulty belies a virulent mistake in conceptualism, namely, there is
still a sense of the Given in it. The Given in this sense deprives experience a role of
justification in empirical knowledge. What conceptualism has is only a New Myth of the
Given.
The New Myth of the Given should not be understood as a myth of experience. We
mayexorcisetheidea ofthe Given completelybyinsistingexperience is belief and can thus
play a justificatory role in empirical knowledge. The next task of the thesis is then to argue
that experience is indeed belief. But before venturing that task, we need to have a better
understandingabouttherelationshipbetween experienceand concept.86
5.Experienceand Concept as MutuallyConstitutive
1. We can distinguish two views concerning the relationship between experience and
conceptual capacities or language ability. One is the view that experience comes before
conceptual capacities or language ability. Call this experience priority thesis. The other is
the view that conceptual capacities or language ability comes before experience. Call this
concept priority thesis. Nonconceptualism exemplifies the experience priority thesis, while
conceptualismhasatendencyto embracetheconceptprioritythesis.
Nonconceptualists follow traditional empiricists and understand conceptual capacities
as something derived from experience. They thus claim an advantage in explaining where
concepts come from. Peacocke, for example, considers the nonconceptual content of
experience necessary for learning observational concepts. Concerning the case of learning
theobservationalshapeconceptpyramid,heobservesthefollowingquandary:
On the one hand, the representational content of this experience, in the case of learning
from a positive instance, must be sufficient for someone rationally to apply the
concept—must entitle her to apply the concept—when experience is being taken at
facevalue. If that werenotso, it would not be an observational concept after all.Yet on
the other hand, this representational content cannot include the concept pyramid, for
that would require the learner already to possess the concept. The learner could have
such experiencesonlyifthelessonwereunnecessary. (2001, p.252)
Thesolution to thequandary, accordingto Peacocke, “is to acknowledgethat thereis such a
thing as having an experience of something as being pyramid shaped that does not involve
already having the concept of being pyramid” (2001, p. 252). The idea is that, to make the
learningofconcept pyramid possibleand necessary, one’s experienceshould have acontent
thatisindividuatedbytheconceptpyramidwithoutinvolvingtheconcept.
The point of Peacocke’s solution is that experience has a content individuated by the
relevant concepts before these concepts are learnt. But this seems neither necessary, nor
possible. It is not necessary because concept learning is not to apply a concept to a
nonconceptual experience, but to apply it to an external object. All we need for concept
learning is that the subject has the kind of sensory abilitythat enables her to apply a concept
to an object. The solution is not possible because it is not clear how experience can have a
content individuated by the concepts that are not only not involved in the experience but
also not possessed bythe subject. It is not clearhowan experience can be “an experienceof
something as being pyramid shaped” without involving the concept of being pyramid. It87
seems that an object can only be experienced as pyramid shaped when the subject applythe
conceptofbeingpyramidshapedtotheobject.
Peacocke’s solution also implies that learning new concepts will not change the
content of the relevant experience since the content of the latter is already individuated by
the concepts before the concepts are learnt. Thus experience needs to undergo no change
during the course of concept learning. In other words, we develop conceptual capacities
without developing experiential abilityto a new stage. The development of language ability
does not bring about the development of experiential ability. But as we have seen, there is
no reason to think that experience has a content individuated by the concepts that are not
possessed by the subject. For this reason, experience has to undergo some kind of changes
in orderto possess acontent that isindividuated bytheconcepts learnt bythesubject. It is to
be admitted that the kind of perception one can have before obtaining the relevant concepts
is nonconceptual. And there is no doubt that perception of a nonconceptual being is
nonconceptual.But thereisno reasontobelievethat experienceofaconceptualbeinghasto
bethesameasthatofanonconceptualbeing.
Conceptualists seethis clearlyand insist sensoryabilityundergoes asubstantial change
once conceptual capacities are acquired. For conceptualists, the crucial point is to see what
happens to experience once one possesses conceptual capacities. The idea is that our
conceptual capacities permeate sensibility in such a way that we have experience which is
itselfconceptual.
We may then suspect a connection between conceptualism and concept priority thesis.
According to Sellars and McDowell, experience is conceptual because it presupposes
conceptual capacities, namely, experience comes into existence because the subject
possesses conceptual capacities. As McDowell puts it, experience is conceptual because
conceptualcapacitiespermeatethesensoryand makeit anexerciseofconceptualcapacities.
Hence the reason that experience is conceptual is that conceptual capacities play a role in
experience. “The relevant conceptual capacities are drawn on in receptivity” (1994, p. 9).
This seems to suggest that conceptual capacities have a kind of explanatory priority over
experience.
For both Sellars and McDowell, conceptual capacities are prior to experience in the
orderofphilosophical explanation. It is not clear, however, what thenatureofthepriorityis.
Both Sellars and McDowell emphasize that conceptual capacities are presupposed by
experience. But they never say things the other way round, that is, experience is
presupposed by conceptual capacities. Sellars may even seem to deny the dependence in
this direction in his psychological nominalism, according to which “not even the awareness
of such sorts, resemblances, and facts as pertain to so-called immediate experience is
presupposedbytheprocessofacquiringtheuseofalanguage”(1956,§29).
It is not very clear, for Sellars, what exactly this awareness, which is not presupposed88
bytheprocessofacquiringtheuseofalanguage,is. Buttheneglect,ifnotdenial,ofthefact
that experience is presupposed by conceptual capacities, would at least be compatible with,
if not entail, the idea of temporal priority of conceptual capacities over experience. Some of
McDowell’s remarks may seem to encourage this understanding. According to McDowell,
“experience has its content by virtue of the drawing into operation, in sensibility, of
capacitiesthataregenuinelyelementsinafacultyofspontaneity”(1994,pp.46-7).And,
Learningtotalkisnotjustacquiringanewrangeofexpressivebehaviour, withthekind
of thing a creature has to express left unaltered, but acquiring conceptual capacities,
which includes acquiring the propensity for such capacities to be actualized in sensory
consciousness.(1998a,p.412)
This may give the impression that McDowell is suggesting the following picture. We
first have our language ability which gives us conceptual capacities. And then this fantastic
language ability permeates sensibility in such a way that we have experience which is itself
conceptual. Of course, McDowell says, “acquiring conceptual capacities…includes
acquiring the propensity for such capacities to be actualized in sensory consciousnesses”.
But his point is that this “propensity” is not itself an exercise of conceptual capacities in
sensory consciousness. According to McDowell, “spontaneity permeates our perceptual
dealings with the world, all the way out to the impressions of sensibilitythemselves” (1994,
p. 69). All this seems to suggest language ability and hence conceptual capacities come
beforeexperience.
It is quite easy to understand Sellars and McDowell as saying language ability comes
before experience. It seems to be impossible for experience to be an exercise of language
ability if the latter is not already there in the first place. But McDowell never provides a
theory of concept acquisition. So it’s not extremely clear what he has in mind.
40 Sellars
does say something very illuminating regarding concept acquisition. While the theory he
has does not necessarily commit him to the temporal priority of conceptual capacities, he
nevermakesitclearhowweshouldunderstandthematter.
Conceptualism thus seems to have a tendency to hold the concept priority thesis.
41 In
any case the uncertain situation behoves conceptualism a theory of concept acquisition. In
what follows Ishall arguethat theprioritythesis causes serious problems forconceptualism.
40 Pietroski may understand McDowell as saying language ability is temporally priori to experience. He thus claims that
McDowellowesusatheoryofconceptacquisitionbyemphasizing“Onedoesnotacquireconceptualcapacitiesinavacuum”
(1996, p. 634). De Gaynesford, nevertheless, understands McDowell as holding “an interdependence claim” which “regards
ourexperienceandconceptuseastwoaspectsofwhatisessentiallythesamearrangement”(2004,p.26).
41 Ginsburg seeks to reconcile the conceptualist insight with the empiricist understanding of concept acquisition by
suggestion that experienceisconceptual butnot linguistic. But asI arguedin chapter 3, thisproposed rapprochement fails for
two reasons. First,theseparation ofconcept and languageisitselfproblematic. Second,theideathat experienceisconceptual
butnotlinguisticsatisfiesneitherconceptualistsnornonconceptualists.89
Thewayout, Ishall suggest, is to seethat there is athird alternative, namelythat experience
and concept are constitutive of each other. This third alternative shows that the priority
thesis is not essential to conceptualism. We can understand experience as conceptual
withoutunderstandingconceptualcapacitiesasprecedingexperience.
2. Conceptualism would run into severe difficulties if it understands conceptual capacities
as something coming before experience. First, it would be difficult to understand how we
can gain our language ability if we understand language ability as something prior to
experience. Second, it seems we can never be ready to have experience if we believe
experience has to presuppose conceptual capacities temporally. Thirdly, if conceptual
capacities are external to sensibility in the first place, then it would be hard to understand
howitcanpermeatesensibilityandmakethelatterconceptual.
The first problem is concerned with language acquisition. It seems obvious that
language acquisition relies on experience. So thequestion is: how can we gain our language
ability without having the relevant experience? Unlike traditional empiricists, Sellars denies
we obtain our language ability from experience, no matter how this is to be understood. But
he shares with empiricists the belief that “the capacity to have classificatory beliefs of the
form ‘x is F’is acquired” (1956, §45). They are acquired, but not dependent on episodes of
nonverbal, nonconceptual awareness. According to Sellars, “instead of coming to have a
concept of something because we have noticed that sort of thing, to have the ability to
notice a sort of thing is already to have the concept of that sort of thing, and cannot account
forit”(1956,§45).
Both Sellars and McDowell emphasize the fact that conceptual capacities are
conditions for experience. According to Sellars, before one can recognize a green colour,
one has to have the concept “green”. But how can one have the concept “green” without
being able to recognize a green colour? Suppose someone claims that she possesses the
concept “green”. But when you show her a shade of green, she cannot recognize this as
green. Wouldn’t this show that she actually does not have the concept “green”? McDowell
might say if someone possesses the concept “green”, then she would be able to recognize a
shade of green as green. We can happily allow this. It is equally true, however, that if she
cannot recognize a shade of green as green, then we have to say she does not possess the
concept “green”. Understood in this way, experience seems to be a necessary condition for
language ability. It seems to be a conceptual necessity that language ability presupposes
experiential capacity.
While correctly emphasizing that we cannot have experience without having the
relevant conceptual capacities, Sellars and McDowell seem to have ignored the fact that we
cannot have conceptual capacities without having experience. We then face the following90
question: how can we have conceptual capacities without having the relevant experience?
The Wittgensteinian idea that to grasp language is to join a language game does not and is
notmeanttogiveapositiveexplanationoftherelationshipbetween experienceand concept.
Henceitstillbehoves conceptualiststogiveastoryofconcept acquisition.
The second problem with the concept priority thesis is concerned with experience. It
would be difficult to understand how we can have experience if conceptual capacities are
understood as something coming before experience. According to Sellars, to have the
concept of being green “involves the ability to tell what colors objects have by looking at
them—which, in turn, involves knowing in what circumstances to place an object if one
wishes to ascertain its color by looking at it” (1956, §18). Now, there is an immediate
problemforSellars,asSellarshimselfwellrecognizes:
…since one can scarcely determine what the circumstances are without noticing that
certain objects have certain perceptible characteristics—including colors—it would
seem that one couldn’t form the concept of being green, and, by parity of reasoning, of
theothercolors,unlesshealreadyhadthem.(1956,§19)
And his response to the worry is to emphasize that “one can have the concept of green
only by having a whole battery of concepts of which it is one element”. Sellars admits the
process of acquiring the concept of a certain colour “may—indeed does—involve a long
history of acquiring piecemeal habits of response to various objects in various
circumstances”. But he emphasizes “one has no concept pertaining to the observable
propertiesofphysicalobjectsinSpaceandTimeunlessonehasthemall”(1956,§19).
It is true that conceptual capacities come as a whole package.
42 As Merleau-Ponty
pointsout,
As far as language is concerned, it is the lateral relation of one sign to another which
makes each of them significant…Since the sign has meaning only in so far as it is
profiled against other signs, its meaning is entirely involved in language. Speech
always comes into play against a background of speech; it is always only a fold in the
immensefabricoflanguage… (1964,p.42)
The holistic idea of conceptual capacities is not to be denied, but the idea of a “whole
battery of concepts” can be very problematic once we understand it as something preceding
experience. We don’t really know what “the whole battery of concepts” means when it is
supposed tobesomethingpresupposedbyexperience.Taketheexampleofcolourconcepts.
42 Interestingly, Aristotlehasasimilarideaaboutpractical wisdom. Forhim, practical wisdomisawholepackageand allthe
virtuesmustcometogether:“hewillpossessallofthemassoonasheacquirestheone,practicalwisdom”(2000,1145a).91
What is it to have the whole battery of colour concepts? Is it enough to know “red”, “blue”,
“green”, “yellow”, “white”, and “black”? If the answer is “Yes”, then we don’t know why
can’t onlytwo ofthem, say“red” and “blue”, do equallywell. Wedon’t understand whythe
list is sufficient to be counted as thewholebatteryofcolour concepts. Ifthe answeris “No”,
then we are forced back to the original question and it seems we would never know what it
is to have the whole battery of concepts. No matter how long the list is, we can never say
this is thewholebatteryofconcepts: this seems tosuggest wecan neverbereadyforhaving
experience.
The idea that experience has to presuppose “the whole battery of concepts” also
worsens the first problem for the concept priority thesis, namely, the problem of concept
acquisition. Experience’s presupposing “the whole battery of concepts” implies one should
have well-developed conceptual capacities without even being able to have experience of
anything.
Thethird problem forthe concept prioritythesis is concerned with the conceptualityof
experience. It would be difficult to understand the conceptuality of experience if we
understand conceptual capacities as coming before experience. If language ability is
something external to sensibility in the first place, then it would be hard to understand how
itcan permeatesensibilityinthewayMcDowellconceivesit.
McDowell claims that the Aristotelian understanding of nature and the mental allows
conceptual powers to be “operative in the workings of our sensibility, in actualizations of
our animal nature, as such” (1994, p. 74). He believes Aristotle’s ethics shows us this
different conception of nature: “If we generalize the way Aristotle conceives the moulding
ofethical character, wearriveatthenotionofhavingone’s eye opened toreasonsatlargeby
acquiring a second nature” (1994, p. 84). But for Aristotle, practical wisdom is not an
external element permeating moral experience later on. Aristotle’s ethics does not consider
rationality as something prior to or external to moral experience. If we understand language
ability as coming before experience, we cannot be naturalist in the Aristotelian sense. For
Aristotle, moral development is a matter of habituation. Aristotle never says that moral
knowledgecancomebeforevirtues.
Hence the conceptuality of experience mustn’t be understood as the idea that
conceptual capacities come before experience. If we understand the explanatory priority of
conceptual capacities in a temporarysense, then conceptual capacities haveto besomething
which come from a vacuum and make experience conceptual by working as an external
factor. It would then be difficult to understand where conceptual capacities come from, how
wecanhaveexperience,andhowexperiencecanbeconceptual.
3. The way out, I shall suggest, is to see that we do not have to be caught between the92
language priority thesis and the experience priority thesis. There is a third alternative, i.e. to
see that experience and concept are interdependent. We can agree with conceptualism that
experience cannot be independent of conceptual capacities. But we also need to see that
conceptual capacities cannot be independent of experience either. This is the fact both
nonconceptualism and conceptualism seem to have neglected. Conceptual capacities not
only make difference to sensory ability, but also take the development of sensory ability as
its condition. Experience and concept come into being together, neither occupies a prior
position. The crucial point is that they are each the condition for the other. This points to an
understanding of the relationship between experience and concept that is stronger than the
oneheldbyconceptualism.
If we reflect on the way we learn language, we find it is sometimes so obvious that
experience is the condition for language acquisition. This can be understood in two senses.
In the first sense, it is obvious that language has phenomenal features. Language is just the
sounds (or gestures, in the case of sign language) we make and the letters (or raised dots, in
the caseof Braille) placed on thepaper. We eitherhear them, seethem, ortouch them. They
do not seem to be much different from other things we experience in the world. Spoken
language has acoustic features, sign language and written language has visual features, and
Braille has tactile features. There is something it is like to listen to, to read, or to “touch” a
language. This is also true for abstract words like “if…then”, “the”, “and”, etc. One
understands these words as of certain meanings when experiencingthem in acoustic, visual,
or tactile version. No one can have conceptual capacities without first of all having
sensibility.EvenHelen Kellerneedstousetouchtobuildherconceptualsystem.
However, this is not the sense of condition I shall dwell on here. What I am going to
say only applies to those concepts regarding material objects or physical features of the
worldwhichwemayexperience,namely, empiricalconcepts.
What is an adult doing when she tells a child “This is blue”? The common answer is
that she is teaching the child the name of the colour. But it is equally right to say that she is
teaching the child the right way of experiencing the world. The child learns a new concept
when she gains a new way of experiencing the world. To know the meaning of “blue” is to
be able to see a shade of blue as blue. To know the meaning of “chair” is to be able to see a
chair as a chair. Thus experience is the constitutive element of conceptual capacities. To
experience is to possess and use a concept. To learn a language is to learn to experience.
Languagegetsitsexistencefirstofallinexperience.
Only when a child sees a green tree as green can we say that she has grasped the
concept “green”. Onlywhen wehavethe relevant experience, say, to experience X as F, can
we say that we have the relevant conceptual capacity, namely, possess the concept F.
Conceptual capacities are not independent of experiential ability. Experience is the criterion
of conceptual capacities. One can only be said to have grasped a concept when one can93
experiencetheworldinacertainway.
It can be objected that this is not always the case. It is not necessary for one to have
seen a book in order to have the concept of book. One can know what a book is by hearing
this: “a book is a set of printed pages that are fastened inside a cover so that you can turn
themandreadthem”(OxfordAdvanced Learner’sDictionary,2000).Afterhearingthis,one
might then be able to recognize a book as a book. For the sake of argument, let’s grant this.
Let’s grant that one can grasp a concept by hearing a definition or description of something.
There are two points to note, though. First, this is only possible for compound concepts. To
be able to do this, one needs to have the relevant basic concepts which essentially come
together with experience. Second, the criterion of one’s grasp of the concept “book” is that
one can see a book as a book, not that one can recite the definition or description of a book.
If this is true, then the criterion of grasping a concept is experiential ability. However we
learn anempiricalconcept,thecriterionis:to grasptheconceptistobeabletoexperiencein
a certain way. Just as to learn the concept “green” is to learn to experience green things as
green,tolearntheconcept“book”istolearnto,say, seeabook asabook.
It is obvious that languageacquisition relies on experience. Experience is thecondition
for conceptual capacities. It is then clear that we cannot have conceptual capacities without
having the relevant experiential ability. Conceptual capacities can never be independent of
experience.
This is not, however, to deny the conceptualist insight that experience has to be an
exercise of conceptual capacities. Just like language ability is the necessary condition for
experience, experience is likewise the necessary condition for language ability. On the one
hand, one cannot have the concept blue without being able to experience a shade of blue as
blue; on the other hand, one cannot experience a shade of blue as blue without having the
concept blue. Or, to put it more generally, on the one hand, conceptual capacities are not
independent of experience, one only possesses a concept when one can experience in a
certain way; on the other hand, experience cannot be independent of conceptual capacities,
one can only experience the world in a certain way when one has the relevant conceptual
capacities.Henceexperienceandlanguageabilityareco-existentorinterdependent.
Acolour word has a meaning once the child learns the language, but it is equally true
that a shade of colour has a meaning once the child learns the language. Hence language
learning has a double effect; it gives one experiential ability as well as language ability.
Concept and experience are together in the first instance. Experience is the constitutive
element of conceptual capacities, and vice versa. Experience and conceptual capacities
come together and neither has a priority over the other. Conceptual capacities and
experience areconstitutiveof each other. This Icall the constitutivethesis ofexperienceand
concept.
According to the constitutive thesis I propose here, Jackson’s Mary had a conceptual94
defect before she was released from her white-black room and was taught the concepts of
differentcolours.
43 Peoplemaythink thatshehad theconceptsbeforeshewasreleased. But
this is not true. One cannot have concepts of colour without seeing the colours. What Mary
had before she was released were concepts of different wavelengths. The rule she was
following was just to call the light of a certain wavelength red, blue, or green… Adefect in
experienceisalso adefectinconcept.
Nonconceptualism is wrong in saying that conceptual capacities are derived from
experience and make no contribution to experience; but conceptualism would be equally
wrong if it says that concepts come before experience. Like nonconceptualists,
conceptualists understand language acquisition as independent of the development of
sensory ability. According to conceptualists, language acquisition makes difference to
sensory ability but do not take the development of sensory ability as its condition. It is true
that experience is an exercise of conceptual capacities. This nevertheless does not require
one have conceptual capacities before having experience. What we need to see is that
concept andexperiencecomeintobeingtogether.
4. Conceptual capacities are at once experiential ability. We acquire language ability while
developing our experiential ability. This immediately solves the first problem for the
conceptprioritythesis,namelythelanguageacquisitionproblem.
The constitutive thesis also solves the second problem for the concept priority thesis
easily. Understanding experience and concept as constitutive of each other, we can save the
holistic insight about concept formation without falling into the difficulty of explaining
experience. The problem with the priority thesis is to treat our conceptual capacities as
something static and complete, and we never know when they are complete. The
constitutivethesis,incontrast, treats conceptual capacities assomethingdevelopingtogether
with experiential ability. Hence, whatever level of conceptual capacities we are at, we are at
once at the corresponding level of experiential ability. The development of conceptual
capacities and experiential ability come together. What we need to see is that both
conceptual and experiential capacities aredeveloping.Both concept and experiencecomein
degrees.
Finer-grained conceptual capacities are therefore corresponding to finer-gained
experiential ability. Learning a new language, for example, enables us to discriminate some
subtle differences between the pronunciations we would not otherwise be able to
discriminate. Meaningless sounds are not only difficult to memorize, but also difficult to
discriminate. But once we learn the language, we can discriminate the very subtle
43 SeeJackson1986.95
differences between the pronunciations. In fact, learning to discriminate the subtle
differences between pronunciations is the basic part of learning a new language. And
interestingly, when learning anewlanguage, it is moredifficult forthelearnerto pick up the
differences which her mother tongue does not possess. For example, English speakers may
find it hard to pick up the tones in Chinese and Thai, while Japanese speakers may find it
hardtopickupthoseEnglishpronunciationstheydonothaveintheirmothertongue.
It can be objected that animals may have better perceptual capacities, although they do
not have the relevant conceptual capacities. A dog may be able to discriminate many
different kinds of smells without possessing the relevant conceptual capacities. But to
discriminate a smell is not to experience a smell as of a certain kind. Experiential ability
shouldnotbereducedtotheabilitytodiscriminate.
The constitutive thesis also explains how experience can be conceptual and solves the
third problem for the concept priority thesis naturally. According to the constitutive thesis,
conceptual capacities are not something originated from somewhere else and permeate
experienceas external factors; theyarethemselvesexperiential ability.Experiential abilityis
constitutive of conceptual capacities, not just an exercise of conceptual capacities which are
supposed to belong to a different domain. Experiential ability, like conceptual capacities, is
a matter of habituation. The way we experience the world is the result of habituation. We
are habituated to experience the world in a certain way and hence obtain conceptual
capacities.Thisprocessofhabituationisatonceadevelopmentofconceptualcapacitiesand
adevelopmentofexperientialability.
The constitutive thesis thus shows why nonconceptualism must be wrong. To have
conceptual capacities is to experience in a conceptual way, that is, to have conceptual
experience. Experienceis essentiallyconceptual in that we experience as conceptual beings.
The way we experience is constitutive of our conceptual capacities. The point is that once
we have the concept, we would inevitably experience in a conceptual way. In this sense,
Aristotle’s ethics does shed light on this. We do not first have a visual impression and then
decideit is blue. Weexperience ashadeof colouras bluedirectly, just likeavirtuous person
decides what the right thing to do is directly without comparing her moral choice with any
moralprinciples.
Experience is essentially conceptual in that it couldn’t be what it is without having the
relevant conceptual capacities; we experienceas conceptual beings. Thewayweexperience
is constitutive of our conceptual capacities. The point is that once we have the concept, we
would inevitably experience in a conceptual way. In fact, this is what we mean by saying
onehasconceptual capacities. Onecan grasptheconceptonlywhenonecan experienceina
certain way. We experience in the way a conceptual being experiences. For this reason,
human experience is essentially different from animal perception. It is a myth that we can
experience without using any conceptual capacities we may possess. It is typical of a96
conceptual being that she experiences in a conceptual way. Human beings have a special
way of experiencing the world. For a conceptual being, experience has to be conceptual,
since her conceptual capacities consist in her being able to experience in a certain way, that
is, her experience’s being conceptual. Conceptual capacities are in fact experiential ability.
One cannot have the concept blue without experiencing a shade of blue as blue. Thus
conceptualcapacitiesareconstitutiveofexperiential ability.
For this reason, it is impossible to separate the function of the eye and the function of
themind.AsJamesputsit:
The two mental functions thus play into each other’s hands. Perception prompts out
thought, and thought in turn enriches our perception. The more we see, the more we
think; while the more we think, the more we see in our immediate experiences, and the
greater grows the detail and the more significant the articulateness of our perception.
(1987, p.1038)
The reason that experience is conceptual is that there is no pure sensitivity in our
mental life. Sensitivity is always sensitivity with a certain level of understanding. And a
conceptual being, with its conceptual capacities, can only have the kind of sensitivity
marked by this level of understanding. This is why pure sensitivity is nowhere to be found
inourreal experience.
While nonconceptualists, by inheriting the empiricist idea, imagine experience as
independent of conceptual capacities, conceptualists, by inheriting the rationalist idea, may
suggest a relation of independence in the other direction, that is, conceptual capacities are
independent of experience. They both assume the distinction between sensibility and
understandingshould implya certainkind ofindependenceconcerningthesetwo capacities.
It is exactly this separation of sensibility and understanding that the constitutive thesis aims
tofight.
5. The constitutive thesis implies that conceptual capacities are essentially experiential
ability. For this reason, the experience of a conceptual being is essentially conceptual. The
constitutive thesis thus promises a more satisfactory reply to the richness argument against
theconceptualityofexperience.
The richness argument against the conceptuality of experience claims that it cannot be
the case that experience is always conceptual, since in some cases, we simply do not have
therelevant conceptual capacities. Theideaoftheconceptualityofexperience, theobjection97
goes,doesnotdojusticetothefine-grainedphenomenologyofexperience.
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The richness of experience seems to be very impressive, in contrast to the thinness of
concept. As James puts it vividly: “Each concept means just what it singly means, and
nothing else…The perceptual flux as such, on the contrary…is always a much-at-once, and
contains innumerable aspects and characters which conception can pick out, isolate, and
thereafter always intend” (1987, p. 1008). James thus insists that no account of experience
“can everbeafull equivalent, and that in point of genesis it remains asecondaryformation”
(1987, p. 1038, no. 1). In the same vein, Armstrong observes: “And we ourselves are often
hard put to translateourperceptions into words. Ifwethink ofthewealth and subtletyofthe
information that we gain by our eyes, to take one example only, we see that much of it
eludes the relatively course mesh of the net of language” (1988, p. 127). Thus Peacocke
claims the existence of “the fine-grained representational content of experience” is not at
issue.Whatisatissueisitscharacter(2001,p.240).
Astraightforward response to the richness argument may be to deny that we have the
relevant experience when no corresponding conceptual capacities are available. When the
subject does not have the concept “indigo”, she does not have the experience of “indigo”
either. However, the point of the richness argument is that although the subject, say, does
not have the concept “indigo”, she is still conscious of the shade of colour in a certain way.
And we may have to say this particular way of being conscious of the shade of colour is
nonconceptual. To insist that experience is always conceptual, we then need to explain in
whatsenseitisconceptual.
In his reply to the richness argument, McDowell suggests that we can use
demonstrative expressions to solve the problem. For a shade of colour for which we do not
haveaspecialword,wecanuseexpressionslike“itisofthisshade”.
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This solution does not seem to be promising. In what sense is the shade of colour
conceptualized by using demonstrative “this”? The demonstrative “this” is certainly not the
name of the colour. As Wittgenstein makes it clear, if we do not want to produce confusion
we should do our best not to call demonstrative words names at all. The reason is simple. It
is characteristic of a name that it is defined by means of the demonstrative expression “That
is N”. But we do not give the definition: “That is called ‘this’”, or “This is called ‘this’”
(1953, §38). To use demonstratives is to point at the object, and “a name is not used with,
but only explained by means of, the gesture of pointing” (1953, §45). “This shade of blue”
does not explain the concept of a special shade of blue. As Wittgenstein remarks: “Imagine
someone saying: ‘But I know how tall I am!’ and laying his hand on top of his head to
44 The richness argument may also be based on cases where we are appreciating a piece of art work. When looking at a
drawing, we may find there is always more to discover. But this is a case of the richness of the drawing, not the richness of
experience which is supposed to go beyond our conceptual capacities. There is always more to discover in the drawing, but
notinexperience.
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proveit”(1953,§279).
Moreover,namingisnotenoughforconceptualization.AsWittgensteinmakesitclear:
For naming and describing do not stand on the same level: naming is a preparation for
description. Naming is so farnot amovein thelanguage game—anymorethan putting
a piece in its place on the board is a move in chess. We may say: nothing has so far
been done, when a thing has been named. It has not even got a name except in the
language-game.ThiswaswhatFregemeanttoo,whenhesaidthat awordhadmeaning
onlyaspartofasentence. (1953,§49)
Hence it’s the meaning of the name which matters: “When we forget which colour this is
the name of, it loses its meaning for us; that is, we are no longer able to play a particular
language-gamewithit”(1953,§57).
If we were to grant demonstratives too much conceptual value, our conceptual
capacities would shrink dramatically. We could then talk in phrases such as “This is like
this”or“Thisman goestothiscity”.Thisisnottoconceptualize,butrathertopoint—which
wemaydobeforewehavewell-developedconceptualcapacities.
The consequence of this is significant. If we can use a demonstrative for an unnamed
colour, we can certainly use it for the colour red when it is not named. In fact, I do not see
why we cannot use it for all shades of colour we can imagine. This seems to suggest the
concept “colour” plus a demonstrative would be sufficient for the kind of concepts to be
presupposed for any colour experience. This should apply equally well to shape, taste, and
smell.
Wemayeven take this further. With thehelp ofdemonstratives, our concept repertoire
does not even need to be fine enough to have concepts like “colour”, “shape”, “taste”,
“smell”, “roughness”, “hardness”. Concept “quality” would be sufficient. We can describe
any property by saying “It is of this quality” or “It feels thus”. Then it seems, with the help
of demonstratives, the concepts to be presupposed by experience could be highly abstract.
Conceptualism understood in this waymaystill be an interesting position. But its scope and
strength mayshrink dramatically. As Martin points out correctly: “In the broader scheme of
things, such purely demonstrative judgements are of little epistemic or pragmatic value.
What matters in making judgements about the objects we apprehend is knowing how to
classify them. A judgement of the form ‘this is thus’ will not do any such thing for one”
(2001, p.443).
The problem with McDowell’s response is that a demonstrative expression does not
help to put the content of experience in the space of reasons. We cannot designate a colour
by pointing at it. The colour which is only recognized as “this shade” is isolated from the
whole conceptual scheme of colour. And a content of this kind cannot play anyjustificatory99
role. If someone asks you: Do you think the colour of the tie match the black suit? You
can’t reply by saying because it is of this shade, so it doesn’t match. You have to say
something about the colour, no matter what. You can say because this colour is too dark (or
bright),soitdoesn’tmatch.
Moreover, what McDowell is trying to do seems to be showing that experience is
articulatable. This, nevertheless, is not the point of the conceptuality of experience. The
point of the conceptuality of experience is that it is exactly certain kind of conceptual
capacities that make a certain experience possible. We certainly do not wish to say that it is
the concept “this colour” or “coloured thus” that makes the subject experience the shade of
colour in a certain way. Hence even if we grant McDowell that his reply is successful
regarding the articulatability of experience, this still does not tell us very much about the
conceptualityofexperience.
The issue of the articulatability of experience is concerned with our conceptual
capacities. It can be a debate about our conceptual capacities, which is not specifically
relevant to the nature of experience. Thus the talk of articulatability of experience can shift
the debate about the conceptuality of experience to a debate about the extent of conceptual
capacities. The conceptuality of experience is sometimes understood as the content of
experience being exhaustible by its articulation. This may give the impression that for
experience to be conceptual is for it to be articulatable. However, this is not true.
Nonconceptualism can agree at least some experiences are articulatable without agreeing
these articulatable experiences are conceptual. Even if the content of experience is fully
articulated, that still does not mean it is conceptual. The content of experience can be
articulatable without being itself conceptual. It is true that experience cannot be conceptual
without being articulatable. But being articulatable does not entail it is conceptual.
Particularly, to articulate an experience with demonstratives does not show that the
experienceisconceptual.
McDowell’s solution betrays a crucial divergence between his conceptualism and
Sellars’s psychological nominalism. For Sellars, “the simple ability to feel a pain or see a
color, in short, to sense sense contents, is acquired and involves a process of concept
formation” (1956, §6). But what McDowell is trying to do here is to show how experience
which does not presuppose the relevant conceptual capacities can still be conceptual. By
responding in this way, McDowell loses sight of the crucial point in Sellars’s attack on the
Given, namely, that there is no awareness of the space of logic prior to conceptual
capacities.
6. The best way to respond to the richness argument, I shall argue, is to see that experience
and concept are constitutive of each other. Specifically, experience is dependent on100
conceptual capacities the subject may possess. We would not be able to experience the
world in that particular way without the relevant conceptual capacities. Hence we can agree
that for a shade of colour we do not have a name for, we cannot experience the shade of
colour in the way specified by that name. A subject who does not possess the concept
“indigo”willnotabletoexperienceashadeofcolourasindigo.
However, to say that the subject does not possess a particular concept or a special
name for a certain shade of colour is different from saying that she does not have the
relevant conceptual capacities to grasp the shade of colour. It is impossible for someone
who does not have the concept “indigo” to see a shade of indigo as indigo. But she should
have no problem in seeing the shade of colour as a shade of dark blue. And this would be
enough for her experience to be conceptual. Hence our not having a special name for a
shade of colour does not mean the experience of that shade of colour is not conceptual. The
fact that we do not have a special name for a shade of colour does not imply there are no
conceptualcapacitiestoappealtofortheexperienceofthisshadeofcolour.
It is true that there is no special concept for every shade of colour we are able to
discriminate in experience. But this does not mean our experiential discriminating ability is
finer grained than our conceptual capacities. Take the example of dark and light. The
conceptual dimension of dark and light is supposed to capture any sensible differences in
the dimension. For any sensible difference, you can say it is darker or lighter. It is true that
we see more shades of colour than we have names for. But this is not to say that those
shades of colour we do not have names for are beyond our conceptual capacities.
Corresponding to one’s experiences of different shades of blue, there are conceptual
capacities of different dimensions of the colour: saturation, brightness, and the shades of
colourthebluecolouristinted with,etc.
The key point is that to say experience is conceptual is to say it is anchored in a
conceptualscheme,not tosaythat wehaveto giveanameforeveryshadeofcolour. Onthe
one hand, giving a shade of colour a special name does not help to make the experience
conceptual if the name is not within our conceptual scheme. Suppose we call a shade of
blue Mary. Without putting Mary in the conceptual scheme of colour, the name does not
help to put the shade of colour within the space of reasons. We cannot say because my
sweater is Mary, so it is not green. Similarly, to know the name of indigo is not enough to
experienceashadeofindigo as indigo. You haveto knowwhich shadeofdark blueit is. To
give every shade of colour a special name, like Mary, John, and Sally, does not help to put
them in the conceptual scheme. The conceptual scheme is a conceptual network with
different hierarchies and dimensions of concept. On the other hand, to put a shade of colour
into our conceptual scheme does not require a special name. To say a shade of colour is
light soft blue is already to put it in the conceptual scheme. We can do a lot of things with
this in the space of reasons. We can sayit is not red, it is not dark blue, it is a pleasant shade101
ofcolour,etc.
There is a distinction between X’s falling within our colour-conceptual scheme, and
X’s falling under a particular colour-concept (being named by a colour term). The scheme
in fact allows colours without names fall within it and hence become conceptual. A colour
experience’s being an exercise of conceptual capacities does not rely on a special concept
for the shade of colour. To say that experience is conceptual is to say that we can somehow
locate the content of experience within the conceptual scheme. An experience of an
unfamiliar shade of colour can be conceptual if onlyone sees it as, say, a shade of dark blue
with a tint of red. Hence, it is not true that our conceptual capacities are not rich enough to
capturethecontentofexperience.
Suppose you are looking at a shade of colour which you do not have a name for.
Someone asks you: “what do you see?” You say: “I see a shade of dark orange.” Then the
conceptual content of your experience is “a shade of dark orange”. If you say instead “I see
a shade of orange with a tint of brown”, then “a shade of orange with a tint of brown” is the
conceptual content of your experience. Or you may say “I see a shade of warm orange”. In
this case “a shade of warm orange” is the conceptual content of your experience. The way
you experience the world is constitutive of the kind of conceptual capacities you exercise
whenhavingtheexperience.
Then the question might be: exactly which one is the conceptual content of that
experience? This is in fact the wrong question to ask. The question is based on the
assumption that there is one single experience behind the three conceptual contents. But in
fact thereis no singlethat experienceexcept forthethreeexperiences each structured bythe
kind of conceptual capacities you exercise at the moment of having the experience. The
crucial point is that the content of experience depends on the kind of conceptual capacities
thatareinoperationwhenyou havetheexperience.
But what about the phenomenal features? If it is the same shade of colour which is
perceived, then the phenomenal features must be the same. I have said there is no single
experience behind the three experiences. Hence there is no reason to believe that the
phenomenal features must be the same. People with different conceptual schemes may see
different things. Or if you like, they may see the same thing in different ways. And these
different ways are different both conceptually and phenomenally. Think about the
duck-rabbit figure. It is certainly not right to say the experience of the figure is
phenomenally the same for people who see it as a duck and for those who see it as a rabbit.
To say that amounts to saying that the experience of seeing a picture duck can be
phenomenally the same as that of seeing a picture rabbit. Were this the case, the subject
would have no reason to believe it is a picture duck rather than a picture rabbit, or the other
way round. A subject who sees the figure as a duck can tell clearlythat she sees it as a duck
rather than a rabbit, not that she has an image which is equally duck-like and rabbit-like and102
it just so happens that she judges it as a duck rather than a rabbit. The difference is in the
experience, not in the judgement based on a neutral experience. The point of the
phenomena is that preoccupations infect the way we see the figure, not just the way we
make judgement from experience. Were the latter the case, the phenomenon of duck-rabbit
picturewouldnotbeofmuchinterest.
Peacocke argues that “We must, in describing the fine-grained phenomenology, make
use of the notion of the way in which some property or relation is given in the experience.
The same shape can be perceived in two different ways, and the same holds for the shape
properties, ifweregardthem aswithintherepresentational content ofexperience”(2001b, p.
240). Peacocke cites Ernst Mach’s example of one and the same shape that can be
perceived either as a square or as a regular diamond. And on this example he comments:
“Thesearenotdifferentshapes.Theshapeofan object need notalterwhenitmoves; and an
object can be perceived either as a square, or as a diamond, in either of the standard
orientations relative to the perceiver” (2001b, p. 240-241). But this, as I argued above, is
exactlyacasewhichdemonstratesthatthewayweexperiencetheworldisconceptual.
Is our language ability sufficient to capture the richness and fineness of experience?
This is, again, the wrong question to ask. Our conceptual capacities are not there to capture
the rich content of experience. Experience is itself an exercise of conceptual capacities. We
develop experience abilitywhile developing conceptual capacities. Our experiencing ability
does not go beyond conceptual capacities. For this reason, the richness argument against
conceptualismiswrong-headed.
To see the point, we may need to consider a different version of the richness argument
that can be found in Collins. Collins understands McDowell’s conceptualism as suggesting
that “The scene I take in perceptually will support a large and open-ended number of
propositional descriptions and no one of them is essential or required”. He protests that
“experience does not come, as though, with subtitles” (1998, p. 379). McDowell’s reply to
this is that the conceptual content of experience is exactly “the open-ended manifold of
propositional entitlement, not some selection from it” (1998b, p. 413). As he makes it clear
earlierinhisbook:
Notethat groundingneednotdependon aninferentialstep fromonecontentto another.
The judgment that things are thus and so can be grounded on a perceptual appearance
that things are thus and so. This does not obliterate the characteristic richness of
experience (especially visual experience). A typical judgement of experience selects
from the content of the experienceon which it is based; theexperience that grounds the
judgment that things are thus and so need not be exhausted by its affording the
appearance that things are thus and so. Selection from among a rich supply of already
conceptual content is not what Evans takes judgement to effect, a transition from one103
kindofcontenttoanother.(1994, p.49)
But this does not seem to be plausible. The conceptual experience has to be itself a
selected one. Thewayoneexperiences theworld has to beconstitutiveoftheconcept that is
exercisedatthemoment.
8. Experience is a way of exercising whatever kind of conceptual capacities we may have.
This does not pose a high requirement to our conceptual capacities in the way that our
conceptual capacities have to be so perfectly developed that every discernible feature of the
world has to be captured by a special word. First, although naming objects and properties is
oneimportant aspect ofconceptual capacities,ourconceptual capacitiesarenotrestricted by
this ability. Wecan conceptuallygrasp adiscernablefeatureofthe world withoutgivingthat
very feature a special name. Second, our experiential ability is restricted by our conceptual
capacities. That which we cannot name we cannot experience as under that particular
description either, although the relevant experiential ability can be supported by some other
aspects of our conceptual capacities. The crucial idea is that conceptual capacities have
soaked through experience. Experience is thus constitutive of whatever kind of conceptual
capacities the subject may possess. While some subjects may have better developed
conceptual capacities and hence experience the world in a more subtle way, some other
subjects may have very limited conceptual capacities and thus experience the world in a
cruder way. While some people are only able to experience things as looking red, sounding
loud, or tasting sweet, some other people are also able to experience things as looking
elegant,soundingominous,ortastingFrench.
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The point of the constitutive thesis is that conceptual capacities are at once experiential
ability. This means experienceis not onlyconceptual, but also conceptual in theliteral sense,
namely a full, active exercise of conceptual capacities. Now if we understand conceptual
capacities as capacities to make judgement, then it seems natural to say that experiential
ability is an ability to make judgement. And given the direct relation between experience
and the world, we are led to the idea that experience is judgement or belief about the world.
Thistakesustotheideaofdoxasticismthat Ishalldiscussinthenextchapter.
46 Gendler and Hawthorn observes: “Not only do we say things like: that looks red, that sounds loud, that tastes sweet, we
also saythings like: that looks elegant, that soundsominous, or that tastes French” (2006, p. 10). This certainlyshould notbe
taken for granted for every single subject. For a subject who has no idea about tasting French, it is impossible for her to
experienceadishastastingFrench.104
6.Experienceas Doxastic
1. In this chapter I shall argue that experience is belief about the world. This is the view I
term doxasticism, as opposed to nondoxasticism, which we find in both nonconceptualism
and conceptualism.
Doxasticism is the idea that experience is essentially doxastic. It is itself belief or
judgement, not a state or episode with a neutral content to be accepted or rejected. The
world, so to speak, forces beliefs upon us in experience. The attitudeofbelievingis intrinsic
to experience, not something about an experience, or over and above an experience. The
doxastic attitude in experience can be believing, disbelieving, or doubting (suspension of
belief).
It is important to note that when I say experience is belief, I mean experience is itself
belief, not just that we derive beliefs from experience. It is not, then, just that we always
believe what we experience. Saying that we believe what we experience would allow the
possibility that there is a gap between experience and belief, which implies that experience
is only something we can believe, disbelieve, or doubt, not that it is itself belief. Of course,
somethingwecan believe, disbelieve, ordoubt can also beitselfbelief, but when peoplesay
that wederive belief from experience, theytypicallymean that experienceis not itself belief.
In contrast, the point of doxasticism is that experience is itself a doxastic state which can be
described as a belief, disbelief, or doubt. The doxastic attitude is already in experience. It is
truethat laterreasoningorexperiencemaychallengethe experience. But what ischallenged
is an experience with the attitude of believing as a constitutive component, neither an
attitudetowards experience, norexperience without an attitude. Forthis reason, doxasticism
is to be distinguished from Armstrong’s claim that perception is the acquiring of belief.
Armstrong, while trying to make a close connection between perceptual experience and
belief,actuallymakesitclearthat“perceptionsarenotbeliefs”(1988,p.132).
I should further make it clear that when I say experience is belief, I mean it is
conceptual belief, namely, belief involves conceptual capacities. Belief, as Iunderstand it, is
essentially a conceptual state. Doxasticism is thus to be distinguished from the claim that
experience is doxastic but nonconceptual. The close connection between concept and belief
is in fact well recognized. Many philosophers insist experience is nondoxastic because they
think it is nonconceptual. Dretske, for example, advocates non-epistemic perception exactly
because he is opposed to the view that the exercise of conceptual capacities is essential for
perception (1993). Similarly, Jose Luis-Bermudez also connects “non-doxastic” with
“nonconceptual” (1995, p. 335-36). But it has recently been argued by Byrne (2009) and
Smith (2001) that experience is doxstic, albeit nonconceptual. Smith claims, “perceptual105
consciousness”, being nonconceptual, “is intrinsically doxastic, or engaged”. By saying
perceptual consciousness is doxastic, Smith means that it is “in reactive and responsive
engagementwiththeenvironment”(2001,p.308).
I should also emphasize that by “conceptual” I mean linguistic. Hence when I say
experience is conceptual belief, I mean it is belief that has language as its vehicle, not just
belief that is expressible in language. This, of course, is not to say experience has a subtitle.
What I mean is that the way experience conceptualizes the world is the way our language
abilitydoes it. Doxasticismis thus tobedistinguished from Ginsborg’s viewthat experience
is doxastic but non-linguistically conceptual (2006a). What she is advocating, from my
pointofview,isactuallyaversionofnonconceptualism.
It seems undeniable that experience is a form of belief. The confidence we all have in
dealing with the world seems to be sure evidence that there is commitment in experience.
We would not be able to manage so well if experience were not belief. Experience
presupposes a general understanding of the world. When you try to reach something you
see in front of you, you not only take it that this something you see is also something you
can reach but also believe it exists in the literal sense. It is phenomenologically obvious that
to experience is to believe. Understanding, desire, aversion, assertion, denial and doubt are
alreadyin experience.
In ordinary language, we report experience as a commitment to the truth of the world.
If I say “I saw Mary in Waitrose yesterday”, I am not just reporting the fact that I had the
experience ofseeingMaryin Waitrose yesterday, Iam committingto the fact that Maryand
I, particularly Mary, were in Waitrose yesterday at a certain point of time. Sometimes the
experienceitselfmaysound moreimportant than thefact to which thesubject is committed.
When I say “I saw the Queen in Banbury yesterday”, I may concern myself less about the
fact that the Queen was in Banbury yesterday, than with emphasizing what an exciting
experienceitwas toseetheQueen. Butagain,theveryreasonthattheexperienceis exciting
isthattheperson IsawinBanburywastheQueen.
The aim of the chapter is to argue for doxasticism. My argument for doxasticism
consists of three steps. First, experience always has one and only one object, which is either
physical or mental. Second, experience has its physical or mental object in virtue of being
conceptual, that is, being an exercise of conceptual capacities. Thirdly, to exercise
conceptual capacities in experience is to make judgment about the world. The conclusion is
thatexperienceinvolvesjudgmentorbeliefabouttheworld.
2. The initial step of my argument for doxasticism is to establish that to have experience is
to have experience of an object. Experience always has one and only one object, which is
either physical or mental, and hence does not have an existence independent of its object.106
This Icalltheobject-dependentthesisofexperience.
To see the point of the object-dependent thesis we need to recognize that experience
can have avarietyof objects, chairs, mirrorimages, shadows, pictures on thescreen, voices,
rainbows, mirages, afterimages, or hallucinatory images.
47 The object of experience can be
roughly distinguished as physical and mental or external and internal.
48 An afterimage does
not exist as a physical object; but it does exist as a mental object. And that’s why
psychologists are interested in studying it and try to explain it. When someone reports to a
psychologist in the lab that she is having a certain kind of afterimage, she is reporting a fact
about a mental object. Her report of the fact can be true or false; and she can lie about it if
she prefers to do so. This suggests that a mental object is important and should not be
dismissed as a non-object. A mental object is the real object of experience in that it does not
exist as something mediating between the subject and a further physical object, although it
is true that, unlike a physical object, a mental object cannot exist independent of the
subject’sexperiencingit.
The experience of seeing a chair has the chair as its object while the experience of
hallucinating a chair has the image of a chair as its object. Experience is individuated by its
object. An experience of seeing a chair cannot be an experience as such without the chair
being its object. In the same vein, the experience of hallucinating a chair cannot be an
experienceassuchwithouttheimageofachairbeingitsobject.
Perceptual experience takes physical objects as its object, while nonperceptual
experience takes mental objects as its object. The object of preceptual experience can exist
independently of it, but perceptual experience cannot exist independently of its object,
otherwise it would not be qualified as a perceptual experience. For nonperceptual
experience, neither can the mental object exist independently of the experience, nor can the
experience exist independently of the mental object. The dependence in the latter direction
is manifested by the fact that a nonperceptual experience cannot be summoned up at will.
There can only be a hallucinatory experience when there is a hallucinatory image there to
experience. The dependence is even stronger than it is the case in perceptual experience in
that it is more difficult to get rid ofthe experienceonce the mental object is there. Hence for
both perceptual and nonperceptual experience, experience cannot exist independently of its
object.
The idea of mental object may be reminiscent of sense datum theories. Both the
object-dependent thesis of experience and sense datum theories seem to agree that
experience can have mental objects. There are nonetheless crucial differences between the
47 Theidea that weperceive different kindsof things can be found in Austin. He writes: “There areno onekindofthingthat
we ‘perceive’but manydifferent kinds, thenumber being reducible if at all byscientific investigation and not byphilosophy:
pens are in many ways though not in all ways unlike rainbows, which are in many ways though not in all ways unlike
after-images, which in turn are in many ways but not in all ways unlike pictures on the cinema-screen—and so on, without
assignablelimit(1962,p.4;seealsop.8).
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two. Sense datum theories insists that the mental object is a common factor shared by
perceptual and nonperceptual experience, and in perceptual experience the mental object is
something mediating between the subject and a physical object, while for the
object-dependent thesis, only nonperceptual experience has a mental object, and the mental
object, where there is one, is the only object of experience. The object-dependent thesis
understands both perceptual experience and nonperceptual experience as having an object
whiledifferentiates thesetwo kinds ofexperienceinaccordancewith thekind ofobject they
mayhave.
The central claim of sense datum theories is that perceptual experience and
nonperceptual experience share a common factor which is exactly the mental object we
have in nonperceptual experience. But nonperceptual experience is only an abnormal
experience which implies a certain kind of malfunction of our visual system. There is no
reasontothinkthat whatwehaveintheabnormalcaseshouldalsobesomethingwehavein
the normal case. Particularly, there is no reason to think that we have what we have in the
normal case in virtue of having the kind of thing we have in the abnormal case. On the
contrary, a mental object which is possessed by experience in abnormal cases is exactly the
kindofthingshouldnotbepossessedbyexperienceinthenormalcases.
Theobject-dependentthesismaythenseemtobeveryclosetoadisjunctiveanalysisof
experience, given that they both treat different species of experience in different ways.
49
But therearesubtledifferences between thetwo kinds of position as well. And the natureof
the difference depends on which version of disjunctivism and what kind of experience we
areconsidering.
It is typical of the naive realist version of disjunctivism that it evades a positive
statement about the object of nonperceptual experience, while agreeing with the
object-dependent thesis that perceptual experience has one and only one object, namely a
physical object. Thus Snowdon claims: “The experience in a perceptual case in its nature
reaches out to and involves the perceived external object, not so the experience in other
cases” (2005, p. 136-7). Snowdon only makes it clear that nonperceptual experience does
not involve an external object, but makes no claim about whether this kind of experience
may have another kind of object. Martin is more explicit with a negative claim about the
object of nonpreceptual experience. In talking about the case of hallucination, Martin
suggests that “one might better deny that there is any object of experience at all in this case,
itmerelyseemstooneasifthisisso”(2002,p.395).
We may then wonder what prevents disjunctivism from admitting that a nonperceptual
experience has a mental object. One possible answer is that this simply is a matter of
terminology. For disjunctivists, objects can only be physical and there is no point of talking
49 Fortheideaofdisjunctivism,seeMartin2002,McDowell1982,Snowdon1981,1990,2002,2005.Theideacanbetraced
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aboutmentalobjects.Thusamentalobjectisnotanobjectatall.
While this seems to be a plausible understanding of the situation, I suspect there is a
deeper reason for denying that a hallucinatory experience has a mental object. This has to
do with a basic commitment that disjunctivism shares with sense datum theories, namely a
perception-illusion disjunction first described by Hinton. According to Hinton, the
experience of having a light appearance, can be either an experience of seeing a flash of
light, or a phosphene, “what you get for instance when an electric current is passed through
yourhead in acertain waybyexperimental psychologists”(1973, p. 40). Disjunctivism thus
denies that a veridical experience and an illusion or hallucination share a common factor
without denying that they have something in common, namely, they are experientially
indistinguishable. Hence, from the subject’s point of view, for any given experience, there
are two possibilities, either it has a physical object, orit does not. Thelatter caseis therefore
a failure. It fails to do the kind of thing it is supposed to do, namely, include an external
objectasitsconstituent.
50
It is exactlyforthisreasonthatMartinclaimsthat,inhallucination,“itmerelyseemsto
one as if” there is an object of experience. The idea that a hallucinatory experience is
indistinguishable from a corresponding normal experience is so prevalent that it is often
taken for granted that if one hallucinates a chair then one is having an experience which is
introspectively indistinguishable from an experience of seeing a chair. But the
indistinguishability between hallucination and an alleged corresponding normal experience
should not be taken for granted. It is not clear that it seems to the hallucinating subject as if
there is a physical object there. Unless the hallucinating subject is totally insane, she would
normally be able to tell that what she has is a hallucinatory image, not a physical object.
Probably what is misleading here is the way we describe a hallucination. We usually
describe a hallucination as one of a certain physical object. We thus have hallucination of a
chair, ofadagger, ofadead relative, etc. This maygivetheimpression that thehallucination
is indistinguishablefrom an experienceof aphysical object. But this does not have to bethe
case. Just as a picture of a chair does not have to be indistinguishable from a chair, a
hallucinationofachairdoesnothavetobeindistinguishablefrom achaireither.
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Hence nonperceptual experience should not be considered a failure. It is true that
things go wrong in nonperceptual experience. But it is not wrong in the sense that a
nonperceptual experience fails to have a physical object as it is supposed to have. It is only
wronginthesensethatithas anabnormalobject,namelyamentalobject.
The idea of indistinguishability is also clear in the epistemological version of
disjunctivism. McDowell claims, “I can make the disjunctive structure explicit like this:
50 Theindistinguishabilitythesisthusleadstotheideathatevenwhenhavingnormalexperience,thesubjectcanonlytakeit
tobesobydefault,whichseemstosuggestaweakversionofscepticism.
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experiences in which one seems to perceive that things are thus and so are either
experiences in which it is given that things are thus and so or experiences in which it seems
to be given, but is not given, that things are thus and so” (2009, p. 470-471). Based on the
indistinguishability thesis, McDowell makes some positive claims about the object of
nonperceptual experience, and seems to get things completely wrong. McDowell groups
illusion and nonperceptual experience together and call them deceptive experience. He
remarks, “when experience misleads us there is a sense in which it intervenes between us
and the world” (1994, p. 143). The idea is that deceptive experience is only a mere
appearancewhichmediatesbetweenus andtheworld.
The idea of mere appearance is itself problematic. Experience is appearance. Many
different kinds of things can appear in experience. A physical object can appear in
experience, a hallucinatory image can appear in experience. Whatever appears in
experienceisjusttheobjectofexperience; inno senseexperienceis amereappearance.The
only reason for talking about mere appearance is that it is assumed that only physical object
appearsin experience. If weallowthatnon-physical objectappearsin experience, thenthere
isnopointoftalkingaboutmereappearance.
In any case, it is a mistake to think that an appearance could be something mediating
between us and the world. In the case of hallucination, what we have is only a hallucinatory
image, there is no physical object behind the image. The fact that the hallucinating subject
may take the hallucinatory image as a chair does not make the hallucinatory image
something mediating her and a chair. Where is the chair, anyway, which is supposed to be
mediated by the hallucination? The same holds for the case of after-image. In the case of
after image, what appears in one’s experience is an after-image. This after-image is the
object of one’s experience; it is not something mediating between one and a further or
deeper object of one’s experience. What we have to give up is the idea that the object of
experience has to be something we can pick up and show to someone else. Whatever one
hasin experienceistheobjectofexperience;itdoesnothavetobeaphysicalobject.
McDowell in fact even wants to say that even in the case of illusion, where the
physical object does appear, there is still an appearance which is not the physical object, but
something mediating between the subject and the physical world. This is why he says, as I
quoted above, “when experience misleads us there is a sense in which it intervenes between
us and the world”. The reason for this is that the appearance we get in this case is different
from the way the object “really” is. In the case of Müller-Lyer illusion, the appearance, it is
said, is that the two lines are unequal, while the “reality” is that they are equal. Hence,
according to McDowell, this appearance must be different from the “reality” and can only
be something mediating between the experiencing subject and the physical object. But even
if we agree that the two lines appear unequal, this does not make it necessary to assume an
appearance of the two lines which is not the two lines themselves. What appear in110
experience are just the two lines. That particular way of appearing does not make the two
linesbecomesomethingelse, whichmediatesthemandthesubject.
The crucial point here is to have a correct understanding of appearance. Traditionally,
the concept of appearance is understood in contrast with the concept of reality. This is the
ideathatthingsmayappearinawaydifferentfromthewaytheyare.When Isay“It appears
that Mary is very happy with the exam result”, I am expressing the possibility that things
may appear in ways which is different from the way they are—Mary may not be happy
with the exam result at all. We may say “John appears as a doctor in the movie” which
means John acts as a doctor in the movie but he is actually an actor, instead of a doctor. We
thus have the corresponding substantive “appearance” which means it is something
different from the real thing. It’s something on the surface, or, superficial; it mayor may not
tell the truth. But this should not be the way we understand appearance as experience. A
different way of saying I experience something is to say that something appears in my
experience. For this reason we may say experience is appearance. This allows the
possibilitythat things may exist but are not in my experience at a certain moment. This also
accommodates the fact that we always experience things from a certain point of view; that
is, in experience, things always appear to us in a certain way. Hence appearance is the way
things present in one’s experience. What we need to note is that what appears in experience
is the object of experience. Hence appearance cannot be separated from the object that
appears. Or, more accurately, there is no appearance which is to be distinguished from the
objectappears.
In any case, it is very common that things appear in many different ways in our
experience. A circular object may appear elliptical from certain direction, a square
rectangular or trapezium. That doesn’t make it the case that what appears in experience has
to besomethingotherthan the object. TheMüller-Lyer diagram, as adesigned case, maybe
less familiar to ordinary subjects, but this does not make it more necessary to assume a
mediating appearance to accommodate the line’s particular way of appearing. As Valberg
puts it: “only what is present in experience can look, or appear, one way or another. The
way an object looks is, we might say, its way of being manifest to us” (1992, p. 78).
Applying this to the case of a straight stick half-immerse in water, Valberg remarks: “If in
the bent-stick case the object present is not the stick but a sense-datum, then it cannot be
true(as we are supposing)that thestick looks bent; for thestick cannot look bent unless it is
present”(1992,p.79).
It is the merit of disjunctivism that it treats different species of experience in different
ways. Disjunctivism is right in rejecting the common factor assumption, or Common Kind
Assumption, as Martin terms it (2006, p. 357). But itis not clearthat it treats each species of
experience in the right way. Both versions of disjunctivism give perceptual experience,111
especially veridical experience, a prominent role in understanding experience.
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physical object becomes the only possible real object of experience. If we cannot find a
physical object of experience, as it is in the case of hallucination, then it must be either
because experience in a sense intervenes between us and the world, as McDowell suggests,
or because there is no object for the experience at all, as Martin suggests. And partly due to
the influence of sense datum theories, McDowell even thinks that in the case of illusive
experience, where there is indeed a physical object presenting in experience, experience is
stillanappearancewhichintervenesbetweenusandtheworld.
Hence while sense datum theories are wrong in giving nonperceptual experience a
prominent role in understanding experience, disjunctivism is wrong in giving perceptual
experience a prominent role in understanding experience: that is, to assume that physical
object is the only kind of object experience one can have. Different kinds of experience
need to be treated in different ways, but neither should occupy a prominent role. To assume
oneofthemoccupiesaprominentroleisitselfanattempttotreattheminthesameway.
The object-dependent thesis of experience allows us to see that experience is always
belief. The fact that the object of experience is a mental object does not prevent experience
from being belief. When one stares at the bulb when the lamp is switched on and then turns
one’s eyes away, one experiences afterimages. One doesn’t believe there is anything
physical there. Nevertheless one does believe there is an afterimage there. For this reason
the experienceis still belief. When one hallucinates, one eitherbelieves oneis hallucinating,
or believes one is seeing a physical object. In either case, one’s experience is belief. If one
believes one is hallucinating when one is hallucinating, then the hallucinating experience is
not only a belief, but also a true belief. If one believes one is seeing a physical object when
one is hallucinating, then the hallucinating experience is a false belief. In either case,
experienceisbelief.
But a nondoxasticist may agree that experience is object-dependent while denying
experience is belief. For nondoxasticism, experience only provides material for belief
formation but is not itself belief. Nondoxasticism understands experience as providing data,
either nonconceptual or conceptual, for further interpretation. The nonconceptualist version
of nondoxasticism understands the data to be interpreted as nonconceptual, while the
conceptualist version understands it as conceptual. I shall now move on to the second step
oftheargumentandshowthatthenonconceptualistversionofnondoxasticismiswrong.
4. The second step of my argument for doxasticism is to insist that to have experience of an
52 Martin,forexample,writes:“weexplaintheveridicalperceptionbyreferencetotherelationalpropertiesitalonepossesses,
and we explain the other two by reference to their indiscriminability from this. So, the particular situation of veridical
perceptionisfundamentaltotheexplanationofthecharacterofallcasesofperceptualexperience”(2002,p.402).112
object is to experience the object under certain descriptions. This is the idea of
conceptualism which asserts that experience is essentially an exercise of conceptual
capacities. Experience has its object by being a grasp of its object. And experience can only
grasp its object by putting it under certain descriptions. Experience has its object in the
sensethatthesubjecttakesitsobject asitsobject.
Conceptualizing or theorizing is obviously essential or indispensable in some kinds of
experience. Suppose you want to buy some furniture. To decide if you can fit in the
furniture, youhavetodosomemeasurements.Youmeasuretheroomandthefurniture.And
to measure is no doubt to experience in a conceptual way. Through measuring, you find the
room is 3mX4m, and the bed is 2mX2m, and the bedside tables are 0.5mX0.5m. So you
decide you would be able to fit in the furniture. Hence your judgement about the possibility
of fitting in the furniture can only be based on the conceptual experience you have when
you dothemeasuring.
It can be objected that this only shows there is an advantage in conceptual experience,
not that everycaseofexperiencehas to beconceptual. Particularly, in this furniture example,
we do not always need to do the measuring. If the room is very big, then there is no doubt
that there is enough space for the furniture. But to experience a room as very big is also to
experience it in a conceptual way. And to experience a room as very big is not to have an
experience of the room and then conceptualize it as very big. One experiences the room as
verybigwhenonefirst experiencesit;itisnotalaterconceptualization.
It is phenomenologically true that we experience the world as meaningful. When we
enter a room, we see tables, chairs, lamps, books, etc. Again, as Cowley puts it, “whatever
we see or hear, we see or hear as such-and-such, or as is sometimes said, under a certain
description. And different people see or hear the same thing under different descriptions”.
Thus, “In looking and seeing we are getting things sorted out and organised in our purview.
Perceivingis makingsenseof things bythesenses”(1968, p. xiii). Thereis no wayto find a
pure experience with no understanding in it. We cannot see without seeing “as”. This
applies to the case of sound as well. We not only attribute sounds to an object, but also
attributemeaningfulsoundstotheobject.Thuswesay“Ihearthebus coming”.
The conceptuality of experience is best exemplified by our experience of language.
Once welearn alanguage, werelatethepronunciation and its meaning directly. When think
aloud and hear what someone else says, the sounds we make or hear are straightaway
meaningful, thereis no need to makesenseofthesounds. As Cowleyobserves,“in thinking
aloud or in hearing what others say we do not have the experience of producing or hearing
thesecurious sounds we make. For the sounds are uttered or heard as meanings. In listening
to someone we hear his meaning, make it ours or reject it, and in talking we simply think or
mean aloud”. We do not hear language “as sounds or even as words, but as
meanings—information, funny stories, sentiments, compliments, insults, appeals, demands,113
etc” (1968, p. 151-152). Hence, “The meaning, as Merleau-Ponty says, devours the sign”
(1968, p. 152). Similarly, to be able to read is to be able to see the marks on the page as
meaningful. Thus, “Wedo not seethemarks and interpret them. Wedo not seethe marks as
such at all. To read is to see the meaning on the page. It is not in the margin or somewhere
offthepage,butthere,accumulatingfromlinetolineand pagetopage”(1968,p.152).
Locke thinks that the reason that we perceive an object under a certain description is
that “the Ideas we receive by sensation, are often in grown People alter’d by the Judgment,
without our taking notice of it” (1975, p. 145). And the fact that we do not take notice of it
only shows “how very quick the actions of the mind are performed” (1975, p. 147). Hence
“thePerceptionofourSensation…servesonlyto excite”“anIdeaformedbyourJudgment”
“and is scarce taken notice of it self; as a Man who reads or hears with attention and
understanding, takes little notice of the Characters, or sounds, but of the Idea, that are
excitedinhimbythem”(1975,p.146-7).
According to Locke, what we get from a three dimensional object is a two
dimensional retina image. But “the Judgment presently, by an habitual custom, alters the
Appearance into their Causes: So that from that, which truly is variety of shadow or colour,
collecting the Figure, it makes it pass for a mark of Figure, and Frames to it self the
perception of a convex Figure, and an uniform colour; when the Idea we receive from
thence, is only a Plain variously colour’d, as is evident in Painting” (1975, p. 145). But the
thing is, the three dimensional object looks to us to be three dimensional, not that it looks
two dimensional and weinfer from thetwo dimensional appearancethat theobject is in fact
three dimensional. For a human perceiver, it is not that her judgment alters a plain
appearance into a three dimensional figure, the appearance is three dimensional and
conceptual in the first place. Locke is well aware of the fact that habituation plays a role
here. But what habituation has done is far more significant than Locke understands it to be.
Habituation does not make the action of mind a too quick to notice performance; it actually
helps to develop perception in such a way that we perceive an object as an object directly.
Ourconceptualcapacitiesareconstitutiveofourperceptual ability.
The crucial idea is that there is no intermediary in perceptual experience. Hence it is
not the speed of the action of mind that matters here. The point is that there is no action of
mind involved at all. As Cowley puts it, in actual experience, “we get whatever we get as
we get it. Interpretation and inference start from what we actually see and hear” (1968, p.
149). As conceptual beings, our experience necessarily involves conceptual capacities. To
experience is to understand. We do not have an experience and then stand back, think about
the experience, and conceptualize the experience. Conceptualization or interpretation is
already in experience. As Merleau-Pontymakes it clear: “The pure impression is, therefore,
not only undiscoverable, but also imperceptible and so inconceivable as an instant of
perception”(2002,p.4).TheideaisnicelycapturedinWittgenstein’sfollowingremarks: “It114
is almost as if ‘seeing the sign in this context’ were an echo of thought.” “‘The echo of a
thought in sight’—one would like to say” (1953, p. 212). Strawson puts the same idea in
this way: “the visual experience is irradiated by, or infused with, the concept; or it becomes
soaked with the concept” (1970, p. 63).
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shows that this is not thewaywe experiencetheworld. Nonconceptual experienceis itself a
myth.Wedon’tknowwhereitis,whatitislike,andwhatitsfunctionis.
It can be objected that even we do possess the relevant concepts, those concepts are
not necessary for a particular experience. Evans, for example, claims: “It is not necessary,
for example, that the subject possess the egocentric concept ‘to the right’ if he is to be able
to have the experience of a sound as being to the right” (1982, p. 159). Evans, of course, is
not making the claim that one can perceive a sound as being to the right without possessing
the concept “right” or “to the right”. What he means to say is that conceptual capacities
make no difference to the relevant experience. A person possesses the concept “right”
experiences asound thesamewayas aperson who does not possess theconcept. As Davies
puts it: “a subject may have an experience without possessing the concepts that would be
usedinthespecificationofthecontentofthat experience”(1991,p.462).
It is true that obtaining conceptual capacities does not necessarily change the way
things look, sound, or feel to us. The essential change that possession of conceptual
capacitiesmakesto experienceisthatitmakesthesubjectexperiencethingsasundercertain
descriptions.
It can then be further objected that even if we have the conceptual capacities, we may
still do not always exercise the conceptual capacities when having the experience. Hence it
is not always true that we experience things as under certain descriptions. Experience of the
directionofanobject,sound, etc.isnotablyofthiskind.When weexperienceasoundtothe
right, we may only experience it as to that particular direction without being aware of the
fact that that direction is to the right. When we experience an object to a certain direction,
wemayonlyexperienceitasbeingtothatdirectionwithoutconceptualizingthedirection.
We need to note this objection is particularly targeted at experience of directions. And
in this case, demonstratives can be used as a concept, for the very act of pointing signals a
direction. While pointing at a shade of colour cannot tell us what colour it is, to point at a
directionistodecideordetermineadirection.
It is possible that you hear a sound as being to the right without realizing it is to the
right. Youmaysimplyexperienceit as comingfromthat direction, pointingto that direction
with your “mind’s finger”, namely, by attending to that direction. You may later realize that
that direction is actually to the right. Another person may directly experience the sound as
beingtotheright.Then what’sthedifference?
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The point is this. Usually the purpose of experience is to attend to the object, not to
attend to the direction of the object. Hence our experience of the direction of the object is
exhibited in our experience of the object. But there are also cases where you need to attend
to the direction of the object particularly, and in these cases your experience is
conceptualizedinthatway.
While it is true that this reply does not apply to the case of colour experience, it is also
truethat theobjection itselfis notapplicableto colourexperienceeither. It is seldom, ifever,
the case that we experience a shade of red without experiencing it as a shade of red.
Campbell is right in saying that we may perceive a physical object without paying special
attention to the colour of the object. But this is not to say we may fail to experience a shade
ofred asred whenwepayattentionto,andhaveexperienceof,ashadeofred.
The way we grasp the object of an experience is to put is under certain descriptions.
This is the way we, as conceptual beings, experience an object. We grasp the object of
experience byexercisingour conceptual capacities. If experience is always experienceofan
object,thenithastobealways anexerciseofconceptual capacities.
5. The final step of my argument for doxasticism is to maintain that to exercise conceptual
capacities in experience is to make judgment about the world. According to this
understanding of the conceptuality of experience, we not only take the object of experience
as its object, but also taketheobject ofexperienceas existent in acertain way. Experienceis
concernedwiththewaytheobjectexistsandisthusdoxastic.
Concepts aretheconstituents ofthoughts. To haveconceptual capacities is tobeableto
think. And to think is, among other things, to make judgements. Philosophers sometimes
talk about detached thinking, namely, to entertain a proposition without making judgement.
But that would be a case of deciding what to think, not a case of thinking devoid of
judgement. To have concept A is to be able to judge that something is A. Conceptual
capacities are thus capacities of making judgements.
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apply concepts to the world. And to apply concepts to the world is to make judgements
about the world. Therefore, if experience is a conceptualization of the world, it must be
judgementabouttheworld.
At this point, doxasticism distinguishes itself from conceptualism. For conceptualists,
experience, though conceptual, is still data to be interpreted or judged. The conceptualist
version of nondoxasticism insists that experience is conceptual but nondoxastic. We find
this idea in Runzo’s non-doxastic “propositional” analysis of perception. According to
Runzo,
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To perceive an object or state of affairs, X, is, and is no more than, to be episodically
aware of a set of propositions about X…This awareness of (set of) propositions during
perceivingis akintoentertainingpropositions…(1977,p.214-5)
Hence for conceptualists, to say that experience is conceptual is only to say it is
propositional. This is, as I shall try to explain, closely related to the conceptualist
understanding of conceptual capacities and its understanding of the way conceptual
capacitiesareexercisedinexperience.
For conceptualists, to have conceptual capacities is to be able to enter the space of
reasons, but not necessarily to be able to make judgements. According to McDowell,
“conceptual capacities are capacities whose paradigmatic actualizations are exercises of
them in judgment, which is the end—both aim and culmination—of the controlled and
self-critical activity of making up one’s mind” (1998a, p. 410). For McDowell, it is very
important that a minded creature should be able to make up its mind. “A creature that
cannot make up its mind does not, in the relevant sense, have a mind. It cannot, in the
relevant sense, be minded in a certain way” (1998a, p. 411). Hence what McDowell means
by conceptual capacities are the kind of capacities we find in critical thinking or judgement
making or the activity of making up one’s mind. In other words, when one decides what to
believe one is exercising one’s conceptual capacities. Then the question is: what exactly are
these conceptual capacities? Are they what we use in making up our mind about the world,
or are they the making up our minds itself? McDowell seems to mean the former. For
McDowell, conceptual capacitiesthemselves arenotcapacitiesto makeupone’s mind;they
are only something we use in making up our mind. Conceptual capacities, on this
understanding,arenotequivalenttocapacitiesofmakingjudgement.
Understanding conceptual capacities as something we use in making judgements
instead of capacities of making judgement, McDowell then takes it that it is possible for us
to exercise our conceptual capacities without making up our mind about the world.
McDowell thus has in mind two ways of exercising conceptual capacities, one active, and
the other passive. For McDowell, when we make judgement about the world, we exercise
conceptual capacities actively, and when we experience the world, we exercise conceptual
capacities passively. For this reason, although McDowell suggests that we identify
conceptual capacities by considering their role in activity of making judgement, he thinks
that “we can extend the idea of actualizations of that range of capacities beyond the active
exercises that definethem as thekind of capacities theyare” and understand experienceas a
passive exercise of conceptual capacities. In this way, “the very same capacities can be
actualized,outsidethecontrolofthesubject,inthereceptivityofsensibility”(ibid.,p.410).
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least is not the part of conceptual capacities which permeates experience and makes it
conceptual.ForMcDowell,tosayexperienceis conceptualisnottosayonemakes upone’s
mind in experience, it is only to say that in experience we find the kind of thing we find in
critical thinking, which is thekind ofactivityofmakingup one’s mind. Thus conceptualism,
while insisting experience is conceptual, begrudges experience the capacity for making
judgement.
But we need to see conceptual capacities are not only capacities to structure the world
but also, no less importantly, capacities to make judgement about the world. To possess
conceptual capacities is to possess the capacities for making up one’s mind, not just to
possess something which can be used in making up one’s mind about the world. That is, to
have conceptual capacities is to be able to take attitudes toward the world. Conceptual
capacities are themselves concerned with the truth of the world. Understood in this way,
conceptual capacities cannot be exercised in a passive way, as McDowell conceives it.
There is only one way to exercise conceptual capacities: to make judgement about the
world.
If conceptual capacities are capacities for making up one’s mind, then experience can
only be an exercise of conceptual capacities in virtue of being a judgement about the world.
Experience is conceptual not only in the sense that it has a certain kind of conceptual
structure but also that to have experience is to take what is experienced as existent in a
certain way. To experience is to make up one’s mind about the world, that is, to take a
doxasticattitudeabouttheworld.
There is an important sense in which experience is passive: we can only see what is in
front of us. But this does not mean we do not make up our mind when we see. To see is to
believe. This is the way we make up our mind when we see. If in experience, as McDowell
putsit,wearesaddledwith content,then weshouldtakethatcontentaswhatwebelieve.To
experience is to make up one’s mind about the world, that is, to take attitude or form
judgement about the world. To say experience is conceptual is not just to say it is
propositional;it istosayexperienceis bothattitudinaland propositional. Experienceis itself
a full-fledged exercise of conceptual capacities which are themselves capacities for making
judgements.
Experience is an exercise of conceptual capacities in the sense that it is a judgement
about theworld. This isexactlytheideaStrawson takes from Kant when hesays experience
is permeated with conceptual capacities.
55 Strawson asserts, “perceptual judgement” is
“internal to the characterization of the experience” (1979, p. 95). When I describe my
experience, I do it by describing a judgement about the world. We cannot give a veridical
characterization of experience without reference to the relevant judgements (1979, p. 95-6).
55 ThisispreciselywhatStrawsontakestobethemainthrustoftheargumentoftheTranscendentalDeduction.SeeStrawson
1966,pp.100-12.118
Thus “our sensible experience itself is thoroughly permeated with those concepts of objects
which figure in such judgements” (1979, p. 96). The point is that, “Sensible experience is
permeated by concepts unreflective acceptance of the general applicability of which is a
condition of its being so permeated, a condition of that experience being what it is; and
theseconceptsareofrealisticallyconceivedobjects”(1979,p.96).Strawson writes:
…mature sensible experience (in general) presents itself as, in Kantian phrase, an
immediate consciousness of the existence of things outside us. (Immediate, of course,
does not mean infallible.) … the ordinary human commitment to a conceptual scheme
of a realist character is not properly described, even in a stretched sense of the word, as
atheoreticalcommitment.It is,rather,somethinggivenwiththegiven.(1979,p.99)
And the very reason that experience is judgement is that conceptual capacities are
essentially capacities for making judgement about the world. As Strawson makes it clear:
“The concepts of the objective which we see to be indispensable to the veridical
characterization of sensible experience simply would not be in this way indispensable
unless those whose experience it was initially and unreflectively took such concepts to have
application in the world” (1979, p. 96). What Strawson tries to put forward here is not just a
conceptualist idea that experience is conceptual. The idea is that experience involves a
commitment about the existence of the object, or judgement about how things stand in the
world. We take what we experience as the world because we exercise conceptual capacities
in such a way that we take the object of experience as existent in a certain way. Experience
isforthisreasonjudgementabouttheworld.ThisisexactlytheideaofDoxasticism.
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7. To say experience is doxastic is to say experience is always experience of facts. Dretske
claims that perceptual experience can be either “a consciousness of things”, or “a
consciousness of facts”. While the former is “a concept-free mental state” and nondoxastic,
the latter is “a concept-charge mental state” and doxastic. According to Dretske, perceptual
consciousness ofthings does not entail perceptual consciousness of facts and thus cannot be
a doxastic state. Hence, for Dretske, experience is not always doxastic. Here is Dretske’s
exampleforconcept-freeperceptualconsciousnessofthings:
The first time I became aware of an armadillo (I saw it on a Texas road), I did not
know what it was. I did not even know what armadillos were, much less what they
looked like. My ignorance did not impair my eyesight, of course. I saw the animal. I
56 ThisisdifferentfromMcDowell’sunderstandingofStrawson.McDowellwrites:“myKantisStrawson’s,andStrawson’s
KantisnodoubtnottherealKant”(McDowell2000,p.342,no.1).119
was aware of it ahead of me on the road. That is why I swerved. Ignorance of what
armadillos are or how they look can prevent someone from being conscious of certain
facts (that the object crossing the road is an armadillo) without impairing in the
slightest one’s awareness of the things—the armadillos crossing roads—that (so to
speak)constitutethefact.(1993,p.266)
Dretske thus concludes that, in perceptual experience, “S is conscious of x” does not entail
that “S is conscious of x is F”. Hence perceptual consciousness of things does not entail
perceptualconsciousnessoffacts.
Dretske seems to take it for granted that he saw an armadillo, although he did not
know what it was. What he means to show is that his seeing an armadillo is not an
awareness of the particular fact that the animal is an armadillo, given that he was ignorant
about what an armadillowas. Butwhyshould werequireDretskebeawareofthisparticular
fact? If Dretske did not see the animal as an armadillo, then of course he did not judge it is
an armadillo.Thisisnoharmtotheideathatexperienceisjudgement.
More importantly, Dretske obviously was conscious of some fact. At least, he was
conscious of x is an animal, which is a fact. And, of course, this is not all what he saw.
Insisting that his sight was not impaired in the slightest by the defect of his conceptual
capacities,
57 Dretske may claim that he actually saw a small animal with a nine-banded
leathery armour shell. Then we can say Dretske was conscious of the fact that x is a small
animal with a nine-banded leathery armour. All we need to admit is that what kind of fact
you take in while having the perceptual experience is determined by what kind of
conceptualcapacities youpossess.Thesubject’slackofaspecialconceptwouldnotprevent
an experiencefrombeinganawarenessoffacts.
Dretske nevertheless has a further reason to doubt that experience is always doxastic.
Paralleling Evans’s richness argument against conceptualism, Dretske has a richness
argument against doxasticism, according to which we see more than we believe. He claims:
“Sensation…is informationally profuse and specific in the way a picture is. Knowledge and
belief, on the other hand, are selective and exclusive in the way a statement is” (1988, p.
152). Hence, “Typically, the sensorysystems overload theinformation-handling capacityof
our cognitive mechanisms so that not all that is given to us in perception can be digested”
(1988, p.157).
Dretske’s example is that one may see 27 children in the playground without believing
that one sees 27 children there, if one does not have time to count (1988, p. 156). But it is
not clear we should require the subject know the exact number of the children she sees in
orderforhertohold abeliefabout what shesees. Thesubjectdoes notsee27childrenifshe
57 Iseriouslydoubtthatthiscanbethecase.ButIshallnotpursuethepointforthemoment.120
has no time to count; she sees only many children or more than a dozen children. What one
sees depends on to what extent one exercises one’s conceptual capacities. This is actually
related to the criterion of seeing. For Dretske, one sees X if X is there to be seen. But we
need a different conception of seeing here. One only sees X when one sees X as X. One
only sees 27 children if one sees 27 children as 27 children. If one does not see 27 children
as 27 children, then one only sees the children in the playground, the number of whom is,
unseenandunknowntoone.
Dretskealso cites somelaboratoryevidenceto showthat weseemorethan webelieve.
Psychological evidence shows that we can at most process seven items at a given moment.
According to Dretske’s understanding, “The rule represents some kind of limit to how
much information we can exact from our sensory experience, not a limit to how much
information can be contained in this experience” (1988, p. 158). And given that we can see
more than seven items in a case of experience, Dretske argues, this implies we see more
than we believe. But there is no evidence that experience contains more information than
our cognitive capacities may process, apart from an objective observation that there are
indeed more to experience over there. What is at work here is still the objective view of
experiencetowhich Iobjectedabove.
Dretske insists that “Our own perceptual experience testifies to the fact that there is
more information getting in than we can manage to get out” (1988, p. 159). He cites an
experiment in which the subject is exposed to an array of nine or more letters for a brief
period but can only identify three or four letters (1988, p. 159). He then concludes that the
subject can cognitively recognize fewer letters than she has in her experience. But, again,
there is no reason to think the subject manages to experientially take in all the letters
exposed to her. One can only take in the information one can process. The experiment
actuallyshowsthelimitofexperience, whichisatoncethelimitofourcognitivecapacity.
The extent the subject exercises her judging ability is the extent she experiences the
world. Experience and judging ability are constitutive of each other. It is exactly for this
reason that experience is doxastic. In other words, experience is doxastic to the extent our
conceptual capacities allow, just as the way we experience the world is restricted by our
conceptualcapacities.
8. I have argued for the following three points stage by stage. First, experience is
object-dependent. It either has a physical object, or a mental object. Second, experience has
its objects in virtue of being an exercise of conceptual capacities. Thirdly, to exercise
conceptual capacities is to make judgment. We can then conclude that experience is
judgementorbeliefabouttheworld.121
7.Experienceand Disbelief
1. To have experience is to be in a state of believing. In this sense, experience is doxastic.
Thisistheideaofdoxasticism.
Even nondoxasticists would agree that there is a strong connection between
experience and belief. Martin admits that “in a situation in which a subject is perceiving
veridically, and in no way distrust his experience, hewill feel compelled to judge that things
are that way” (2002, p. 399). He even agrees, “Perceptual experiences do not merely have
power over a subject’s belief, they also have authority” (2002, p. 390). Despite this, Martin
insiststhat“experiencedoesnothavetheexpected coerciveeffectoverone’sbeliefs”(1993,
p. 85). Likewise, many of those who recognize a close connection between experience and
belief deny experience is doxastic. This is due to the idea that we do not always believe our
experience.
It is widely accepted that we may experience the world in one way while believing in
another, namely experience is belief-independent. Evans claims “the subject’s being in an
informational state is independent of whether or not he believes that the state is veridical”
(1982, p.123).AndherearesomeexamplesEvanshasinmind:
It is a well-known fact about perceptual illusion that it will continue to appear to us as
though, say, one line is longer than the other (in the Müller-Lyer illusion) even when
we are quite sure that it is not. Similarly, it may still seem to us as though
such-and-such an episode took place in the past, even though we now believe our
apparent experience of it to have been hallucinatory. And our being placed in the122
appropriate informational state by someone telling us a story does not depend upon our
believingthestorytobetrue. (1982,p.123)
McDowell shares with Evans the idea that the way we experience the world is independent
of the relevant belief we may hold about the world. He claims “how one’s experience
represents things to be is not under one’s control, but it is up to one whether one accepts the
appearance or rejects it” (1994, p. 11). Hence the belief-independent thesis says experience
remains the same whether we believe what we experience. If we believe experience is
belief-independent in this way, and insist a subject cannot hold conflicting beliefs
simultaneously, then we have to accept that the content of experience might not be the
contentofan actualbelief.
There is obviously a close relationship between nondoxasticism and the
belief-independent thesis. But it is important to note the distinction between the two theses.
The belief-independent thesis says experience is not affected by the belief held by the
subject, while nondoxasticism says experience is not a belief. The belief-independent thesis
emphasizes the primitiveness of experience while nondoxasticism focuses on the inertness
or insufficiency of experience in producing a belief. We get nondoxasticism from the
belief-independent thesis only when we add that there cannot be conflicting beliefs in a
subject simultaneously and that the conclusion drawn from the case where the content of
experience conflicts with the belief held by the subject should be generalized into cases
where there is no such conflict between experience and belief. For nondoxastists, the
belief-independent thesis naturally leads to nondoxasticism. According to McDowell, “the
content of a perceptual experience cannot be explained as the content of an appropriate
actualbelief,sincetheremaybenobeliefwithasuitablecontent”(1994,p.60).
Thus the impediment to accepting doxasticism is a consideration based on cases that
one disbelieves one’s experience, or, as Martin puts it, cases of “disbelief in perception”
(1993, p. 83; see also Martin 2002, p. 387; Peacocke 2009, p. 477). This I call the disbelief
objection to doxasticism. The disbelief objection says one may have a belief with content
not-P while having an experience with content P. This means experience may fail to
produce a corresponding belief, since in this case, there is simply no corresponding belief
exists.
The disbelief objection particularly focuses on cases of sober hallucination and
familiar illusion. In the case of sober hallucination, it may look to one that there is, say, a
chair in front of one while one disbelieves that there is a chair there. In the case of familiar
illusion, things may look a certain way while the subject does not believe they are in fact
that way. Take the example of Müller-Lyer illusion. For someone in the know, the line with
outwards wings appears longer than the one with inwards wings although the subject
believes the two lines are the same length. The two lines look unequal without the subject123
believingthis. Itisthiskindofallegedinconsistencybetween experienceandbeliefwhichis
supposedto generateathreattodoxasticism.
One response to the disbelief objection is to admit that in some special cases
experience is not doxastic but insist that it normally is. Ginsborg proposes an identity claim
restricted to some experiences. She admits that there are cases in which experience is not
believing, although “these cases are parasitic on the primary case in which seeing is
believing, and, for the most part, knowing” (2006a, p. 355). Smith seems to endorse a
weaker claim and insists that “believing plays an essential part in perceptual experience”
(2001, p. 284). Henevertheless admitsthat “itis certainlynot trueto saythat onebelieves in
the existence of any and every object one perceives, not that one necessarily believe such
objectsactuallytobethewaytheyappear”(2001, p.284). Responses ofthiskindimplythat
the majority of our experiences are beliefs. Particularly, those experiences that are used for
beliefjustificationsarethemselvesbeliefs.
Wemaywanttobehappywiththiskind ofresponse.Afterall,forexperiencetoplaya
justificatory role in empirical knowledge, all we need is just that those experiences that are
used for belief justification are beliefs. But it is not clear that we can fend off the disbelief
objection so easily. First, if experience is itself belief, then an opposite judgement should
only contradict the experience as a belief, not to deprive the belief we may have in
experience. Hence doxasticism should not allow exceptions where experience is not belief.
Second, the disbelief objection starts with the idea that in some special cases such as
familiar illusions we don’t believe what we experience. This means, in these special cases,
experience does not have a corresponding belief, and hence cannot be a belief. Experience
is the same kind of mental state in a case of disbelief as a case of belief, so if it is not belief
in the one case, it is not belief in the other. This implies, the reasoning goes, even in those
cases where experience does have a corresponding belief, experience is still not itself a
belief. Hence doxasticism needs to show how we can stop the reasoning from working in
thisway.
Smith also makes amorepositiveeffort to defend theideathat experienceis belief. He
tries to accommodate the conflict between the content of experience and the content of
belief by making a distinction between perceptual belief and theoretical belief and insisting
“perceptual belief can exist alongside a contradictory theoretical belief” (2001, p. 292). In
the case of a seeming appearance of a huge spider crawling over me, although Iwas told by
the psychologist that this is not a real spider, I may still generate a perceptual belief that
there is a spider approaching if the appearance is vivid enough. Smith suggests that in this
kind of cases, we should allow the existence of conflicting beliefs. He thus insists that “a
certain kind of perhaps qualified belief is essential to perception” (2001, p. 288). This
qualified belief is a perceptual belief that might conflict with the belief the subject may
possess. But the perceptual belief Smith proposes is actually a non-belief; it is not what the124
subject actually believes. Doxasticism requires that experience be belief in the literal sense.
It requires that experience be what the subject believes, not a certain kind of qualified belief
thatthesubjectdoesnotreallybelieve.
Mystrategyforrespondingto the disbeliefobjection will beto arguethat experienceis
doxasticthrough andthrough. Thisisbasedon an attack ontheideaofdeceptiveexperience
which asserts that experience can be deceptive even if the subject is not deceived. I shall
suggest that we replace the idea of deceptive experience with the idea of disadvantaged
experience. A disadvantaged experience, while not being a belief that P when it is the case
that P, is not a belief not-P either. Hence the possibility that experience is belief is not
excluded by the fact that the subject holds the belief that P. All we need to do in replying to
the disbelief objection is then to find the belief in a disadvantaged experience, which does
notconflictwiththebeliefthesubjectmayhold.
2. The disbelief objection is based on a particular understanding of the fallibility of
experience. It is a notorious fact that experience is fallible, that is, we sometimes make
mistakes in experience. The fallibility of experience may itself motivate the view that there
is a gap between experience and belief: if experience is fallible, then it may not be very
good news if it is belief. But this consideration should not be decisive. If we are allowed to
hold falsebeliefs, then itisnot right todenyexperienceis beliefsimplybecauseit is fallible.
The disconnection between experience and belief is actually based on a particular
understanding of the fallibility of experience, that is, to understand the fallibility of
experienceascausedbyexperience’sbeingabletobedeceptive.
TheideaofdeceptiveexperiencecanbetracedbacktoAyer.HereareAyer’sexamples
ofdeceptivecases:
It is remarked that a coin which looks circular from one point of view may look
elliptical from another; or that a stick which normally appears straight look bent when
it appears in water; or that to people who take drugs such as mescal, things appear to
change their colour. The familiar cases of mirror images, and double images, and
completehallucinations,such asthemirage,providefurtherexamples.
58 (1969,p.3)
According to Ayer, “the fact that appearances vary…proves at least that people
sometimes do not perceive things as they really are”. It is here he introduces the concept of
“deceptiveexperience”:
58 Itdoesnotseemtoberighttoconsidermirageasacaseofhallucination.Seechapter6foranaccountofmirage.125
If, to take a familiar example, a coin looks at the same time round to one person and,
from a different angle, elliptical to another, it follows that it is to one of them at least
presenting a deceptive experience…So that if each of these persons judges that he is
perceiving the coin as it really is, at least one of them will be undergoing an illusion.
(1956, p.87)
Thepoint here is that an object maylook different in different circumstances, and given that
there can only be one way for an object to be, only one appearance manifests the way the
objectis,alltheothersmustbedeceptive.
The idea of deceptive experience is obviously based on a non-doxastic understanding
of experience. According to this understanding, if experience does not manifest the way the
object is, it induces the subject to make a false judgment, but is not itself a false judgement.
Deceptive experience is thus distinctive in its power of inducing the subject to make a
mistaken judgement; it is not necessary that a false judgement is really produced. Hence
Ayer says that it is not necessary that “anyone should ever actually be deceived by an
experienceofthiskind”(1956,p.87).
Not all the cases Ayer lists are considered deceptive by contemporary philosophers.
But theideaofdeceptiveexperienceendorsed bycontemporaryphilosophers does not seem
to be capable of excluding those cases that are not anymore considered deceptive. Here is
McDowell’snotionofdeceptiveexperience:
I shall speak of cases as deceptive when, if one were to believe that things are as they
appear, one would be misled, without implying that one is actually misled. (1988, p.
210)
This means that having a deceptive experience does not entail that the experiencing subject
is deceived, and an experience can be deceptive while the subject is not deceived. It is in
this sense McDowell talks about “the deceptive capacities of appearance” (1995, p. 881).
And this is where the gap between experience and belief begins to emerge: to experience is
onething,tobelieveanother.
This is exactly where we have the disbelief objection. The disbelief objection is the
idea that experience can be deceptive when the subject is not deceived. This is not just to
say that experience can be deceptive when the subject may occasionally not to be deceived.
The idea is that experience can be deceptive even if the subject is never deceived. It can
even bedescribed as theideathat experience can bedeceptive even ifno one has everbeen,
orwouldeverbe,deceived.Thereissomethingintrinsictotheexperiencewhichisboundto
bedeceptive.
Understood in this way, it seems we have to admit that the vast majority of our126
everyday experiences are deceptive. If we follow McDowell’s notion of deceptive
experience, then it seems not only that experience can be deceptive, but also it is almost
alwaysdeceptive.
Take Ayer’s first example of various illusions: “a coin which looks circular from one
point of view may look elliptical from another”. This kind of illusion seems to be
everywhere in our everyday life. Suppose you are looking at a big building with lots of
circular windows. Now whichever window you are facing directly and see as circular, you
see the others as elliptical to a certain extent. Then from whatever perspective you look at
the building, your experience of the building has to be illusive in Ayer’s sense. Now, if we
follow McDowell’s notion of deceptive experience, then for every case of your experience,
onlyasmallbitofitisnotillusive.
And this kind of example, to repeat, is everywhere. Look around your room, you find
the edges of the mugs and the bowls look elliptical, and the round mirror looks elliptical.
This holds forthings with othershapes as well. If you look at yourfriend without facing her
directly, you willget an“illusion”ofher, although yourightlyseeheras yourfriend.
If wefollowMcDowell’s notion of deceptiveexperience, that is, an appearance can be
deceptive without the subject really being deceived, then we may say to see a shadow is to
have a deceptive experience, since a shadow looks as if it is coloured darker than the other
part of the ground, although that part of the ground isn’t coloured darker and the subject
doesnotbelieveitiscoloureddarker.
If we follow McDowell’s notion of deceptive experience, we would have to accept
that most, if not all, of our everyday experience is deceptive in a certain sense. If we insist a
coin looks elliptical from a certain point of view and thus has an illusive appearance, then
we have to accept that most of our experience is illusive. There is hardly an escape. Illusion
seems to be almost everywhere. And it seems that in most cases, we experience the world
byhavingvariouskindsofillusionofit!
Hence there must be something wrong with McDowell’s notion of deceptive
experience. To avoid the disastrous consequence, we have to give up this problematic
notion.
It is exactlythis problematicideaofdeceptiveexperiencewhich underlies thedisbelief
objection. If an experience is deceptive, then the only belief that can be derived from the
experience is the belief that P when it is not the case that P. And allowing that experience
could be deceptive without the subject being deceived, it is then possible that there is a
deceptive experience from which the subject can only derive a belief that P while the
subject actually holds the belief that not-P. If we agree that a person does not normally hold
conflicting beliefs consciously, we will have to accept that a deceptive experience is not a
belief. Hence the crucial point is to problematize the idea that experience can be deceptive
withoutthesubjectbeingdeceived.127
To reject the idea of deceptive experience is to reject the idea that an experience may
have a content P while the subject believes not-P. There is then no direct conflict between
the content of experience and the content of the belief the subject may hold. The disbelief
objection thus loses its power. All we need to do then is to show experience always has a
correspondingbeliefwhichisheldbythesubject.
The idea of deceptive experience is first of all based on the assumption that there is a
distinction between veridical and non-veridical experience, according to which, a veridical
experienceis amanifestationorcorrect representationoftheworld andhencenon-deceptive,
while a non-veridical experience is not a manifestation or an incorrect representation of the
world and hence deceptive. The idea is further strengthened by a second assumption that a
non-veridical or deceptive experience has an intrinsic feature which is indistinguishable
fromaveridicalone.
I shall first weaken the idea of deceptive experience by arguing against the second
assumption and then venture to extrapolate the idea by collapsing the very distinction
betweenveridicalandnon-veridicalexperience.
3. The second assumption which strengthens the idea of deceptive experience is the thesis
that there is an intrinsic feature in a non-veridical experience which is indistinguishable
fromaveridicalexperience.This Icalltheindistinguishabilitythesis.
The idea of deceptive experience allows an appearance to be deceptive even if the
subject never believes the appearance. The idea itself is a conditional: if the subject takes a
non-veridical experience as a veridical one, then she would be deceived. This relies on the
possibility of the subject taking a non-veridical experience to be a veridical one, which in
turn relies on the assumption that a non-veridical experience is indistinguishable from a
veridical one. The idea of deceptive experience thus heavily relies on the assumption that a
non-veridicalexperienceisindistinguishablefrom averidicalone.
What the indistinguishability thesis is trying to say is this. Anon-veridical experience,
in which it looks Pwhileitis in fact thecasethat non-P, is indistinguishablefrom averidical
experience in which it looks P while it is in fact the case that P. The reason that the two
experiences are indistinguishable is that in both cases it looks P. This is how Ayer
understandstheindistinguishabilitybetweenanon-veridicalexperienceand averidicalone:
…there is no intrinsic difference in kind between those of our perceptions that are
veridical in their presentation of material things and those that are delusive. When I
look at a straight stick, which is refracted in water and so appears crooked, my
experience is qualitatively the same as if I were looking at a stick that really was
crooked. (1969,p.5-6)128
In the same vein, McDowell allows what is given to experience in deceptive and
non-deceptive cases “to be the same in so far as it is an appearance that things are thus and
so”(1988,p.214).
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It is important to note how damaging this indistinguishability thesis could be to our
understanding of experience. If a non-veridical experience is indistinguishable from a
veridical experience, then a veridical experience would be equally indistinguishable from a
deceptive experience. The consequence is that a veridical experience, however veridical,
would not be able to guide us to the truth of the world. And it is exactly this
indistinguishability thesis that leads to the idea that experience is not belief. A veridical
experience, being indistinguishable from a deceptive experience, cannot be an assertion or
belief about the world. Hence while non-veridical experience gains its power of deceiving
by being indistinguishable from a veridical experience, veridical experience loses its power
of guiding us to the truth of the world. And experience, in general, loses the power of
asserting. Experience is not anymore an assertion about the world. We cannot then depend
onexperienceforthetruthoftheworld.
But the indistinguishability thesis seems to be very dubious. Take the example of a
straight stick half immersed in water. According to the passage from Ayer I quoted above,
the experience of looking at a straight stick which is half immersed in water is qualitatively
indistinguishable from the experience of looking at a crooked stick. But this does not seem
to be right. If there is no “qualitative” difference between these two cases of experience,
then even an instructed adult wouldn’t be able to discriminate a straight stick which is half
immersedinwaterand acrookedstick.
And indeed, we have good reasons to believe, at least in this case, the non-veridical
experience is distinguishable from the veridical one. One’s experience of seeing a stick half
immersed in water is obviously different from one’s experience of seeing a crooked stick
out of water. As in the case of the stick in the water, we not only see the stick, but also the
water, and that makes the experience of the stick half immersed in water different from
one’s experience of a crooked stick out of the water. We need to see experience should not
be understood as an isolated picture; an experience is an experience of the whole thing
which includes not onlythe object one is particularlyinterested in, but also the other objects
closely related to it and the whole environment as well. The idea that a straight stick half
immersed in water looks the same as a crooked stick out of the water only holds when we
think about the case in an abstract way, namely, they both in a sense look crooked. But they
59 McDowell’s embrace of the indistinguishability thesis is clear in the following passage: “the same claim would be
‘contained’ in, say, each member of a trio of possible experiences of which one is a case of seeing that there is a red and
triangular physical object infrontofone,oneisacaseinwhich somethingin frontofonelooksred andtrianglealthoughitis
not, and one is a case in which it looks to one as if there is something red and triangular in front of one although there is
nothingthereatall”(1998,p.443).129
lookcrookedindifferentways.
Thesameholds forSellars’exampleoflookingat atiein a green-lighted room. Thetie
looks greenishintheroom.Sellarssays that thetielooksthewaya greenishonewould look
under normal light condition. But, we may assume, the whole room is within the subject’s
experience. If everythingin the room looks greenish,that maysuggest that thelight is funny.
Certain things should not be greenish undernormal light, say, one’s hands. And ifthewhole
room looks greenish, then the subject will not see her tie as green just because it looks as
greenish as her hands. The way a tie looks under green light condition is certainly
distinguishablefromthewaya greentielooksundernormallightconditions.
This applies to many other cases as well. To see myself in the mirror is different from
seeing myself in front of me. I not only see the image in the mirror but also the mirror as
well. And seeing the mirror, with my knowledge about mirrors, would guarantee that I see
themirrorimageasamirrorimage,notanother“I”inthemirror.
We thus have to take the context into consideration. According to the
indistinguishability thesis, the appearance of a circular coin seeing from a certain point of
view is indistinguishable from the appearance of an elliptical coin. But this can’t be true.
The appearance of a circular coin seen from a certain point of view is certainly
distinguishablefromtheappearanceofanelliptical coinseen fromexactlythesamepointof
view. In having the experience, one not only sees the coin but also is conscious of the point
of view from which one sees the coin. For the same reason, to see a shadow is different
fromseeingadarker-coloured area.Whenseeingashadow, oneis awareofthelight andthe
objectthatblocksthelight.
This is also true for the case of hallucination. Someone might say: suppose there is a
book on the table, we can all see the book, and the subject is hallucinating a book on the
table which is exactly the same as the book which is really on the table. In this case, a
veridical experience is indistinguishable from a non-veridical experience. But there is no
real difficultyhere. If the subject is hallucinating, then the book would still bein front ofher
even she turns away. If she sees a book on the table, then she won’t be able to see it if she
turns away. When one hallucinates, what one hallucinates would follow one everywhere as
long as the hallucination lasts. This is obviously not the case for any physical objects that
one perceives. One has to follow the objects in order to see them. Another way of
distinguishing a hallucination and an experience of a book is to try to remove the book. A
subject who is hallucinating a book cannot remove the “book” in front of her, while it is
easy for the subject in a normal case to remove the real book she sees in front of her.
Someone may hallucinate with her eyes closed, then her body sensation would tell her that
sheishallucinatinginsteadofseeing.
It can be objected that there must be cases where a non-veridical experience is so
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made in such a way that it looks exactly like a real book. But first, this seems to shift the
topic of indistinguishability of deceptive experience and veridical experience to the topic of
the indistinguishability of authentic object and decoy object. Second, even the
distinguishability of decoy object and authentic object should not be taken for granted. A
fake book might look exactly like a real book. But what if you try to read it? The point is
that our experience is an active exploration of the world; it is not a static picture of the
object. We’ll find out the difference between similar objects by experiencing more aspects
of them. No two different objects are indistinguishable in principle. There is a difference
between “difficult to distinguish” and “impossible to distinguish”. As Austin points out
correctly,
From the fact that I am sometimes ‘deluded’, mistaken, taken in through failing to
distinguish Afrom B, it does not follow at all that Aand B must be indistinguishable.
Perhaps I should have noticed the difference if I had been more careful or attentive;
perhaps Iam just bad at distinguishingthings ofthis sort (e.g. vintages); perhaps, again,
I have never learned to discriminate between them, or haven’t had much practice at it.
(1962, p.53)
The fact that practice contributes to our experiential ability and improves our ability to
distinguishsimilarobjectsissharplyobservedbytheStoics:
I will even concede that the wise person himself—the subject of our whole
discussion—will suspend his assent when confronted by similar things that he does not
havemarked off; and that he will never assent to any impression except onesuch that it
could not be false. But he has a particular skill by which he can distinguish true from
false impressions in <normal> cases and he must bring experience to bear on those
similarities. Just as a mother discriminates her twins as her eyes become accustomed to
them, so you, too, will discriminate them, if you practice. You see how the similarity of
eggs to each other is proverbial? Nevertheless, we have heard that there were quite a
few people on Delos, when things were going well for them there, who used to rear a
great number of hens for their living; well, when these men had inspected an egg, they
couldusuallytellwhichhenhadlaidit.(Cicero2006, 2.57)
Different objects are in principle distinguishable. Hence the Stoics would agree that
there are similar things in the world which are difficult to distinguish, but they deny that
these similar things are identical (Cicero 2006, 2.54). And for this reason, we say, it is
possibletodistinguishthem.
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one if we understand experience as an isolated picture or snapshot. But we need to see
experience is holistic both spatially and temporally. First, spatially, we experience or take in
the whole object or, more usually, the whole scene with all the relevant objects in it, not
isolated bits or aspects of a single object. When I look at the edge of a mug, I see not only
the edge, but also the rest part ofthemug, and Iseethe apparentlyelliptical-looking edge as
the circular edge of the mug, not an elliptical ring hanging over there. When I look into the
mirror, Iseenot onlymyimagein themirror; but also themirror.When Iseetheshadowon
the ground, I see the sunshine and the object which blocks the sunshine as well. When I see
the stick half immersed in the water, I see not only the stick, but also the water. And a
so-called non-veridical experience is distinguishable from a veridical one when we
understanditastheexperienceofthewholescene.
Second, temporally, experience is a dynamic, evolving process, not a static picture or
snapshot. It is an active exploration of the world, not a passive receiving of information. To
put it in another way, experience is essentially an embodied process. If I am puzzled by the
way the edge of my mug looks from a certain distance, I can go closer and look at it again.
In a while I will get used to the different ways things look from different perspectives. If I
am not sure if the stick half immersed in the water is crooked or not, I can take it out of the
water and look at it again. There aremanydifferent ways ofexperiencing theworld, and we
are not bound to sit still and passivelylook at whateverwe’ve got in front ofus. It is exactly
in this way and for this reason that experience continuously reveals reality to us. When you
walk on the street, you see things as you walk. You experience people and the traffic from
different perspectives and distances, and through different sense organs (you hear the traffic
as well as seeing it).
60 All this makes a so-called non-veridical experience distinguishable
fromaveridicalone.
We thus have good reasons to doubt that it can be established that a non-veridical
experience is indistinguishable from a veridical one.
61 The idea of deceptive experience
cannot be supported by the alleged indistinguishability. But a non-veridical experience may
be deceptive simply because it does not manifest the world as it is and hence induces the
subject to make a false judgement. For this possibility we turn to the first assumption on
which the idea of deceptive experience is based, namely the very distinction between
veridicalexperienceandnon-veridicalexperience.
4. The distinction between veridical and non-veridical experience is widely accepted. There
60 Fortheideathatexperienceinvolvesaction,seeNoë2004andSchellenberg2007.SeealsoDretske1988,p.155.
61 In this sense, my view is different from that of Austin. Austin does not deny that “there may be cases in which ‘delusive
andveridicalexperiences’reallyare‘qualitativelyindistinguishable”.Hispointistodenythat“suchcasesareanythinglikeas
common as both Ayer and Price seem to suppose” and that “the fact that we are sometimes ‘deceived byour senses’have to
beexplainedbysuchcases”.“Wearenot,afterall,quasi-infalliblebeings,whocanbetakeninonlywherewhenavoidanceof
mistakeiscompletelyimpossible”(1962,p.52).132
can be different ways of understanding the distinction, though. For representationalists, a
veridical experience represents its object as it is, while a non-veridical experience does not.
For nonrepresentationalists, a veridical experience is a manifestation of the world, while a
non-veridical experience is not. To avoid complications, I shall stick with the
non-representationalist expression of the distinction. But what I shall say about the
distinctionisneutraltothewayitisexpressed.
According to the distinction between veridical and non-veridical experience, a
veridical experienceis non-deceptivein that itis amanifestation oftheworld and supports a
right judgement about the world, while a non-veridical experience is deceptive in that it is
not a manifestation of the world and supports a wrong judgement about the world. Now the
question is: in what sense is not a non-veridical experience a manifestation of the world and
doesitsupport anincorrectjudgementabouttheworld?
To answer the question, we shall start with some familiar cases from everyday life.
TakeAyer’sexampleoflookingat acoinfromacertainpointofview.Acoinlookselliptical
from a certain point of view while it is indeed circular. For this reason, it may be said, the
experience is non-veridical because it does not manifest the way the coin is. And it is
deceptive in that it would support a wrong judgement about the coin, namely, the coin is
elliptical.
But both of the two points are mistaken. First, the way the coin looks is indeed a
manifestation of the way the coin is. It is right for a coin to look elliptical from that
particular point of view. Acoin’s appearing elliptical is exactly the right way for a circular
objecttoappearfrom thatparticularpointofview. That’sjustthewaya coinlooks fromthat
particular point of view. It is right for a circular object to look elliptic when we are not
facing it directly. In fact it is simply wrong for the coin to look circular from that particular
point of view. Second, the coin’s looking elliptical from that particular point of view does
not normallyinduce the subject to make an incorrect judgement about the coin, namelythat
the coin is elliptical. In fact, it is exactly this elliptical appearance which makes the subject
see the coin as circular. The subject would certainly get confused if a coin looks circular
from that particular point of view. And the coin’s looking circular from that particular point
of view would definitely not lead the subject to judge that the coin is circular. Hence the
experience in which the coin looks elliptical does manifest the way the coin is and does not
normallyinduceafalsejudgementabouttheobject.
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The fact that we may get different impressions from the same object does not simply
mean only one of them is a manifestation of the world and all the others are not. Hence to
get a different impression is not to get a wrong or misleading impression; on the contrary, it
is exactly this different impression which provides knowledge of the relevant object in a
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differentcircumstanceandleadstoatruejudgementabouttheobject.
The thing is, the same object does not have to look the same way in different
circumstances, and it is right for it to look different from different perspectives, under
different light conditions, etc. And in all these cases, neither can we say the appearances are
not manifestations of the way things are, nor can we say the subject is deceived by these
different appearances. Not onlythe so-called non-veridical ordeceptiveexperiencedoes not
deceive us, it is actually conductive to our right judgment of the objects. The so-called
deceptive experience is actually a clue to the truth of the world and hence guides us to a
correctjudgementabouttheworld. Itisnotsomethingwedismissortryto getridof;itisby
virtueofwhich weobtainthetruthoftheworld.
There are numerous familiar examples of this kind in our everyday life. Take the
example of parallel roads. Parallel roads may in a sense look converging and for this reason
the experience of seeing the roads may be considered deceptive. But again, we have two
reasons for saying the roads’looking converging is not a deceptive experience. First, this is
just the right way for parallel roads to look from far away. Second, the converging looking
of the parallel roads does not lead to the wrong judgment that the roads are indeed
converging. Anormalsubjectwouldseetheconverginglookingparallel roads asparallel. In
fact the very look of converging without crossing gives the clue that the roads are parallel.
The point here is that the subject does not need to infer from the
converging-but-not-crossing look of the roads that they are parallel; she sees the roads as
parallel.Theexperienceisamanifestationofthewaytheroadsare, andisnotdeceptive.
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We may then think that the idea of non-veridical experience should be restricted to
those unfamiliar cases. This, in fact, is exactly the way McDowell intends to use the term
“deceptiveexperience”.
Things are indeed a bit different with some less familiar cases. Take the example of a
straight stick half immersed in water. A straight stick looks crooked when it is half
immersed in water. In this case, we may still want to say that it is just right for a straight
stick to look that way in that circumstance. There is nothing wrong with the experience.
Supposesomeonecomes and says: “Thatstick halfimmersedin waterdoesn’t look crooked
to me”. We would all be surprised and think there must be something wrong with her
experience. But is it true that the appearance induces a false judgement about the shape of
the stick, even if an experienced subject does not mistakenly judge the stick as crooked?
One thing we should admit is that in this case the subject won’t be able to see the stick as
straight even if she judges that the stick is straight. But neither should we say that the
experiencewouldinducethesubjecttojudgethatthestickiscrooked.As Iarguedinthelast
section, the experience of seeing a crooked looking straight stick half-immersed in water is
63 Forasimilartreatmentoftheapparentalterationofthesizeofanobject,seeMartin2001,p.204.134
distinguishable from the experience of seeing a crooked stick out of the water and hence
will not induce the subject to judge that the stick is crooked. Hence, even in this case it is
still not correct to say that the experience is deceptive. This is the same for the case of
Müller-Lyer diagram, in which the line with outwards wings appears longer than the one
with inwards wings although they are the same length. It is right for one line to look longer
than theother. And theappearancedoes not induceafalsejudgement about thecomparative
length of the two lines. Although the two lines do not look equal, they do not look unequal
either,sincetheydonotlookthewayunequallineswouldlook.
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Perhaps, then, we should restrict the idea of non-veridical experience to the kind of
experience which does not have a physical object, say, experience of having a hallucination
or seeing an afterimage. In this case, it is true that the appearance is not a manifestation of
the physical world. But is it deceptive in the sense that it supports a wrong judgement about
the world? Not really. Hallucinations, as I argued in the last section, are in principle
distinguishable from perception and are normally experienced as hallucinations. They thus
do not necessarily support any kind of wrong judgement about the world and are not in any
sensedeceptive. Thereforeit is fineifwewant to usetheterm “non-veridical”experienceto
designate experiences that do not have a physical object, but this term should not carry with
it the implication that a non-veridical experience must be deceptive in that it induce the
subjecttomakeincorrectjudgementsabouttheworld.
The distinction between veridical and non-veridical experience is intended to be a
distinction that is relevant to the world. What is behind the distinction is the idea that
experience has an intrinsic feature which is independent of the subject’s understanding of
the situation. It is exactly this intrinsic feature of experience which lends support to the idea
that experience may be deceptive. In saying that “if one were to believe that things are as
they appear, one would be misled”, McDowell assumes that things definitely appear a
certain way, no matter what kind of judgment we may hold about them (1988, p. 210).
According to this understanding, once one is presented with a Müller-Lyer diagram, the
experiencegottobeinacertainwayandisinevitablyillusive.
But the idea of the intrinsic feature of experience is dubious. It is easy to understand
that things may look different to different subjects or to the same subject in different
circumstances. But we also need to see things may look different to the same subject in the
same physical circumstances. Aduck-rabbit figure may look to a subject either as a duck or
as a rabbit, dependingon the kind of mind-set she mayhave at the moment. As Imentioned
in chapter 5, if we assume the figure give rise to the same appearance in the two cases, then
we will have to accept a duck and a rabbit have the same appearance, which is obviously
absurd.
64 ThisawkwardsituationmakesMerleau-Pontysayssomethingreallyobscureandprofound:“Thetwostraightlinesin
Muller-Lyer’sopticalillusionareneitherofequalnorunequallength”(2002,p.6)135
We don’t even need to appeal to these contrivances of psychology to see the point.
There are numerous examples of this kind in everyday life as well. Take the example of a
shadow. We can imagine that for someone who has no previous knowledge of shadows, the
shadowareamight appearcoloured darkerthan theotherpart ofthe ground. Butformost of
us who are familiar with shadows, the shadow area does not look coloured darker, although
it may look darker. In fact, it seldom occurs to us that the shadow area is darker. It only
appears to us that it is a shadow, not that it is a darker area, although it is true that a shadow
does look darker. The same goes for the case of after-image. An after-image taken as a
colour patch on the white wall looks different from the one taken as an after-image. Hence
Austin remarks: “descriptions of looks are neither ‘incorrigible’ nor ‘subjective’”. He
writes:
Of course, with very familiar words such as ‘red’, it is no doubt pretty unlikely that we
should make mistakes (though what about marginal cases?). But certainly someone
might say, ‘It looks heliotrope’, and then have doubts either as to whether ‘heliotrope’
is right for the colour this thing looks, or (taking another look) as to whether this thing
really looks heliotrope. There is certainly nothing in principle final, conclusive,
irrefutable about anyone’s statement that so-and-so looks such-and-such. And even if I
say, ‘…looks…to me now’, I may, on being pressed, or after looking at the thing more
attentively, wish to retract my statement or at least amend it. To rule out other people
and other times is not to rule out uncertainty altogether, or every possibility of being
challenged and perhaps proved wrong. It is perhaps even clearer that the way things
look is, in general, just as much a fact about the world, just as open to public
confirmation or challenge, as the way things are. I am not disclosing a fact about
myself,but aboutpetrol,when Isaythatpetrollookslikewater.(1962, p.42-4)
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Similarly, Stroud says, “One’s acceptance of how things appear to be is also revisable, just
as one’s beliefs about what is so are” (2002, p. 88). Our understanding of appearance or
experience is revisable exactly because it is judgmental. Like any other kinds of judgement,
experienceorappearancecanbefalseandissubjecttorevision.
The waythings appear or look cannot be separated from the way we understand them.
Things look the way we understand them to be. The circular edge of a mug in a certain
distance looks circular to a competent subject, while it may look elliptical to someone who
does not have the relevant understanding. Parallel roads look parallel to a competent subject
whiletheymaylookconvergingtosomeonewhodoesnothavetherelevantunderstanding.
Thus Wittgenstein remarks, when you feel the seriousness of a tune, what you are
65 According to Austin, “our senses are dumb…our senses do not tell us anything, true or false” (1962, p. 11). For Austin,
“looksandappearancesprovideuswithfactsonwhichajudgementmaybebased”(1962,p.43).136
perceiving could not “be conveyed by reproducing what you heard” (1953, p. 210). In like
manner, we can say, how an object looks to you cannot be conveyed by pointing at that
object. If someone asks me what I think about a painting, I cannot give an answer by
pointing at the painting. Appearance may change when our understanding of the situation is
different. Again, Wittgenstein writes: “I meet someone whom I have not seen for years; I
see him clearly, but fail to know him. Suddenly I know him, Isee the old face in the altered
one. Ibelievethat IshoulddoadifferentportraitofhimnowifIcouldpaint”(1953,p.197).
There is no definite way for an object to look. Hence the very distinction between
veridicalandnon-veridicalexperiencecollapses.
5. With the distinction between veridical and non-veridical experience collapsed, the idea of
deceptive experience is now baseless. In fact, it is not even right to say that experience is
deceptive when thesubject is reallydeceived. Experiencecan be deceived but not deceptive.
If there is anything deceptive at all, it must be something other than the experience
concerned. Sometimes the object of experience can deceive. In the Müller-lyer illusion, it is
the Müller-lyer diagram which is deceptive, not the experience of looking at the diagram.
Whatwehavecanonlybeadeceivedexperience,notadeceptiveexperience.
In some cases it is not so easy to tell exactly what deceives us into having a false
experience. The experience of seeing a mirage of oasis as a real oasis, we may say, is
deceived by the optical process unknown to the subject, during which light rays are bent to
produce a displaced image of distant objects and the sky. But it is hard to say what deceives
the subject into having a hallucination. The same goes for the case of after-image. The idea
ofsomethingdeceptiveisnotalways plausible.
Hence, theideaofdeceptive experienceis itselfproblematic. On theonehand, itmight
be true that we sometimes have false experience, that is, see things in the wrong way,
because we are deceived by something else, say, the object of experience or a wrong
mind-set. But itis astrangethingtosaythat wearedeceived byourown experience. Onthe
other hand, the fact that wemake mistakes in our experience does not necessarilymean that
theremustbesomethingdeceptive.TakeAustin’sexampleofaproof-reader’snegligenceof
a mistake, say, the proof-reader fails to notice that what ought to be “causal” is printed as
“casual”. Is the experience deceptive, or is the print deceptive? Neither. It might be just that
the proof-reader is so engrossed with the meaning of the whole sentence and ignores this
mistake. Or as Austin puts it: “he simply misreads” (1962, p. 27). Recall that even when a
wordiscorrectlyprinted, itisstillpossibletomisread.
If one does not experience an object as it is, that simply means that what one has is a
false experience. False experience or misperceiving is not a case of deceptive experience.
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deceptive, just like one’s making a mistaken judgment does not mean one’s judgment is
deceptive. The point is: in having the experience, one already makes the judgment. The
experience is not something leading to a judgement, true or false; it is itself a judgment. We
do not need “the power of human reason” to “devise fully effective protections against the
deceptive capacities of appearance” (McDowell 1995, p. 881). It is simply not part of the
function of appearance that it deceives us. The function of experience is to understand the
world as it is. Experience as belief can only be distinguished as true or false. As the Stoics
makeitclear,“someperceptualimpressions aretrue,somefalse”(Cicero2006,2.79).
Experience is judgmental but not deceptive. This is not because experience is always
true, but becauseit is not thekind ofthingto deceive.Afalseexperienceis onlyfalse, not in
any sense deceptive. Experience is the kind of thing to be deceived. One can be deceived
and have a false experience, but cannot be deceived by one’s own experience. To say one is
deceived by one’s experience is to say one is deceived by oneself. People do talk about
self-deception, but not in this sense. To say one is deceived by one’s own experience is to
sayoneisdeceivedbyone’sownjudgment.
However, there is a difference between the unfamiliar cases which are called illusions
and the case of seeing a coin from a certain point of view which are not usually considered
illusions. Thesubject cannot seethecrooked looking stick as straight even ifshejudges that
the stick is straight. Hence unlike atypical everydaylife case, the experiencedoes not direct
us to the truth of the world. We do not judge the stick as straight in virtue of having its
crooked-looking appearance in our experience. Then how should we account for the
difference?
The difference lies in the fact that the experience of looking at a straight stick half
immersed in water is in a sense disadvantaged. The best way to judge the shape of a stick is
to see it in the air, not to see it when it is half immersed in water. Hence as far as the shape
of the stick is concerned, the experience of seeing a stick in the air is an advantaged
experience, while the experience of looking at the stick when it is half immersed in water is
a disadvantaged experience. There is a third kind of experience, namely everyday life
experience. Seeing a coin from a certain point of view is an experience of this kind. The
subject can judgetheshapeofthecoin byhavingthe experience, but this isnot thebest way
to make the judgement. In this case, the best way to judge the shape of the coin, namely the
advantagedexperience,istheoneonehaswhenfacingthecoindirectly.
We can then distinguish three kinds of experience: advantaged experience, everyday
life experience, and disadvantaged experience. An advantaged experience is the best wayto
experience or judge a certain aspect of its object, while a disadvantaged experience is not in
a position to judge a certain aspect of its object. An everyday life experience is in a position
tojudgeacertainaspectofitsobjectbutnotthebestwaytomakethejudgement.
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First,an experiencemightbedisadvantaged inonesensebutnotin another. As Isaid above,
as far as the shape of the stick is concerned, the experience of looking at the stick when it is
half immersed in water is disadvantaged. But if our concern is to observe the phenomenon
of light refraction, then this same experience is an advantaged experience. Second, an
experience might be disadvantaged for some people but not for others. We can say that the
best way to judge the shape of a coin is to face it directly, not to see it from a different point
of view. Hence for someone who is not familiar with this kind of situation, seeing a coin
from a certain point of view, as far as the shape of the coin is concerned, is a disadvantaged
experience. But for a normal competent subject, this is not anymore a disadvantaged
experience. Back to the example of looking at a straight stick half-immersed in water. For
an ordinary subject, as I said above, as far as the shape of the stick is concerned, the
experience is disadvantaged. Yet a scientist, who is very familiar with the refraction
phenomenon, may be able to see the straight stick half immersed in water as straight. And
for her, the experience is not any more disadvantaged. Hence familiarityplays a crucial role
here. When the situation is familiar to us, a disadvantageous condition may becomes a clue
tothetruth and conductiveto arightjudgement abouttheobject. Hence, Austinremarks: “It
isimportanttorealizeherehowfamiliarity,sotospeak,takestheedgeoffillusion”(1962,p.
26).
To make the difference between the three kinds of experience clearer, Ishall propose a
doublemeaningunderstandingof appearance. Therecan be two meanings ofan appearance.
One is its phenomenal meaning, the other is its engaged meaning. The phenomenal
meaning of an appearance normally requires a special attitude or way of attending, which
we may have to be taught, or to practice, and is difficult to maintain. The engaged meaning
of an appearance is that which we grasp when we engage with the world. When we say the
coin looks circularfrom acertain point ofview, wearetalkingabout theappearancewith an
engaged meaning. When we say the coin looks elliptical from a certain point of view, we
are talking about the appearance with a phenomenal meaning. Similarly, when we say that
parallel roads look converging, we are talking about the appearance with a phenomenal
meaning. When we say, pointing at the two parallel roads, that those roads look parallel
(though they apparently look converging), we are talking about the appearance with an
engagedmeaning.
Appearances with different meanings are actually different appearances. There is no
appearance which is devoid of meaning or independent of our understanding about the
object that appears. We can then distinguish engaged appearance and phenomenal
appearance. An engaged appearance is the way things appears to us when we have engaged
with world forawhileand havelearnt theengaged meaningoftheappearance. Phenomenal
appearance is the way things may look to us before we have had any engagement with the
worldandwhenwehavenotlearnttheengagedmeaningoftheappearance.139
Our perceptual experience is an active engagement with the world. Hence what we
usually have is an engaged appearance. In everyday life, we very often ignore the
phenomenal appearance of an object, or, an object gains its engaged appearance while loses
its phenomenal appearance. In most cases, the phenomenal appearance of an object is not
anymore natural to us. It remains submerged. It takes effort for us to realize that a circular
coin looks elliptical from certain points of view, that a shadow looks coloured darker. The
engaged appearance of an object becomes our second nature and plays a prominent role in
our everyday life. Austin says, “we all know that what looks crooked may not really be
crooked” (1962, p. 88). And we should add, for this reason, what looks crooked may not
evenlookcrooked atall.
The establishment of the engaged appearance of the object is a matter of habituation.
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And there is a point that we theoretically know the engaged meaning of an object, but still
cannot see the object with its engaged meaning straightaway, that is, the engaged
appearance is not yet established. This is the case when a person in the known is facing a
Müller-lyer diagram. She knows the engaged meaning of the diagram, since she is
“familiar” with the diagram. But she is not really habituated to get the engaged appearance
so as to be able to see the diagram with its engaged meaning, for the simple reason that it is
notpartofhereverydaylife.
The best way to experience the comparative length of two lines is to view them when
theyarenot with wings in opposite directions. Henceas far as the comparative length ofthe
two lines is concerned, the experience of looking at the Müller-lyer diagram is a
disadvantaged experience. The Müller-lyer diagram as a purpose-designed diagram is not
part of our everyday life. Hence we don’t get a chance to learn to experience this kind of
diagram. But as I said above, a disadvantaged experience can become an everyday
experience if we get the chance to practice. When looking at the Müller-lyer diagram, if the
subjectconcentrateson thelength ofthetwolines and tries to get ridofthedistractionofthe
wings, she’ll find the two lines look equal. And if she practices a lot, she’ll gain the ability
of seeing the two lines as equal although they may still look unequal when she shifts her
attention. That is, she’ll establish the engaged appearance of the Müller-lyer diagram if she
practices a lot. An experienced builder will see the equal length wooden bars as equal
whethertheyhaveinwardoroutward wings.
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It is to be admitted that there are cases where no practice can transform a
disadvantaged experience into an everyday life experience, that is, it is impossible to
establish the engaged appearance of the object. The same colour illusion may be considered
an example of this kind.
68 The same shade of grey looks darker when surrounded by white
66 ThismayremindusofAristotle’stheoryofmoraldevelopment(2000).
67 IownthisbuilderexampletoAdrianMoore.
68 MythankstoMarkKalderonforalertingmethepossibilitybydrawingmyattentiontothesamecolourillusion.140
colour patches than when surrounded by black colour patches. And it is very unlikely that
this kind of disadvantaged experience can be transformed into an everyday life experience
bypractice. Itseemstobesomethingfirmlyprogrammedinourneuralsystem.
We can then understand the three kinds of experience in terms of the concept of
engaged meaning and engaged appearance. In an advantaged experience, the phenomenal
meaning of the object coincides with its engaged meaning. The object only has one
appearance. That is, its phenomenal appearance is also its engaged appearance. A
disadvantaged experience is an experience when the viewing condition is so disadvantaged
that the subject cannot experience the object as it is. The subject cannot experience the
object with its engaged meaning. But the concept of disadvantaged experience is a dynamic
concept. As I said above, we learn to experience. If the subject engages with the object
sufficiently, a disadvantaged experience may become an everyday life experience in which
thesubjectcanexperiencetheobjectwithitsengagedmeaning.
We can then replace the idea of deceptive experience with the concept of
disadvantaged experience. A disadvantaged experience is not deceptive in the sense Ayer
and McDowellunderstandit;itdoesnotinduceafalsejudgementwhen thesubjectdoesnot
holdthefalsebelief.
6. I have argued that the distinction between veridical and non-veridical experience on
which idea of deceptive experience is based is problematic and suggested that we replace
theideaofdeceptiveornon-veridicalexperiencewiththeideaofdisadvantagedexperience.
The concept of disadvantaged experience first of all stops the disbelief object from
working in a rampant way and hence saves nondoxastists from running into the danger of
committing to the idea that we seldom believe what we experience, which would inevitably
threaten the understanding that we normally believe what we experience, which is shared
by both doxasticists and nondoxasticists. And given the fact that the disbelief objection is
based on an ideaof deceptive experience which implies experience is mostlydeceptive, this
threat is too real to ignore. The distinction between disadvantaged experience and everyday
life experience shows why the disbelief objection, if it has a bite to the case of
disadvantaged experienceatall,cannotbeextendedtothecaseofeverydaylifeexperience.
More importantly, to falsify the idea of deceptive experience is at once to disarm the
disbelief objection. The most powerful part of the disbelief objection is the idea that an
illusive experience can only lead to the belief that not-P when it is the case that P. And for
someone in the know who holds the belief that P, it is impossible that she at once
consciously holds the belief that not-Pwhich is supposed to be the one that may be derived
from the illusive experience. Hence, concludes the objection, there is no belief
corresponding to an illusive experience. Now if we realize that, for people in the know, an141
illusive experience is not deceptive and does not have to lead to the belief that P when it is
the case that not-P, then the possibility that there be a corresponding belief for a familiar
illusion is not excluded. All we need to do is to identify a belief corresponding to a familiar
illusion.
At this point it is important to note the difference between saying experience is
belief-independent and saying it is not belief. To say experience is independent of a certain
belief is not to say it cannot be another belief. In fact, the very reason that it is independent
of one belief is that it is another belief. In the case of familiar illusion, the appearance we
have in experience in no way guides us to the truth of the world, and this experience does
not seem to be relevant to the belief we mayhold. Take the example of Müller-lyer illusion.
The subject does not see the two lines as equal although she firmly believes that the two
lines are equal (through measuring the two lines, say). Hence the experience is independent
of the belief one holds about the comparative length of the lines. But this does not mean the
experience cannot be another belief, if we realize that the Müller-lyer illusion is a
disadvantaged experienceinsteadofadeceptiveexperience.
Hence what we need to do is actually to identify a belief for the disadvantaged
experience.
One thing we should note is that experience is generallybelief even if a small part of it
does not have a corresponding belief. In the Müller-lyer illusion, the subject’s experience
that there are two lines with their wings there is a belief, even if part of her experience
which is about the comparative length of the two lines may not be the content of her
relevant belief. However, what I’m going to show is that even for this small part of the
experience,thereisstillacorrespondingexperience.
I have argued that for an observer who is familiar with the Müller-lyer diagram, the
two lines do not look unequal. Then what do they look? The answer is: it only looks as if
that the two lines are unequal. The “as if” is already in experience, and the corresponding
belief, of course, is that it looks as if the two lines are unequal. In the same vein, a stick half
immerged in water does not really look crooked and the subject does not believe it is
crooked. It only looks as if the stick is crooked and the subject believes it looks as if the
stick is crooked. It is important to note looking crooked is phenomenalogically different
from looking as if it is crooked. The experience of the water and the unusual crooked
looking contribute to the “as if”. In the same colour illusion, for an observer in the know, it
onlylooksasifthatthetwosquares aredifferentcolours. Anobserverintheknowwouldbe
able to pick up the information from the fact that Ais surrounded by white squares while B
issurroundedbyblacksquares andhenceget an“asif”inherexperience.
The crucial point is that the belief is not based on a previous belief; it is based on what
we have in the relevant experience. Jackson observes that there can be disbelief even when
thereisnocontradictingpreviousbelief:142
But suppose I had not known that I was wearing blue glasses, what would I have
believedthenif Ihadnotknown thewallwaswhite?Mustitinthisbetruethat Iwould
have believed that the wall was blue? There is no must about it. I might have noticed
thatmyhandlookedblueandsohavesuspected.(1977,p.41)
DiscussingtheMüller-lyerillusion,hewrites:
Even if Ihad not measured the lines, or otherwise determined that the lines were equal,
I would not have believed that the top line was longer than the bottom; Iwould, rather,
have reserved judgement. This is not because I am familiar with the Muller-Lyer
illusion, but is the result of the fact that it is obvious that the ‘wings’at the end of the
lines are going to have a distorting effect. The first time I was presented with the
illusion, and before Ihad measured thelines, Inoted that the top linelooked longer, but
did not therebybelievethat it was longer. And this is almost universallythe case. (1977,
p.40-41)
This suggests that we do not disbelieve our experience; the disbelief is already in
experience.
This applies to other cases of illusion as well. Take the example of the luggage belt
illusion. Many of us may have the experience of collecting luggage from a luggage belt at
the airport. If you stare at the moving belt for a while, you may feel you are moving but the
belt is not moving, although you firmly believe you are not moving. Then the content of
your experience is that it looks as if you are moving. And the corresponding belief is that it
looks as if you aremoving. Thepoint hereis that a“as if”movingfeels different from a real
moving. In an “as if” moving experience, you feel there must be something wrong: it can’t
betruethat you aremovingwhen youareneithermovingactivelynorinamovingvehicle.
It can be objected that this “as if” belief is belief about appearance; not about the truth
of, or how things stand in, the world. But this is not true. Experience does not have to be
belief about the truth of a physical object. Belief about how an object appears is also belief
about the world and is no less important than belief about the way the object is. Our
understanding of the way things look contributes significantly to our understanding of the
world. Without this kind of belief, no one would be able to understand the point of
Müller-lyer illusion. In the case of the stick half immersed in water, the fact that the stick
looks crooked leads to our understanding of light refraction. It is thus an important fact that
the stick does in a sense look crooked. No one would be able to explain to you the idea of
light refraction if the stick doesn’t look crooked to you. Beliefs about appearance also
justifyotherempiricalbeliefs. Believingthatthetwolines lookasifunequalmayleadtothe143
belief that this would be the same for other observers and tempt one to try this to other
people. Different experiences provide different kinds of belief and play different kinds of
justificatory role. The way things look is a fact about the world which cannot be dismissed
as insignificant. Furthermore, the belief is not just about the appearance, it is also concerned
withthetruthofthephysicalworld.Thisiswhat“asif”isdoinghere.
Having dealt with the case of disadvantaged experience, we shall now go back to the
caseofeverydaylifeexperience. Ihavesaidthatinthis casethecoinlooks ellipticalwithout
really looking elliptical. The subject sees the coin as circular and hence the content of the
experience is exactly the content of the belief the subject held about the coin, namely, the
coin is circular. But still, if we concentrate on the phenomenal appearance of the coin, we’ll
still find the coin looks elliptical. Now the question is: what is that mysterious phenomenal
appearancedoinghere?
It is no longerproperto saythat it looks as ifthecoin is elliptical, becauseunlikein the
case of disadvantaged experience, the elliptical-looking coin does not even looks as if
elliptical, itsimplylookscircular.Then whatis thebeliefcorrespondingtotheelliptical look
of the coin? Thebelief is: the waya coin appears from that point ofviewis to look elliptical
in a certain sense. This belief, among other things, tells us how to draw a coin seen from a
certainpointofview.
7. I shall now conclude the chapter by considering a special case known as the movement
after-effect. This isthephenomenon in which, afterwatchingmovement in onedirection for
a while, a stationary object viewed afterwards seems to be both moving in the opposite
direction and not moving. Take the example of waterfall illusion. When you stare at a
waterfall for a while, and then turn your attention away from the waterfall to a stone, you
will get the experience that the stone is both moving and not moving. It is moving in the
sense that every part of it seems to be moving; it is not moving in the sense that the whole
stone does not seem to be moving. This sounds striking. Fisby thus claims that this “is
logicallyimpossible”(1980,p.101).
This example is used by Crane to argue that experience has a nonconceptual content.
Crane makes it clear that he is concerned with “contents, not attitudes” (Crane, 1988). But
this case seems to be threatening to doxasticism as well. If there are two conflicting beliefs
in experience, how can we identify experience with a single belief? Or, in this case, what
reallyisthebeliefsupposedtobefoundinexperience?
This objection can be very damaging if it really works, since it suggests that the
subject cannot even haveabeliefabout theappearance, namely, abeliefthat it looks that the
stone is moving (or not moving). The problem is that the experience cannot suggest any
kindofbelief,whetherabouttheobjectorabouttheappearance.144
But the waterfall illusion does not generate a real conflict. Even the subject believes
the stone is moving in that particular way, there are no conflicting beliefs or logical
impossibility in the strict sense. If we say the stone appears both moving and not moving,
then we can say the same thing about the waterfall. The waterfall appears and is both
moving and not moving in the sense that the water is moving while the waterfall is not
moving. And this explains what happens to the later experience of the stone: as an
after-image of the experience of staring at the waterfall, every part of the stone appears
moving while the stone is experienced as staying still. Hence we have two beliefs here. The
first is that every part of the stone is moving; the second the stone is not moving. And these
two beliefs do not in fact conflict. The reason is that this is not a logical impossibility. It is
perfectlypossiblethat everypart ofan object is moving whiletheobject itselfis not moving.
We have seen this in the case of waterfall, as I said above, the water is moving while the
waterfall is not moving. There are numerous other examples of this kind in the real world.
Imagine a ball keeps rotating on its axis. Every part of the rotating ball is moving, while the
ball itself is not. So there is no real conflict between the moving of the parts and the staying
still of the whole, and we can certainly have the corresponding two beliefs in one
experience.
There is, nevertheless, a sense that the phenomena may threaten doxasticism. While it
lookstothesubjectthat everypartofthestoneismoving,thesubject doesnot believethisis
really the case. This takes us back to the disbelief objection. The main reason that one does
not believe that every part of the stone is moving is that the way every part of the stone
seems to be moving is very strange. It is different from a real look of moving. Hence the
content of the experience is that it looks as if every part of the stone is moving and this is
exactlywhatthesubjectbelieves.145
8.VoluntaryBeliefandActiveExperience
1. Conceptualism, while insisting experience is conceptual, does not think experience is
itself a belief. And this, as I argued in chapter 4, makes it impossible for experience to
justify other beliefs. The reason is that what is not a belief cannot justify a belief. The way
out, Isuggested, is to seethat experienceis itselfbelief. In thelast two chapters, Iargued for
and defended thethesis that experienceis doxastic. Thepoint is that theattitudeofbelieving
is intrinsic to experience, not something about an experience, or over and above an
experience. Experience is not something to be judged; it is itself a judgment or suspension
ofjudgment.Experienceisessentiallydoxastic;itisnotacontentonemaystandalooffrom.
This would close the gap between experience and belief and explain how experience can
justify our belief about the empirical world. The solution, however, does not seem to be
availabletoMcDowell.
One of the main obstacles for McDowell and many others to accepting that experience
is doxastic is the idea that we should be rationally in control of our beliefs. According to
McDowell, we are responsible for what to believe in the sense that this is “something we
freely do, as opposed to something that merelyhappens in our lives”. Hence forMcDowell,
beliefisin“therealmoffreedom”(1998,p.434).Hewrites:
Of course, a belief is not always, or even typically, a result of our exercising this
freedom to decide what to think. But even a belief is not freely adopted, it is an
actualisation of capacities of a kind, the conceptual, whose paradigmatic mode of
actualisationisintheexerciseoffreedomthatjudgingis.(1998,p.434)146
The idea that we can decide what to believe is called the voluntariness of belief. And given
that experience does not seem to be within our control, it is thus reasonable to think that
experienceisnotbelief.
I agree with McDowell that the voluntariness of belief is not to be denied.
69 But it is
mycontention that thevoluntariness ofbeliefdoes notunderminetheideathat experienceis
belief. In what follows I shall first explain in what sense belief is voluntary and then
establish the valuntariness of belief by arguing that belief is not something merely happens
to us. Belief is not only an achievement of action, but also essentially action involving. We
not only decide how to act to get the belief, but also decide what to believe. I shall then
move on to argue that the voluntariness of belief does not imply that we should favour
reasoningoverexperiencein decidingwhat to believe. Experiential beliefis an achievement
of experiential exploration instead of a decision made by reason. And more importantly, the
voluntariness of belief does not undermine the thesis that experience is belief. The reason is
that experience is itself a voluntary, active exploration of the world, not a passive receiving
ofinformationabouttheworld.
2. To put it crudely, the voluntariness of belief is the idea that we decide what to believe.
One of the main challenges to the voluntariness of belief is based on the connection
between belief and truth. To believe is to believe the truth, and truth is not up to us, hence
we cannot decide what to believe. As Aristotle observes: “it is plain that having thoughts is
not the same as supposing; for the former is up to us, whenever we wish…; but opining is
not up to us—forit is necessaryeitherto hold falselyor to hold truly” (1984, 427b16-21). A
belief is either a true belief or a false belief; and “true and false depend on agreement and
disagreement with the facts, and the facts do not depend on us” (1984, 206.35).
70 Hence,
Williams, for example, argues that “beliefs aim at truth”, so we cannot believe as we wish
(Williams,1973).
Even Descartes, who is well known for his view that belief, assent, or judgement is the
operation of the will, is negative about the role the will may play in forming a belief or
making a judgement and warns us to restrict ourselves to what we perceive clearly.
According to Descartes, belief is assent to perceptions, namely sensory perception and pure
understanding which are not themselves judgements (1985, p. 204).
71 As Descartes
69 Whentalkaboutthevoluntarinessofbelief,philosophersveryoftenaddressthemselvestoreligiousbelieformoralbelief.I
shallneverthelessconfinemyselftofactualbelief,whichisalsowhatMcDowellmeanstotalkaboutwhenhesayswedecide
whattobelieve.
70 Aristotle claims that “to perceive is not up to us—for it is necessary for the object of perception to be there” (1984,
417b25-26). And this is in contrast with having a thought: “to have thought is up to us, whenever we want to” (ibid.
417b24-26;427b16-21).Butthisisnottosaybeliefisuptous.
71 NotethatthewayDescartesusestheterm‘perception’isverydifferentfromthewayweuseittoday.147
understands it, there are limitations on theunderstanding, whilethe will has no limitations. I
can thus not only decide what to act, but also what to assent. And this is why we make
mistaken judgements. We fall into error “only when we make judgements about things
which we have not sufficiently perceived” (1985, p. 204). Thus, for Descartes, error arises
from the relations between the will and the understanding. It is because “the scope of the
will is widerthan that ofthe intellect” that error arises (1996, p. 40). “In this incorrect useof
freewillmaybefoundtheprivationwhichconstitutestheessenceoferror”(1996,p.41).
It follows from this account that the avoidance of error is in myown power. According
to Descartes: “If, however, I simply refrain from making a judgement in cases where I do
not perceive the truth with sufficient clarity and distinctness, then it is clear that I am
behavingcorrectlyand avoidingerror”(1996, p. 41). ForDescartes, the kind of free will we
have is actually the freedom of avoiding error by refraining from “believing things which
arenot completelycertainand thoroughlyexamined”(1996, p. 41). HenceDescartes claims:
“We have free will, enabling us to withhold our assent in doubtful matters and hence avoid
error” (1985, p. 194). We see for Descartes, the action of the will is actually the source of
error. And the freedom of the will is to refrain itself from jumping to a judgement which is
notbasedon“sufficientclarityand distinctness”.
Hence, it seems, with the understanding that beliefs aim at truth and truth is not up to
us, we should deny that belief is voluntary, if the voluntariness of belief is to be understood
as believing as one wishes or to assent to something that is not well-supported by one’s
understandingofthematter.
But what McDowell means by saying that we should decide what to believe is not that
we should believe randomly or freely whatever we want to believe. What he means is a
rational control on what to believe; truth is not something which simplyoccurs to us. Hence
we need to have some control over belief exactly because belief aims at truth. Truth
certainlyisnotuptous,butwecandecidewhatthetruthisbyfindingitout.
When McDowell says belief is up to us, he is not saying we can believe at will. His
idea is that belief is subject to rational control. This is the idea of the freedom of reason. For
McDowell, we need to decide what to believe exactly because this is the right way of
getting at the truth. According to this understanding of freedom, what we are free to do is
not to refrain from believing but to make belief subject to our rational control. In this sense,
McDowell’s freedom is the freedom of deciding what to believe. For McDowell, the realm
of freedom is to be identified with the space of reasons, not the act of the will, and we can
decidewhat to believethrough thepowerofreason. As Owens puts it, forMcDowell, belief
issubjectto “reflectivecontrol”(2000,p.5).McDowellwrites:
This freedom, exemplified in responsible acts of judging, is essentially a matter of
being answerable to criticism in the light of rationally relevant considerations. So the148
realm of freedom, at least the realm of freedom of judging, can be identified with the
spaceofreasons.(1998,p.434)
HenceforMcDowell,therealmoffreedomistheactofreason,nottheactofwill.
The idea that belief is the act of reason can also be found, for example, in Burge and
Korsgaard.AccordingtoBurge,
Beings who have reasons must sometimes be in continuing, uncoopted control of some
events, in the sense that the events are a direct guided product of the reasoner’s central
rational powers. Events guided by reasons issuing from a thinker’s uncoopted central
rational powers (from the thinker qua individual) are acts, as are the guiding events.
(1998, p.251).
The idea that belief is the act of reason is the idea that we decide what to believe
through the power of reason. This is what McDowell calls the freedom of reason. This is
essentially a Spinozan-Kantian notion of freedom. Spinoza says, “I call him free who is led
by reason alone” (1985, p. 584). Spinoza thus criticizes the Cartesian idea of the freedom of
the will in a very radical way. He points out, “The will cannot be called a free cause, but
onlyanecessaryone”:
The will, like the intellect, is only a certain mode of thinking. And so…each volition
can neither exist nor be determined to produce an effect unless it is determined by
another cause, and this cause again by another, and so on, to infinity…And so…it
cannotbecalled afreecause,butonlyanecessaryorcompelledone…(1994,p.105-6)
Spinoza actually denies any kind of freedom. According to Spinoza, “men are deceived in
that they think themselves free”, and this is because “they are conscious of their actions and
ignorant of the causes by which they are determined” (1994, p. 137). Hence, “In the Mind
there is no absolute, or free, will”, “there is no volition, or affirmation and negation, except
that which the idea involves insofar as it is an idea” (ibid., p. 146-7). For Spinoza, “The will
andtheintellect areoneandthesame”(1994,p.147).
For this reason, McDowell claims: “When Kant describes the understanding as a
faculty of spontaneity, that reflects his view of the relation between reason and freedom:
rational necessitation is not just compatible with freedom but constitutive of it. In a slogan,
the space of reasons is the realm of freedom’’(1994, p. 5). Hence the idea of the freedom of
reasonistheideathatreasondecidesornecessitateswhattobelieve.
Truth is not up to us. But we can decide what the truth is by making rational
explorations. To decide what to believe is to decide what the truth is, what the fact is, what149
the world is like. This is what McDowell means by saying that we can decide what to
believe.
There is also another sense that belief is voluntary. We can decide to take the right
actiontoexplorethetruth,although wecannotdecidetobelieverandomlyandfreely. In this
sense, we have duties and obligations about ourbeliefs, and ignoranceor erroris a fault. We
are in a sense responsible for our ignorance or error. For this reason Stuart Hampshire is not
completely right in saying that, while we may well say that someone is responsible for her
own actions, “it may seem exaggerated” to speak of someone as responsible for her beliefs
(1982, p. 155). Hampshire claims that “It would seem logically absurd to prohibit by law
the holding of certain beliefs, if having the beliefs was distinguished from expressing them”
(1982, p. 155). But we should note, in many cases, holding a belief is connected with
consequential actions, and is in that sense connected with responsibility. Medical accidents,
forexample,areveryoftenresultsofmisjudgementsofthesurgeries.
For this reason ignorance can be considered as a fault. Locke states unequivocally
“Assent is no more in our Power than Knowledge” (1975, p. 717). But this does not mean
we are not responsible for our ignorance. “Yet we can hinder both knowledge and Assent,
bystoppingourEnquiry, and not employing our Faculties in the search ofanyTruth” (ibid.).
The duties and obligations are not only in the practical realm, but also in the epistemic
realm.
72 AsCottinghamputsitnicely:
what we want is not just that we should be passivelyled to the truth, but that we should
play an active role in searching for that truth, in scrutinising the candidates for truth, in
devising procedures for eliminating the faulty candidates and establishing why the
sound candidates are reliable. In short, we want a methodology of inquiry that is within
ourcontrolas epistemicagents. (2002,p.352)
Belief is then voluntary in two important senses. First, belief is a result of valuing and
revaluingdifferentevidencewemayhaveaboutthematter. It isrationalandself-examining.
Second, belief is an achievement of action which may involve choice and decision,
although it is not an action of free will. We cannot decide what to believe randomly and
freely, but we can decide what to do to get theright belief. Beliefis an achievement because
wecandecidehowtoactto get attherightbelief.
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3. It can be objected that, as a matter of fact, belief is something merely happens to us.
72 ForthisreasonIagreewithOwensthatLockeadmits“anelementoffreedominthought”(Owens2000,p.89).
73 It isin thissense, I think, Chignell saysthat Kant “isan indirect voluntarist about conviction…becausehethinksthat there
arethingswecanchoosetodothatwill,inthelongrun,havetheeffectofproducingconvictionsinus”(2007,p.37).150
Hume is well-known for holding this view. According to Hume, “beasts are endow’d with
thought and reason as well as men” (2000, p. 118). Adog learns how to please its master; it
believes, on the basis of experience, that running when summoned will bring reward and
avoid punishment. Such “experimental reasoning” is something we have “in common with
beasts” and “is nothing but a species of instinct or mechanical power, that acts in us
unknown to ourselves” (1999, p. 168). According to Hume, “nature, by an absolute and
uncontrollable necessity has determined us to judge as well as to breath or feel” (2000,
p.123). Hume thus rejects the idea that belief is subject to reason. He allows that beliefs are
governed by the sort of biological norms that apply to the process of breathing, or the
workings of the human heart. Hume is right in saying that belief “depends not on the will,
norcanbecommandedatpleasure”(1999,p.124).
Williams also cite this as an argument against the voluntariness of belief, adding that
this is not a contingent fact, given that beliefs aim at truth. We have seen in the last section
that beliefs’ aiming at truth does not undermine their voluntariness. Hence, if belief is
something merely happens to us at all, it can only be a contingent fact. Therefore what we
need to examine now is whether it is true that belief is something which merely happens to
us.
The idea that belief is something which merely happens to us implies that we can
neither decide what thought to have, nor when to have a thought. Nietzsche famously says
“a thought comes when ‘it’ wants, and not when ‘I’ want” (2002, §17). In the same vein,
Galen Strawson claims that “most of our thoughts—our thought-contents—just happen”.
Theyare“notactions”at all(2003,p.228-9).
74 Hewrites:
No actual natural thinking of athought, no actual havingofa particularthought-content,
is ever itself an action. Mental action in thinking is restricted to the fostering of
conditions hospitable to contents’ coming to mind. The coming to mind itself—the
actual occurrence of thoughts, conscious or non-conscious—is not a matter of action.
(2003, p.234)
According to Strawson, “Contents occur, spring up—the process is largely automatic.
Even when our thoughts are most appropriate to our situation and our needs as agents,
action and intention need have little or nothing to do with their occurrence” (2003, p. 229).
For Strawson, belief is not itself an action and, therefore, we cannot decide what to believe.
Strawson thinks “the role of genuine action in thought is at best indirect. It is entirely
prefatory, it is essentially—merely—catalytic” (2003, p. 231). What he has in mind is the
kind of action like “setting one’s mind at the problem” or “to shepherd or dragoon one’s
74 Barnesmakesasimilarpointwhenhesaysthat“sometimesthoughts…forcethemselvesorareforceduponus”(2006,p.
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wondering mind back to the previous thought-content in order for the train of thought to be
restarted orcontinued”(2003,p.231-2).
Strawson seems to ignore the fact that belief is based on reason. Belief, typically, is not
somethingwhichsimplyoccursto us,itissupportedbyvarious evidenceandunderstanding.
For this reason it is essentially rational. This is the first sense of the voluntariness of belief I
mentioned attheendofthelastsection.
Moreover, action may also play a more important role in producing belief. This is
concerned withthesecondsenseofthevoluntarinessofbelief. SupposeIamwalkingonthe
street andseesomeonewholooks likeoneofmyfriends, frombehind. Iam notyet sureshe
is really my friend. So I try to catch up with her. When I get near enough, I see it is my
friend. In this case, my belief that she is my friend is an achievement of my action of trying
to catch up with her. It is essential (if I would not overtake her without trying) to the
formation of my belief; not just prefatory or catalytic. And the same goes for inferential
belief. The procedure of making an inference is no doubt an action. This means not only
thatbeliefisan achievementofaction,itisactuallyactioninvolving.
Strawsonwoulddisagreewiththis.Hewrites:
So too, all the cognitive work that thought involves, all the computation in the largest
and most human sense, all the essential content-work of reasoning and judgement, all
themotionorprogressofjudgementandthought considered(so tosay)inits contentual
essence—the actual confrontations and engagements between contents, the
collaborations and competitions between them, the transitions between them—is not
only not a matter of action but also non-conscious or sub-experiential. It is not itself a
phenomenon of consciousness, however much it is catalysed by conscious primings.
Rather, the content outcomes are delivered into consciousness so as to be available in
their turn for use by the catalytic machinery that is under intentional control. (2003, p.
234)
This is where I disagree. Thinking or reasoning is a conscious activity. It is not usually
the case that one solves a mathematical problem unconsciously. This is the same for the
example I mentioned above. I do not consciously decide to catch up the person and then
unconsciously do the catching up. The action of catching up is mostly a conscious action. I
focusonmyfriendandtrytospeedup.
Strawson remarks: “In many respects thinking is like seeing. Opening one’s eye,
turning one’s head in the direction of X, concentrating on the scene in the attempt to pick
out X—all these things can be a matter of action, but seeing X can’t be” (2003. p. 237). But
what is problematic is exactly this sharp distinction between looking and seeing, reasoning
and judging. We see when we look. Or, we only see because we look. In the same vein, we152
judge when we reason, or, we only judge because we reason. There is no clear-cut
distinctionbetweentheactionandtheachievement.
Isn’t it, though, true that sometimes a thought just occurs to one? This is in fact true.
But this is usuallyregarding somethingofone’s concern. It is seldom thecasethat athought
suddenly occurs to someone who has never heard of anything relevant or has never cared
about it. It is true that when it occurs, the necessary background is simply given, not
controlled. In this sense, the relevant belief just happens. But it does not happen as a matter
ofpurechance.Theelementtablemayoccurto achemistwhohasbeenthinkinghard about
it for a long time. But it is very unlikely that it would suddenly occur to someone spending
thewholeofherlifeon farmwork andhasneverheardofanythingaboutchemistry.
Hence belief should not be understood as something merely happens to us. First, belief
is rational and is based on evidence and understanding. Second, belief is not only the result
or achievement of one’s action, but also essentially action involving. Different kinds of
belief involve different kinds of action. We get experiential belief (that is, experience) by
looking (or listening, touching, etc.), and inferential belief by reasoning. We judge the road
conditionbylookingwhenwearedrivingandjudgehowmuch988+988isbyreasoning.
4. The voluntariness of belief does not entail that, in deciding what to believe, we should
privilegereasoningoverexperience.
The voluntariness of belief, for some, is the freedom of reason that exhibited in its
control over experiential belief. For McDowell, reason is superior to experience and saves
us from the fallibility of experience. Hence the freedom of reason is the freedom of
doubting or disbelieving one’s experience. In the same vein, Martin writes: “For us, there
will always be the possibility that a conflict between how things appear and how one
antecedently believes things to be will result in one’s retaining one’s prior beliefs” (1993, p.
83).
ThisideaisnicelyexpressedbyKorsgaard:
A lower animal’s attention is fixed on the world. Its perceptions are its beliefs and its
desires are its will. It is engaged in conscious activities but is not conscious of them.
That is, they are not the objects of its attention. But we human animals turn our
attention onto our perceptions and desires themselves, onto our own mental activities,
and weareconsciousofthem.Thatiswhywecanthinkaboutthem.
And this sets us a problem no other animals have. It is the problem of the normative.
Forourcapacitytoturn ourattentionontoourown mental activitiesis alsoacapacityto
distance ourselves from them, and to call them into question. I perceive, and I find153
myself with a powerful impulse to believe. But I back up and bring that impulse into
view and then I have a certain distance. Now the impulse doesn’t dominate me and
now I have a problem. Shall I believe? Is this perception really a reason to believe? I
desire and I find myself with a powerful impulse to act. But I back up and bring that
impulse into view and then I have a certain distance. Now the impulse doesn’t
dominateme and now Ihave aproblem. Shall Iact? Is this desirereallyareason to act?
The reflective mind cannot settle for perception and desire, not just as such. It needs a
reason. Otherwise, at least as long as it reflects, it cannot commit itself or go forward.
(1996, p.92-3)
The crucial idea is that the criterion of truth is not in the senses. Hence the stoic
criticism of the Old Academy seems to apply to this idea of the freedom of reason as well.
According to the Stoics, the Old Academy maintained that the “criterion of truth was not in
the senses…although it took its start from the senses: the mind was the judge of things.
They believe that this was the only faculty deserving our trust, because it alone discerned
what was always simple, uniform, and same as itself” (Cicero 2006, 1.30). Knowledge, for
the Old academy, existed only in the conceptions and reasoning of the mind (Cicero 2006,
1.32).
Like the Old Academy, McDowell seeks warrant of knowledge in reason. Particularly,
for McDowell, this is how we can guard against the fallibility of experience. Hence what
McDowell means bythefreedom ofreason is actuallya freedom relativeto experience: one
is free to believe according to one’s reason, without being constrained by one’s experience.
We actively decide what to believe by exercising the freedom of reason while passively
receive whatever we get in experience. Observational belief is decided by reason, not by
experience. This idea of the freedom of reason echoes Locke’s rationalist canon that
“Reason must be our last Judge and Guide in everything”, which is not readily convergent
withhisempiricistconvictions(1975, p.704).
But is it true that we should or do privilege reason over experience in deciding what to
believe?
According to McDowell, “How one’s experience represents things to be is not under
one’s control, but it is up to one whether one accepts the appearance or rejects it” (1994, p.
11). What McDowell has in mind here is the case of familiar illusions: “In the Müller-Lyer
illusion, one’s experience represents the two lines as being unequally long, but someone in
theknowwillrefrainfromjudgingthatthatishowthingsare”(1994,p.11n.).
I argued in chapter 7 that in the Müller-lyer illusion, the two lines do not look unequal
to someone in the know. But we can agree the two lines do not look equal either. Then the
freedom of reason consists in its being able to decide that the two lines are equal, although
they do not look equal. Yet in what sense is this judgement a free choice of reason?154
McDowell’s point is that the subject makes the judgement by using the power of reason.
Thenweneedto ask whatkindofpowerofreasonisexercisedinthis particularcase. To get
a clue, we need to ask what makes someone in the know judge that the two lines are equal
when they do not look equal. First, it is the present experience of the Müller-Lyer diagram
which reminds the subject that there is something “illusive” in it. One’s reason for judging
the two lines as equal is to be found in the present experience, not anywhere else. It is the
experience of this typical kind of diagram which gives one the reason to judge that the two
lines areequal. Second,itisone’s previous experienceofthereal lengthofthetwolines ofa
Müller-Lyer diagram (by looking at the two lines themselves or by measuring the two lines
with a ruler) which gives her the reason for judging that the two lines are equal. Hence all
thework isdonebyexperience, pastorpresent.Thereisnomysteriouspowerofreason init.
WhatarebehindthereasonMcDowelltalksabout arejustprevious experiences.
Moreover, previous experience cannot guarantee the subject gets the right judgement.
Maybe in this case, one line is longer than the other. As Descartes warns us, there is a
danger of going wrong if we misuse our previous experience. And to get the right
judgement, thesubject has todo something, not just think about it. Sheneeds to either cover
the wings and look at the two lines themselves, or, acting more carefully, measure the two
lines. In anycase,itisexperience,notreason,decideswhattobelieve.
It is not safe to rush to the judgement that the two lines are equal without doing any
further exploration. The reason is that what the present experience can tell the subject is
onlythat the two lines might not be the way they look; it does not saywhether the two lines
are equal. And the judgement the subject can make about the two lines is limited by what
the present experience can tell her. To know more about the two lines, she needs to conduct
further explorations and have more experiences. What we believe can only be what we
experience.
The same goes for Martin’s claim about “the possibility of disbelieving one’s senses”.
Martinwrites:
If Austin had been convinced that therejust could beno pigs in his areaof Oxford, then
he might have become convinced that his eyes were deceiving him, and in that case his
experience would not have settled the question for him, but would have just convinced
himthat hewassufferingfrom anillusionorhallucination. Alternatively,hemighthave
had reason to believe himself subject to hallucinations anyway, and so come to distrust
his senses while remaining agnostic about whether there could have been pigs in the
area.(2002,p.390;seealso2006,p.403)
But it would be a strange thing if one doubts one’s experience simply because one is, for
independent reasons, convinced that things should be the other way round. It is not clear155
that there can be any reason for believing or disbelieving there are pigs around which is
stronger than the fact that one sees that there are pigs around. And to judge one’s own
experience as a hallucination, one must has independent reasons for believing that one’s
experience is hallucinatory, say, when one approaches the hallucinated object, the object
recedes.
Peopleseemtobetoo readyto believethat thecontentofexperiencecanberejected by
previousbelief, even whenwhatonehasis atrueexperience.Smithwrites:
Sometimes we just do not ‘believe our eyes’ (or ears, etc.). To cite a by now standard
example, aseasoned travellerinthedesert, whoismistakenlyconvinced thatthereis no
oasis ahead,maydiscounttheactualappearanceofoneasamirage.(2001,p.287)
But what if the traveller approaches the oasis and really sees the oasis is in front of her? As
Smith himself admits: “it is easy to over-estimate the impeding effect that thought can have
onperceptualexperience’sdoxasticforce”(2001,p.291).
We can understand this by examining the case of hasty judgment. We can make both
hasty inferential judgments and hasty experiential judgments. Ahasty inferential judgment
is based on invalid reasoning. Hence one is blamed for hasty inferential judgment because
one reasons invalidly. To get the result of 988+988, one needs to do some kind of
calculation. And once one finishes the calculation, one ends up with the result and a belief
about this. There is no room for free decision. One has to follow the rule. If one is blamed
for a wrong calculation, for making a careless mistake, one’s mistake can only be in not
following the rules correctly. But one cannot be blamed for believing what one gets from
thecalculationastheresultofcalculation.
This is the same for hasty experiential judgment. A hasty experiential judgement is
based on a hasty experience, not on a hasty judgement of experience. In this case, one is
blamed for, say, not looking carefully. To see the point, we only need to reflect on what we
usuallydowhen wewant to correct ahastyexperiential judgement. Do wetryto thinkmore
carefully, or do we look more carefully? The answer is obviously the latter. Hasty
experiential judgement is corrected by more careful observations. So a more careful
experiential judgement is a more careful observation. Reason does not play a role as a free
arbiter. Reason only plays a role in the sense that it makes one become suspicious and try to
domorecarefulobservations.
It can be objected that sometimes we can’t see clearly and have to relyon reason to get
things right. But if we can’t see clearly, reason won’t be of any help, since reason
concerning observational belief can only be based on observation, that is, experience. This
does not mean we have to make a wrong judgement when we cannot see clearly. As
Descartes makes it clear, the limitation of perception (with understanding included) can156
only explains ignorance, but not error. And if we make a judgement beyond what we get
from experience (in the name of reason), then we may go wrong. This is how the will
extendsitspowerbeyondperceptionandcreateserror.
Moreover, ifwefind wecannot seeclearly, westill need to relyon oursenses todecide
what to believe. If we cannot see clearly in a dim light, we may try to improve the light
conditions in orderto seemoreclearly. Ifwecannot tell byhearingifit is acarormotorbike,
we may try to look at it. Even in the case of false experience, what is to be judged and
re-examined is not the looking or appearance. It is the world or the object of experience
which is to be re-examined, not the experience. And to re-examine the object of experience
istohaveanotherexperienceofit,say, bylookingmorecarefully.
Hence Cowley is right when he writes: “Hypothesis and theory remain idle till
someone confirms or fails to confirm a prediction, and this is done almost always by seeing
with his eyes” (1968, p. 5). And one’s only reason for believing something is observation:
“If I ask him how he knows what he describes did happen, his only answer can be ‘I saw
it’”(1968,p.7). In fact,itisonlyforthisreasonthatknowledgebytestimonyispossible.As
Cowley remarks: “It is only because I believe that others actually see (are conscious) too
that Iacceptnumerousexperimentalfindingswhich Ihavenotmyselfmade”(1968,p.11).
It is truethatwesometimesturntoreason when wecannotdecidebysenses. Butthisis
the case only when we are prevented from using our senses properly, and reason, in any
case, can never decide what to believe about empirical world without starting from
observation. It canneverbeused asthetribunalofthesenses. Asfarasobservational beliefs
areconcerned,itisexperience,notreason,decideswhattobelieve.Hence,Austinobserves:
If I find a few buckets of pig-food, that’s a bit more evidence, and the noises and the
smell mayprovide better evidence still. But if the animal then emerges and stands there
plainly in view, there is no longer any question of collecting evidence; its coming into
view doesn’t provide me with more evidence that it’s a pig, I can now just see that it is,
thequestionissettled.(1962,p.113)
We may distinguish two kinds of beliefs, experiential beliefs and inferential beliefs.
The former we get directly from experience, while the latter from inference. In neither case,
can we have a belief by deciding what to believe through reason, which is supposed to be
over and above the experience or inference. Of course reason plays a role in both cases.
Suppose we see two Tony Blairs in a conference room. We may wonder what happens and
try to explore further. Suppose we do some calculations and end up with the result that
someoneis 2cm tall, then wewill becomesuspicious and decideto do the calculation again.
But in neither case can reason, which is supposed to be external to experience or inference,
decidewhattobelieve.157
Experiential belief is an achievement of empirical exploration; it is not decided by the
freedomofreason.
5. I have argued that, in the case of perceptual experience, it is not up to reason to decide
what to believe. There is no room for reason in experiential judgment in that once we have
the experience we cannot help having the relevant belief. We thus need to guard against the
idea that reason, conceived as something over and above experience, can work as the
tribunal forexperience.
As I mentioned above, the idea that reason is the criterion of truth can be found in
traditionalempiricismaswellasin rationalism. Inhisreplytoscepticism,Humeobserves:
These sceptical topics, indeed, are only sufficient to prove, that the senses alone are not
implicitly to be depended on, but that we must correct their evidence by reason, and by
considerations, derived from the nature of the medium, the distance of the object, and
the disposition of the organ, in order to render them, within their sphere, the proper
criteriaoftruthand falsehood.(1999,p.200)
This is closely related to the idea that reason can decide the truth a priori, that is,
independentofexperience.WefindthisideainKant:
A new light flashed upon the mind of the first man (be he Thales or some other) who
demonstrated theproperties oftheisosceles triangle. Thetruemethod, so hefound, was
not to inspect what he discerned either in the figure, or in the bare concept of it, and
from this, as it were, to read off its properties; but to bring out what was necessarily
implied in the concepts that he had himself formed a priori, and had put into the figure
in the constitution by which he presented it to himself. If he is to know anything with a
priori certaintyhe must not ascribe to the figure anything save what necessarily follows
fromwhathehashimselfsetintoitinaccordancewithhisconcept.(1929, Bxi-Bxii)
And this, according to Kant, applies to natural sciences as well. He is impressed with the
fact that before scientists conduct an experiment, they usually “know” the result through
pure reason. Hence pure reason constrains nature “to give answer to questions of reason’s
owndetermining”(1929,Bxiii).
This might be true. Yet the answer is from experience, not from pure reason. Take the
example of Galileo’s well-known experiment. When Galileo dropped the two balls with
different weights from the tower, he anticipated that the two balls would hit the ground
simultaneously. What he needed to do is only to prove that he was right in his reasoning158
about free fall. But what if it turned out that the heavier ball did hit the ground first? Then
whatGalileoneededtodowasmostlikelytore-examinehisreasoning.
The idea that the development of science is not based on experience can also be found
in Popper. When talking about knowledge, Popper always means scientific knowledge. He
makes it clear that he dissents from the belief that “one should study the problems of the
theory of knowledge in connection with our knowledge of an orange rather than our
knowledge of the cosmos”. The reason is that “our Western science…did not start with
collectingobservationsoforanges,butwithboldtheoriesabouttheworld”(1998,p.8).And
scientific knowledge, for Popper, is not derived from observation: “All science is
cosmology, I believe, and for me the interest of philosophy, no less than of science, lies
solely in its bold attempt to add to our knowledge of the world, and to the theory of our
knowledgeoftheworld”(1998,p.7).HenceaccordingtoPopper:
The rationalist tradition, the tradition of critical discussion, represents the only
practicable way of expanding our knowledge—conjectural or hypothetical knowledge,
of course. There is no other way. More especially, there is no way that starts from
observationorexperiment.(1998, p.23-4)
Hethusclaims:“Wedonotknow,weonlyguess”(1998,p.24).
Popper is not saying that observation and experiments make no contribution to
knowledge. It is just that “thesignificanceofobservations and experiments depends entirely
uponthequestionwhetherornottheymaybeused tocriticizetheories”(1998,p.24). Butif
conjectures are rejected by observational evidence, then experience is still the tribunal of
thought, albeit in a negative sense. Hence there are two reasons to insist that scientific
knowledge is based on experience. First, hypotheses have to be based on experience.
Second,totestifyorrejecthypotheses,wehavetorelyon experience.
Thedifferencebetween everydayempirical knowledgeandscientificknowledgeisthat
the object of the former is easier to experience while that of the latter is not. It is easier to
decide how tall the person in front of you is by measuring her height than to decide the size
of the sun by measuring it. It is this difference which makes Popper believes that “truth is
often hard to come by, and that once found it may easily be lost again. Erroneous beliefs
mayhavean astonishingpowerto survive, for thousands of years, in defianceof experience,
with or without the aid of any conspiracy” (2002, p. 10). But we need to note that the
difficulty in finding scientific truth is exactly due to the fact that scientific truth is not so
easy to be discovered by experience. This actually shows that experience is the way of
gettingat empiricalknowledge.159
6. The voluntariness of belief does not undermine the thesis that experience is belief. The
reason is that experience is a rational active exploration of the world and is in this sense
voluntary.
First, experience is an active exploration of the world. Seeing as believing is a kind of
achievement. Onewon’t be ableto seeifonedoesn’tbotherto open one’s eyes. Peoplemay
say one doesn’t need to bother to open one’s eyes. There is no real effort in it. But an
achievement is an achievement, no matter how easy it is for one. Someone might be very
keen on mathematics and just enjoys it and finally becomes a distinguished mathematician.
She never feels there is an effort in it. In fact, she might sometimes need to make an effort
not to work too much on maths. But that doesn’t mean it is not an achievement to become a
mathematician. Thereis akindoftalentinit, butstillyou need to work onitin theright way.
This is what we call achievement. In this sense Aristotle is not completely right in saying
this: “to perceive is not up to us—for it is necessary for the object of perception to be there”
(1984, 417b25-26). While it is necessary for the object of perception to be there, it is also
necessary that one takes the action to look at it. Hence Barnes is correct when he says:
“when an object of perception is in the vicinity, it is still up to me whether I perceive it or
not: I may open or shut my eyes, stop or unblock my ears, stick out or hold my tongue”
(2006, p.25).
Second, experience is rational. It is important to note that in arguing against the
freedom of reason, I am not denying that reason plays a role in empirical knowledge. I do
not mean to suggest that beliefis not rational. Particularly, when Isayobservational beliefis
not decided by reason, I am not saying it is the kind of thing we share with other species of
animals. Hence Hume is wrong in separating “an act of the sensitive” and “the cogitative
partofournatures”(2000,p.123).
We don’t need to deny the rationality of belief in order to bestow experience a role of
tribunal in belief formation. Observational belief is rational, though not decided by reason,
which is over and above experience. The reason is that experience is itself rational. Even
when things go wrong with experience, there is no necessity to turn to reason which is
supposed to be something over and above experience. It is very common among both
philosophers and lay people to regard reason with a kind of reverence while remaining
sceptical about experience. But once werealize conceptual capacities, or reason, are already
in experience, we should have good reasons to regard experience with at least equal
reverence.160
9.Justification withoutInference
1. We have now established that experience is belief. This solves the problem we
encountered in chapter 4. Experience can now meet the doxastic criterion of justification
and thus play a justificatory role in empirical knowledge. Then the question is: does
experienceasbeliefneedtobejustified?
We seem to have good reasons to give an affirmative answer to the question. First,
human belief is typically a rational state. One holds a belief, mostly, if not always, because
one is justified in holding the belief. Hence like any other beliefs, experience needs to be
justified. Second, it is required by the justificatory role we bestow to experience that
experience itself be justified. As I mentioned in chapter 4, the doxastic criterion of
justification, while being essential, is not sufficient. In order for experience to be able to
justify other beliefs, it has to be itself justified. The justifier has to be in a better epistemic
position in order to justify other beliefs. Only a justified belief can justify other beliefs.
Henceforexperiencetobeabletojustifyotherbeliefs,ithastobeitselfjustified.
It is important to note to justify experience is to justify that we should experience the
world in a certain way. To have experience is, among other things, to make judgement. We
may experience the world either in the right way or in the wrong way. Hence we need to be
justified in experiencing the world in a certain way. It is thus important to distinguish
justifyingexperiencefromjustifyingabeliefabout experience.
It is very easy to ignore the difference between justifying experience and justifying a
belief about experience. This is especially the case when experience is understood as
nondoxsticbuthasatruthvalue. Ifexperiencehasatruthvalue,then wemayfeelitneedsto
bejustified as true. And ifexperienceis nondoxastic,then thereis no point ofjustifyingit as161
being a certain way, since experience, on this understanding, is just the way it is, there is no
need to be justified in experiencing the world in a certain way. Hence, for nondoxasticism,
to justifyexperienceas trueis not to justifythat oneshould experiencein this particularway,
buttojustifythatwetaketheexperienceastrue,whichis tosay, to justifythat abeliefabout
the experience is true. For nondoxasticists, “justification of experience” is actually short for
“justificationofbeliefaboutexperience”.
The distinction between justifying experience and justifying belief about experience is
clear onceweunderstand experience as doxastic. Just as we need to bejustified in believing
thatP, weneed tobejustified inexperiencingthat P.To have, say, avisualexperienceisnot
just to have things look to one in a certain way; it is also to judge that this is really the way
things are in the world. Hence when one sees things in a certain way, one needs to be
justified in seeing things in that particular way. Of course, given all the justification, one
may still be wrong in experiencing things in a certain way. We then need to make
judgement about thejudgement wemakein experience, or, hold abeliefabout thebeliefwe
hold in experience. The justification of this further judgement or belief is based on further
evidence of the situation. It will not change the experience and hence cannot justify the
experience; it only changes the way we judge the experience. This is the justification of
beliefabout experience.
If experience needs to be justified, we then face the following challenge: how can
experience be justified if it is supposed to be the starting point of knowledge? This is the
challengeIshalldealwithinthisconcludingchapter.
2. Chisholm’s solution to the above-mentioned challenge is that there is self-evident
knowledgethatdoes notneed justification and experienceis exactlyknowledgeofthiskind.
Chisholm claims, “statements as ‘I am now appeared to in a way which is blue’, when
intended noncomparatively…are statements which cannot express any error or mistake”
(1957, p. 65). First, according to Chisholm, “there are ways of being appeared to—ways of
sensing—that are such that being appeared to in those ways is self-presenting” (1982, p.
10-11). Second, “the presence of a self-presenting property is ‘indubitable’” or evident to
the subject who has them (1982, p. 11). According to Chisholm, “the self-presenting would
seem to be the closest we can come to that which constitutes its own justification” (1982, p.
25). Thirdly, “the self-presenting…may be said to justify that which is not directly evident”
(1982, p. 25). In this way, “theself-presentingconstitutes thebasis orfoundation orgrounds
we have for the other things we know” (1982, p. 26). Fourthly, appearance is one kind of
self-presenting properties which “present themselves to the subject who has them” (1982, p.162
9-10).
75 Hence, the conclusion is, experience is self-evident and can thus be used as
justificationofotherbeliefswithoutitselfbeingjustified
Chisholm takes care to distinguish the expression “being appeared redly to” from the
expressions “beingappearedtobysomethingthatisred”, “beingappearedtointhewayone
is normally appeared to by things that are red”, and “being appeared to in the way in which
one believes that red things normally appear”. According to Chisholm, the expression
“beingappeared redlyto”has akindof“noncomparativesense”in itsuse(1982,p. 16), that
is, not comparative to the truth of the world. The idea is this. What one is appeared to is a
self-presenting property, while what appears is the external object. As Chisholm well
recognizes, “It is the object of perception that appears.” What Chisholm is interested in is
“what one is appeared to” instead of “what appears”. And he thinks what one is appeared to
isakindofself-presentingpropertywhichneedsnojustificationorisself-justified.
The distinction between “what one is appeared to” and “what appears” is very dubious.
As I argued in chapter 6, there is no distinction as such. “What one is appeared to” is just
“what appears”. It is truethat when an object appears in one’s experience, it has to appearin
a certain way. And it is the way an object appears that is called appearance, or, to use
Chisholm’s terminology, “what one is appeared to”. But this is not to say appearance is
somethingthat can beseparated from theobject that appears. Onecannot beappeared to the
wayanobjectappears withoutbeingappearedtotheobject.
More importantly, the distinction made by Chisholm does not really help to explain
how experience can justify knowledge about the world. It is not clear that we can have
knowledgeof“what appears”byhavingknowledge about “what oneis appeared to”, which
is supposed to be different and separable from “what appears”. Chisholm’s reply to the
question is that “perceptionis, essentially, theindirectattribution ofapropertytoathing, the
thing being considered as the thing that is appearing in a certain way” (1982, p. 15). He
writes: “if a person is appeared redlyto, then it is evident to him that there is something that
appearsredtohim—provided heconsidersthequestion whethersomethingis appearingred
to him and provided he has no reason to suppose that it is not the case that something
appearsredtohim”(1982,p.17-8).
Hence for Chisholm, “Being appeared to”, though it allows the possibility that nothing
is there appearing, has an objective significance. He claims, “Being thus appeared to puts
oneincontact,soto speak, with externalreality.And such initialcontact,itwouldseem, can
only be via appearances” (1982, p. 18). Then what Chisholm has here seems to be
self-evident knowledgeofappearancewhich is supposed to bethefoundation ofknowledge
oftheexternalworldbehindtheappearance.
The problem is that Chisholm’s self-presenting experience is not concerned with the
75 Other examples of these Cartesian properties Chisholm lists are feeling and thinking. But unlike Descartes, who includes
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truth of the world. It may be evident that I am appeared to redly by X and yet it is false that
X is red. Hence even if it is justified that I am appeared to redly, it is still not justified that
what appears is really something red. It is exactly this idea Sellars is trying to get at in his
complaint aboutChisholm’sideaof“direct apprehension”:
How is ‘direct apprehension’to be understood? If the apprehending is distinguishable
from the apprehended, is it not also ‘separable’? Mightnot apprehendingoccurwithout
any fact being apprehended? If so, an ‘apprehending that-p’ might not be an
apprehending of the fact that-p…Of course, ‘apprehend’, like ‘see’, is, in its ordinary
sense, an achievement word. But does this not mean that, as in thecaseof‘see’, thereis
a place for ‘ostensiblyapprehending’, i.e., seeming to apprehend, a concept which does
notimplyachievement? (1975,p.128)
For Sellars, a “direct apprehension” of a “fact” cannot be non-inferential knowledge
becauseitisnotknowledgeatall:
Now the distinction between seeing and merely seeming to see implies a criterion. To
rely on the metaphors of ‘apprehending’ or ‘presence of the object’ is to obscure the
need of criteria for distinguishing between ‘knowing’ and ‘seemimg to know’, which
ultimately define what it means to speak of knowledge as a correct or well-founded
thinkingthatsomethingisthecase.(1975,p.128-9)
Hence Sellars concludes, “The notion of a non-conceptual ‘direct apprehension’of a ‘fact’
providesamerelyverbalsolutiontoourproblem”(1975,p.129).
Chisholm’s response is that a justified belief need not to be a true belief (1982, p. 3).
This might be true. But as Chisholm himself well recognizes, to justify one’s belief is to
justify it as true (ibid., p. 4). And when Chisholm says appearances are self-justified, he is
not saying they are justified as true, since they are only considered in a noncomparative
sense.Thenifappearancesarenotjustifiedastrue,thismeanstheyarenotjustifiedat all.
Chisholm’s self-evident theory understands the justification of experience as justifying
that I am here now having this experience. But to justify experience is to justify the truth of
experience, i.e., things are the way as I experience them, and to justify the truth of
experience is to justify the truth about the world. Hence experience cannot be self-justified
in the way Chisholm suggests. The given as Chisholm understands it is not supposed to be
about thetruthoftheworld andhencecannot reallybejustified. Aself-evident experienceis
not about the truth of the world. Experience understood in this way is only self-evident in a
non-comparative sense, and cannot be used to justify other beliefs which have to be
understood in comparative sense. What we need to do is to show that experience can be164
justifiedastrueand canthusjustifyotherbeliefs.
As I noted in §1, to justify experience is to justify that this is the right way to
experience the world, namely, the world is the way we experience it. But for Chisholm,
experience does not need to be justified in this way. Experience as experience is always
right. Understood in this way, not only that experience is not always the way the world is,
but also that experience does not aim to be the way the world is. Hence there is no need to
get experience right, or to make experience a true experience. This is obviously a mistaken
picture of experience. To have experience is not to “be appeared to” passively, it is to figure
out actively what the world in front of one is like. It is an effort to understand the world in
theright way.Andthiseffortneedstobeguidedbyitsjustification.
3. What we need to do is to justify experience in a “comparative” sense, namely, the world
is really as we experience it. This, as Sellars understands it, is to justify experience as
veridical.
The idea can be explained in terms of the distinction between “ostensible seeing” and
“seeing”. Ostensible seeing, according to Sellars, is a class of experiences which has seeing
as its veridical member (1956, §7). Or, as McDowell puts it, “Ostensible seeings are
experiences in which it looks to their subject as if things are a certain way”, while “Seeings
are a singled-out subclass of ostensible seeings” which are veridical (2009, p. 9-10). For
Sellars and McDowell, a subject sees P if it looks to the subject that P and it is really the
case that P, it doesn’t matter if the subject believe is it is really P that is there to be seen.
Sellars writes:
If I make at one time the report “X looks to be green”—which is not only a report, but
the withholding of an endorsement—I may later, when the original reasons for
withholding endorsement have been rebutted, endorse the original claim by saying “I
saw that it was green, though at the time I was only sure that it looked green”. (1956,
§16)
Similarly, McDowellclaims:
Seeing that P is not the same as acquiring the belief that P in a visual way, though no
doubt usually people who see that P do acquire the belief that P, and no doubt if that
were not so it would not be possible for there to be such a thing as seeing that P. The
difference between seeing that P and visually acquiring the belief that P can be brought
out by noting that one can realize later that one was seeing that P, though one did not
knowitatthetimeandsodidnotatthetimeacquirethebeliefthatP.(2003,p.680)165
McDowelldoesnotseemtothinkostensibleseeingneedstobejustifiedasseeing.As I
mentioned in chapter 4, for McDowell, “unless there are grounds for suspicion”, we take
ostensible seeing as seeing “by a sort of default” (1998, p. 439). But this may also suggest a
way of justifying: if we have no reason not to take an ostensible seeing as seeing, then we
are justified to taketheostensibleseeing as seeing. In contrast, if wedo have a reason not to
take an ostensible seeing as seeing, then we are justified not to take the ostensible seeing as
seeing. In either case, this seems to suggestion a justification by inference. The reasoning
goes as follows. (1) I ostensibly see that P; (2) There is no ground for suspicion; (3) I
actuallyseethatP.
If we agree that the truth ofexperience is justified in this way, then we seem to have to
agree that experience is justified inferentially. But if we bear in mind the distinction
between the justification of experience and the justification of belief about experience, we
will realize that what McDowell is talking about is actually the justification of belief about
experience,notthejustificationofexperience.
LikeMcDowell, what Sellars is actuallydoingis alsoto justifybeliefabout experience.
Again, as mentioned in chapter 4, for Sellars, in order to endorse the content of experience,
we need to justify that the relevant experience is veridical. This may give the impression
that he is interested in justifying experience. But what Sellars is interested in is justifying a
judgement about experience. The justification will not change the way one experiences the
world, it only changes one’s judgement about one’s experience. Sellars’s real concern is to
justify the basic belief which is an endorsement of the content of experience. And to justify
basicbelief, wehavetojustifythattherelevantexperienceisveridical.
For Sellars, to justify experience as veridical is to make an inference from the belief
that the experiential conditions are normal. Hence, in experience, the subject does not infer,
say, that there is a red apple in front of him. On the contrary, “he is inferring from the
character and context of his experience that it is veridical and that there is good reason to
believe that there is indeed a red apple in front of him” (1975, p. 130). The idea is that,
while experience is not inferential, basic belief which, for Sellars, is an endorsement of the
content of experience, is based on the understanding of the character and context of the
experience and has to be inferential. Thus, according to Sellars, the justification of an
observational belief is in fact an inferential justification. And the reason that such beliefs
give the appearance that they are self-justifying is that their justification “has the peculiar
character that its essential premise asserts the occurrence of the very same belief in a
specific context” (1975, p. 130). As Sellars understands it, the subject infers from the
character and context of his experience that the experience is veridical and can thus judge
that an ostensible seeing is indeed a seeing. Basic beliefs are thus not non-inferential. There
isneitherself-evidentknowledge,nornon-inferentialjustification.166
Sellars is right in saying that the basic belief which, for him, is a judgement about the
judgement in experience, is inferential. This is true even if we consider experience as
doxastic. From a doxasticist point of view, the inference, for example, goes like this. (1) I
believed (saw) the tie is blue; (2) The lighting condition was normal; so (3) The tie was
indeed blue and mybeliefwas correct. Or, alternatively, (1a) Ibelieved (saw) the tie is blue;
(2)Thelightingconditionwasnotright;so (3)Thetiewas actuallygreen andmybeliefwas
wrong. But it does not follow that there is no non-inferential justification or non-inferential
knowledge. Particularly, it does not follow that the justification of experience has to be
inferential. To see this we need to shift our focus from the justification of belief about
experiencetothejustificationofexperienceitself.
4. What is it to justify experience? To justify experience is to justify that the subject
experiences the world as it is: that the world is the way the subject experiences it. In other
words,tojustifyexperienceistojustifythejudgementonemakesinone’sexperience.
Therearethentwo aspectsofexperiencethatneedto bejustified. First,oneneedstobe
justified in experiencing the world under certain descriptions. This is not so difficult if we
understand experience as conceptual, namely, experience is an exercise of the conceptual
capacities wemaypossess. If experienceis conceptual, then wearejustified in experiencing
the world under certain descriptions by the conceptual capacities exercised in experience. It
is thus McDowell’s suggestion that the reliability of my being able to “tell a green thing
when I see one (in the right conditions of illumination)” needs no evidence or justification.
“It is held firm for me by my whole conception of the world with myself in touch with it,
and notastheconclusionofaninferencefromsomeofthatconception”(2002,p.101).
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Experience cannot be what it is without interpretation; it is itself an interpretation. This
is the idea we find, for example, in Wittgenstein. According to Wittgenstein, the mind set is
already in experience. This is why we may see the same thing in different ways. As
Wittgensteinputsit,we“seeanobjectaccordingtoaninterpretation”(1953,p.200).
This is even true for what Wittgentein calls “picture objects”. When we see an
illustration, “weinterpret it, and seeit as weinterpret it”(1953, p. 193). This can bedoneby
following certain directions. But mostly, it is so natural that we see a picture or a real object
as something that we don’t realize that we see it as something, we feel that we just see this
something. Wittgenstein remarks: “I should not have answered the question ‘What do you
see here?’ by saying: ‘Now I am seeing it as a picture-rabbit’. I should simply have
described my perception: just as if I had said ‘I see a red circle over there’” (1953, p.
194-195).
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Thus, seeing a picture object is just like seeing a real object. The interpretation is
already in the seeing, not something we use to describe the seeing. Hence Wittgenstein
continues: “It would have made as little sense for me to say ‘Now I am seeing it as…’as to
say at the sight of a knife and folk ‘Now I am seeing this as a knife and fork’. This
expression would not beunderstood”(1953, p. 195). And seeing areal object is so naturally
interpretation involving that it seems to happen automatically. As Wittgenstein puts it: “One
doesn’t ‘take’ what one knows as the cutlery at a meal for cutlery; any more than one
ordinarilytriestomoveone’smouthasoneeats,oraimsatmovingit”(1953,p.195).
This conceptualist solution explains why we are justified in experiencing the world in
a certain way. I am justified in seeing a lamp as a lamp simply because I exercise my
conceptual capacities in experience. My conceptual capacities inform the way I experience
the world. But what I experience cannot be inferred from my conceptual capacities; I
experience what I experience, namely, the world. Hence the way I experience the world is
informed but not decided by my conceptual capacities. This aspect of myexperience is thus
justifiedwithoutinference.
However, this is not all we need to do in order to justify experience. There is another
aspect of experience that needs to be justified, namely, the truth of experience: what needs
tobejustifiedis notonlythat experiencehascertain content butalsothattheworldis indeed
the way we experience it. To justify experience is not just to justify that I am here and now
having a certain kind of experience, it is also to justify the judgement we make in
experience. ItisthejustificationofthissecondaspectofexperienceIshallnowfocuson.
5. To have experience is, among other things, to make judgement about the world. Then
what affects the judgement one makes in one’s experience? Or, what changes the way one
experiencestheworld?
It can be suggested that it is the experiential conditions which influence the judgement
one makes in one’s experience. This is well recognized by the Stoics. For the Stoics, there
arejudgements in thesenses and “Theirjudgments areso clearand certain”. TheStoics also
agree that optimum conditions warrant the judgment we make in experience. Hence, we
“alter many conditions until our vision itself provides the warrant for its own judgment”
(Cicero 2006, 2.19). It is nevertheless important to note that, fortheStoics, “our vision itself
provides the warrant for its own judgment”. This means that it is experience, not the
experiential conditions, which justifies experience. What we need to do is to alter
experiential conditions to the optimum so that experience justifies itself. The idea is that the
truthofexperienceiswarranted whentheexperientialconditionsareoptimum.
Apart from the external experiential conditions, we may also add that the internal
experiential conditions are at least no less important. The subject has to function well in168
order to experience the world in the right way. It is a basic condition that the person should
notbeinsaneordrunk. That’spartofthereason thatpeoplewho haveconsumedalcoholare
notallowedtodrive.
Hence, we may say, one important way of justifying one’s experience is to make sure
that the experiential conditions are optimum. Or, as we might put it, we arrangeexperiential
conditions in such awaythat experienceis in aposition to justifyitself. If this is all we need
for justifying the truth of experience, then we can say experience is justified without
inference,orthatexperienceisself-justified.
But we need to see that experiential conditions are not the only thing that matters for
the truth of experience. First, the truth of experience does not always go together with
optimum experiential conditions. We may have true visual experience in the dark while
having false visual experience in broad daylight. Even when both the external and internal
experiential conditions are satisfied, it is still not guaranteed that the relevant experience is
true. In fact it is not always easy to decide what normal conditions are supposed to be or
how normal is normal. Second, we are sometimes amazingly good at adjusting to adversary
experiential conditions. If someone wears a pair of glasses which makes the objects look
upside down, then in a while the subject will adjust to this and see the object as in the right
direction. In any case, abnormal experiential conditions do not always prevent the subject
from having a true experience. A hallucinating subject, with the understanding that she is
hallucinating, may experience her hallucination as hallucination and hence have a true
experience.
Whatisimportanthereis thusone’sunderstandingofone’s experiential conditions,not
just the experiential conditions themselves. It is one’s understanding of one’s experiential
conditionswhichjustifiesone’s experience.
If the truth of experience is justified by one’s understanding of one’s experiential
conditions, then we don’t need to go very far to find the justification. One’s understanding
of one’s experiential conditions is part of one’s experience in that one experiences the world
in the light of one’s understanding of one’s experiential conditions. This is true whether
one’s understanding of the viewing conditions is correct. Hence, again, experience is
justifiedwithoutinference.
In most cases the clue of the experiential conditions is already part of what one
experiences, that is, the character and context of the experience are part of the object of the
experience. When one has an experience, one is aware of the character and context of one’s
experience as well. Hence one obtains one’s understanding of one’s experiential conditions
when one has the experience. Take Sellars’ example of looking at a tie in a green-lighted
room. The tie looks greenish in the room. Sellars’s idea is that Jones becomes doubtful
about this only when he is told that the room is green-lighted and this makes everything
looks greenish. But the clue is part of the object of the experience and the subject should be169
able to aware of this even if he is not told about the light condition in the room. In this case,
the justification of one’s experience is part of one’s experience, or, is exactly the experience
itself. To see the point, we need to realize that experience is experience of the whole thing,
including not only the particular object we are interested in but also everything else
surrounding it. For this reason, one can get the clue about the viewing conditions of the
experience when one has the experience and can thus see things in the light of one’s
understandingoftheviewingconditions.
It is to be admitted that sometimes the clue of the viewing conditions is not so easy to
be found in the object of experience. Suppose in the above-mentioned example the false
light is partial, not global, that is, the false light is only on the tie, not anything else in the
room. Then one either gets to know about the lighting conditions from other resources, or
knows nothing about the false light. In either case one’s experience is still justified by one’s
understanding of the viewing conditions in that one still sees things in the light of one’s
understanding of the viewing conditions. First, one experiences the world in the light of
one’s understanding of the experiential conditions whether one obtains the understanding
from the current experience or somewhere else. Second, to say one’s experience is justified
by one’s understanding of one’s experiential conditions is not to say one’s understanding
has to be correct. One’s understanding of one’s experiential conditions may be falsified by
later discovery, but that is not to say there was no understanding of the experiential
conditions when one is having the experience. Amistaken understanding of the situation is
stillanunderstandingandcanjustifythebeliefoneholdsinone’s experience.
In either of the cases mentioned above, one’s experience is justified by one’s
understanding of the viewing conditions. The justification is a justification without
inference, since the experiential belief in not inferred from the understanding of the viewing
conditions.
This is the same for one’s understanding of one’s internal experiential conditions. One
experiencetheworld in thelight ofone’s understanding ofone’s own situationaswell. Here
again, there is no requirement that one’s understanding of one’s situation be correct.
Although, as it has been well recognized, one’s understanding of one’s own condition is
normally correct. Anormal subject is normally able to distinguish herself from an abnormal
subject. As the Stoics point out correctly, “If things are such that it makes no difference
whether one’s impressions are those of an insane or sane person, who can be sure of his
own sanity? Trying to achieve this result is itself a sign of no slight insanity!” (Cicero 2006,
2.54). The point is that while it is true that an insane person cannot tell that she is insane, a
sane person is able to tell that she is sane. Hence, we should not use “the examples of
dreamers, madman, and drunkards” when “looking for the criterion of someone serious,
constant,strong-minded, andwise”(Cicero2006,2.53).
Even Descartes finds it hard to deny this. Talking about one’s “inability to distinguish170
betweenbeingasleepandbeingawake”, Descartes remarks:
For I now notice that there is a vast difference between the two, in that dreams are
never linked by memory with all the other actions of life as waking experiences
are...when I distinctly see where things come from and where and when they come to
me, and when I can connect my perceptions of them with the whole of the rest of my
life without a break, then I am quite certain that when I encounter these things I am not
asleep but awake. And I ought not to have even the slightest doubt of their reality if,
after calling upon all the senses as well as my memory and my intellect in order to
checkthem, Ireceivenoconflictingreportsfromanyofthesesources.(1996,p.61-2)
It is important to note that normal subjects include those having physical diseases that
may affect their experiential ability. Apatient with high blood pressure may feel dizzy and
see things turning around in front of her. She nevertheless won’t experience things in front
of her as turning around, but will rather experience herself as having some medical
problems.
In anycase, even when one’s understandingofone’sown situationisnot correct,itstill
justifies one’s experience in that one experiences the world in the light of it. And again, this
isajustificationwithoutinference.
Thus as far as the understanding of the external and internal experiential conditions are
concerned,thejustificationofexperienceisnotinferential.
6. The understanding of the experiential conditions should not be understood in the narrow
sense. It is not just concerned with things like lighting conditions; so many aspects of
experiencearerelevanthere.
What justifies onein seeing a coin from aparticularpoint ofview as circularinstead of
elliptical?Whatjustifiesoneinseeingashadowasashadowinsteadofadark-colouredarea?
What justifies one in seeing a mirror image as a mirror image instead of another “I”? What
justifies one in seeing the parallel roads from far away as parallel instead of converging?
What justifies one in seeing a stick half-immersed in water as seemingly bent instead of
bent?
All these have to do with one’s understanding of one’s experiential conditions. One is
justifiedinseeingacoinfromaparticularpointofviewascircularbytheunderstandingthat
oneislookingatthecoinfrom aparticularpointofview.Oneisjustified inseeing ashadow
as a shadow instead of a dark-coloured area by the understanding that sunlight is prevented
from shining on this area by a tall building. One is justified in seeing a mirror image as a
mirror image by the understanding that what one sees is “in” the mirror. One is justified in171
seeing the parallel roads as parallel instead of converging by the understanding that one is
looking at the roads from far away. One is justified in seeing a stick half-immersed in water
asstraightinsteadofcrookedbytheunderstandingthatthestickishalfimmersedinwater.
Strictly speaking, in all the above-mentioned examples, it is not the understanding of
the viewing conditions but the understanding of the meaning of the viewing conditions that
influences the way one experiences the world. One sees an elliptical looking coin from a
certainpointofviewas circularbecauseoneunderstandsthat’sthewaya circularcoinlooks
from that particular point of view. This is what I call the engaged meaning of appearance.
An object gains its engaged appearance while the appearance gains its engaged meaning.
The experience is thus an engaged appearance, namely, an appearance with an engaged
meaning. In this way the understanding of the situation informs the way we experience the
world.
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Generally speaking, the way we experience the world is justified by our background
understanding of the whole situation. This means background understanding plays a crucial
role in experience. The more experienced the subject is, a better position she is in to justify
herbelief.Platothusobservesthatsomeoneiswiserthan othersinparticularaspects:
…thereis noonein theworld who doesn’t believethat in somematters heis wiserthan
other men, while in other matters, they are wiser than he. In emergencies – if at no
other time – you see this belief. When they are in distress, on the battlefield, or in
sickness or in a storm at sea, all men turn to their leaders in each sphere as to God, and
look to them for salvation because they are superior in precisely this one
thing—knowledge. And wherever human life and work goes on, you find everywhere
men seeking teachers and masters, for themselves and for other living creatures and for
the direction of all human works. You find also men who believe that they are able to
teach andtotakethelead.(1997a,170a-b)
Experience is permeated by one’s background understanding. The more experienced the
subjectis,themorejudicioussheisinexperiencingtheworld.
Background understanding covers awiderangeofaspects of experience. Forexample,
one’s understanding of the context of a conversation influences the way one understands
one’s interlocutor. Suppose you give someone a suggestion and she says: “This is gold”.
With your understanding of the context of the conversation and your understanding that
people may speak different accents and dialects, or even just accidentally make strange
pronunciations, you are well justified in hearing her as saying “This is good”, although
realizing her pronunciation is strange. Your understanding of the context justifies your
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hearing her in this way, which is the correct way, that is, this is indeed what she intends to
say. Youaregivingsomeonesuggestionsanditisreasonablethatshesays “Thisis good”.In
contrast, if you are asking someone what her ring is made of and she says “This is gold”,
then you wouldhavenoreasontobelievesheissaying“thisis good”.
It is to be admitted, however, that experience can be true in different senses, and they
are justified in different ways. In the above example, if the question is what the person
intends to say, then the true experience is that she intends to say “this is good”. If the
question is howthepersonpronounced theword “good”, then thetrueexperienceis thatshe
pronounced it as “gold”. Suppose someone experiences the person as saying “this is cold”.
Thensheismistakeninbothsenses.
Here, again, we need to make a distinction between the justification of experience and
the justification of belief about experience. Suppose after saying “this is good”, the person
continues to elaborate how much she would benefit from following your suggestions or
express her gratitude to your suggestions, then you are justified in believing your former
experience of hearing her as saying “This is good” is true. This is the justification of belief
about experience, not the justification of experience. And in this case, as Sellars rightly
observed,thejustificationisinferential.
Similarly, your experience of seeing a motionless duck as a duck may be justified by
the background understanding that there is a pond around and you see some duck feathers
nearby. This justification is not inferential because you see the motionless duck as a duck in
the light of the background understanding you have. In contrast, your belief that the
experience is a true belief can be justified by your later experience of seeing the duck
quacks and runs awaywhen you approach it. This justification is inferential in that you infer
from your later experience that the early experience must be true. Your later experience of
seeing the duck quacking and running away justifies your belief about your earlier
experience of seeing it as a duck, not a decoy duck. But this is not to say later experience
justifies earlier experience. Experience is an event. Later experience does not justify earlier
experiencebecauseearlierexperiencedoesnotexistanymorewhenthesubjectishavingthe
later experience; and when the subject is having her earlier experience, her later experience
isnot yetavailablefordoingthejustification.
Background understanding influences the way we experience. This, nevertheless, does
not mean experience needs to be justified by inference. Justification of experience is
justification without inference. First, although background understanding influences the
wayweexperience, it does not decide what we experience. To sayexperienceis justified by
one’s background understanding is not to say that one can infer the content of one’s
experience from the background understanding. After all, one has to have the experience,
and it is what one experiences decides what one believes. Background understanding
influences or informs the way one experiences, but what one has in experience is what one173
experiences, not something inferred from one’s background understanding. Second, one
experiences the world in the light of one’s background understanding. Experience in this
senseis actuallyself-justified. This is nottosayexperienceis self-presentingorself-evident.
To see that experience is self-justified we need to see interpretation, rationality or critical
abilityisalreadyfunctioninginexperience.
For an inferential justification, the belief justified is entailed by the premises of the
inference. There is nothing else you need to do except for accepting the conclusion drawn
from the premises. For a non-inferential justification like the justification of experience, the
resulting belief, namely, experience, is not something that can be derived from the
background understanding that justifies the experience. The reason that experience is not
derived from the background understanding is that the background understanding is not
separated from experience, it is part of what experience is. We see things in the light of our
understandingofthesituation.
Wittgenstein says there are many ways of seeing a triangle. And the reason that we see
a picture in a certain way is that we are brought up in a certain way. As he puts it, “custom
and upbringing have a hand in this” (1953, §201).
78 Hence experience is a learned ability.
“It is only if someone can do, has learnt, is master of, such-and-such, that it makes sense to
sayhehashadthisexperience”(1953,§209).Similarly, Mearleau-Pontyobserves:
The light of a candle changes its appearance for a child when, after a burn, it stops
attracting the child’s hand and becomes literally repulsive. Vision is already inhabited by
a meaning (sens) which gives it a function in the spectacle of the world and in our
existence. (2002,p.60)
7. Experience is justified without inference. In this way experience remains the foundation
of empirical knowledge while being justified as true. We can agree with Sellars that
non-inferential knowledge, like inferential knowledge, presupposes knowledge of other
facts. And the foundation of our empirical knowledge are not
“self-authenticating…unmoved movers” (1956, §38). But we need to note that all the
presupposed knowledge of other facts is already in experience in that we experience the
world in the light of this background understanding. And it is exactly for this reason that
experience can be itself empirical knowledge and provide sound foundation for inferential
knowledge. Otherwise we will not be able to understand the “difference between inferring
thatsomethingisthecaseand,forexample,seeingittobethecase”(1956,§1).
We cannot even say that there is a coherentist story within the domain of experience.
78 McDowell may in a sense agree with this—when he says that experience is conceptual in the sense that we see things as
suchandsuch.Butstill,hethinksthatthisconceptualexperienceisagainapicturetobejudged.174
We don’t balance the results of different experiences and decide what to believe in order to
achievecoherence.Weoptimisethewayweexperienceandtrustthatoneonly.
It is thus important to note that some experiences are in a better position than others to
decide what we should eventually believe. Take the example of Müller-Lyer diagram. In
judging the comparative length of the two lines in the diagram, the experience we have
when looking at the diagram is less reliable than the experience we have when looking at
the two lines by covering the wings, while the latter, again, is less reliable than the
experience we have when measuring the two lines. This last experience is more basic
because when you doubt the result you get by measuring, the only thing you can do is to
measure it again. This is not to say you cannot contradict the result just by looking at it. If
the result you get by measuring a 2cm line is 10cm, you can certainly know there is
something wrong before re-measuring it. But to get the right result, you still need to
measure it again. And more importantly, you don’t have to appeal to other experience in
order to get the right result. The experience is the best or most reliable way (not necessarily
the most convenient way) of getting the right result. That is, the best way of justifying one’s
beliefabouttheexperienceistorepeattheexperience.
Experience is sufficiently justified when one experience the world in the light of
correct background understanding. Correct background understanding is what we call
background knowledge. True experience which is supported and hence justified by
background knowledge is sufficientlyjustified true belief, namelyknowledge. This gives us
Gnosticism, namely the idea that experience, in so far as it is the source of knowledge, is
itself knowledge. Not only that experience can be sufficiently justified, but also that it can
bejustified non-inferentially. This gives us foundationalism. Experienceis thefoundation of
knowledge in that it is the part of our knowledge system which supports the other parts of
thesystem anddoesnotneedtobesupportedbythelatterinthesameway.
Experience is the foundation of knowledge not in the sense that we see the world with
naked eyes. Experience as a whole is an active, rational exploration of the world, not a
passive receiving of pieces of information. Experience is a dynamic process; not a static
picture. It is exactly for this reason that experience is the rational foundation of empirical
knowledge. Experience is the foundation of knowledge not because it is infallible or
incorrigible, but because it is rational. There is no incorrigible error in experience. We do
make mistakes in experience, but we can also correct the mistakes in experience and by
experience.
People may think this is a weak version of foundationalism in that the foundation is
not a purely independent foundation. But I would say this is a strong version of
foundationalism. The foundation is solid exactly because it is dynamic. While Descartes
understands knowledge as an edifice built upon a secure foundation, I think our knowledge
system is more like a plant than a building. Experience is more like the root of the plant. It175
provides the whole plant with nutrition. But the root of the plant is also part of the plant and
nourished by the other part of the plant in an important sense. If we cut the trunk and
removetheleaves ofthetree, thetreewill bedamaged and theroot maynot survive either.
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In this sense, the root is also dependent on the other part of the plant. But still, it is the root.
The root is not dependent on the other parts of the plant in the same way the other parts of
theplantisdependentonit.
Experience gives knowledge. The fact that we may make mistakes in experience does
not make us distrust experience but only makes us try to improve our experiential ability.
Sometimes experience does not provide a satisfactory answer, but it will if we try harder.
Sometimes we try our best to see clearly, but still we cannot. This is not a case where
experience fails us; it is that we fail to get the right experience. Or, the experience fails us
only in the sense that it is not the right experience we need in order to know what we want
to know. Thereis something wedon’t seem to beableto knowthrough experience, but may
bepossibleinthefuture.
If there is something we can never know through experience, then all we have is
merely speculation. We have to admit there is an unbridgeable distance between us and the
truth in this case. Experience is, in any case, the only thing we can rely on in obtaining
knowledge of the empirical world. If we cannot get the right experience, then we cannot
achieve knowledge. But there is nothing wrong with it; we are not supposed to have
knowledge of everything. The point is, if we obtain experience, we obtain knowledge.
Experienceis, intheend, allwehave. So,ifwehaveknowledgeat all,itwillnot and cannot
transcend experience.Thelimitofexperienceisthelimitofknowledge.
79 ThisisclosertoReid.Reidremarks,“Inthistreeofknowledge,perceptionistheroot,commonunderstandingisthetrunk,
andthesciencesarethebranches”(Reid1997,p.174).176
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